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Most political parties that emerged in Europe since 1945 have roots in social
movements, but unlike older mainstream parties with movement origins they
did not adopt an electoral-professional party model focused on pursuing the
median voter. Neither have they retained their organizational connections to
movements, thus foregoing both the advantages of a “catch-all” platform and
access to the mobilizing capacity of movement organizations. Why? I employ a
multi-method design combining the analysis of voters and movement party suc-
cess with original data from fieldwork in Sweden and Germany on four move-
ments and the Green and Pirate parties they spawned. I find that movements
are incentivized to be organizationally distinct from parties in order to maxi-
mize their public support and influence on government policy. Parties cannot,
however, break with their movement origins programmatically, because they
exist in saturated party systems and rely on issue voters who are disappointed
with the dominant mainstream party models. In that environment social move-
ment organizations are empowered vis-a`-vis the parties they spawned and able
to influence parties’ platforms through four distinct mechanisms. In that way
social movements, together with the parties they spawn, counterbalance the
trend towards catch-all and cartel parties and thereby (re-)integrate disaffected
citizens into the democratic process.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On October 3rd, 2014 Stefan Lo¨fven, Sweden’s then newly elected prime
minister, presented his cabinet (Gro¨nberg 2014), which included not only mem-
bers of his own Social Democratic Party, but for the first time in the country’s
history also ministers from the Green Party. Even though both parties have
deep roots in social movements their paths to sharing power in this coalition
government have been quite different.
For Sweden’s Social Democrats governing is almost the default position,
since they have received the largest share of the vote in every election since
1917 (Arter 1999, p. 71). When the Swedish labor movement gave rise to the
party in 1889 it “was a loose umbrella organization for trade unions, political
organizations, and health and burial funds” (Molin 1992, p. xviii). The Social
Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP) sent its first
member to parliament in 1896 (Haberman 1972), and focused mainly on gaining
universal suffrage and an eight-hour workday (Molin 1992, p. xviii). Once uni-
versal suffrage was achieved the party adopted increasingly broader appeals af-
ter 1929, when the SAP “gathered its forces around a program aimed at practical
reforms within the framework of a capitalist society” and committed to “policies
not only aimed at the workers, but designed to include the entire population”
(Molin 1992, p. xxii). After having loosened its programmatic link to the labor
movement from which it originated, the Social Democratic Party soared to new
electoral heights, gaining 45.9% of the vote in 1936 (Hamilton 1989, p. 174). Later
the SAP also began to reduce its organizational connections to the unions. The
system of collective membership between the Social Democrats and Sweden’s
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main union organization, Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), was abolished in
1987, leading to a sharp drop in party membership (Aylott 2001, Gidlund 1992).
In spite of decreasing electoral results, the Social Democrats continued to be the
dominant party in Swedish politics for the remainder of the 20th century.
The SAP’s evolution from a loose coalition rooted in a movement to a mod-
ern party with broad electoral appeals stands in stark contrast to their current
partners in government, the Green Party (Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na). Like the Social
Democrats, the Greens started deeply rooted in a social movement. The party
was founded as a reaction to the 1980 referendum on nuclear energy in which
the most anti-nuclear energy alternative gained almost 40% of the vote, but was
defeated by a compromise option. As a result, anti-nuclear and environmental
movement leaders hoped that there was electoral potential for a party that took
up the issue and Miljo¨partiet was founded in 1981 (Bennulf & Holmberg 1990,
p. 167). Taking the issue to the ballot box, however, was rewarded with much
less electoral success than the labor movement’s entry into electoral politics. It
took the Greens until 1988 to enter parliament, only to lose representation again
in 1991. Since then the party has returned to parliament, but electoral results
have only shown a minor upward trend, peaking at 7.3% of the vote in 2010. As
opposed to the SAP and despite the tenuous support it enjoyed at the polls, the
Green Party has not gone through a process of programmatically delinking itself
from the movement. While it has become more amenable to seeing economic
growth and environmental protection as compatible (Elander 2000), its focus
on environmental issues is not in doubt and it fought, for example, the 2014
national election campaign under the slogan “Policy must be warmer. Not the
climate”1 (Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na 2014, p. 2). However, the party never had the
1Swedish: “Politiken ma˚ste bli varmare. Inte klimatet.” (Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na 2014, p. 2)
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same formal links to movements that existed between the SAP and the unions
and it has become organizationally decoupled from the environmental and anti-
nuclear movements through increasing professionalization (Burchell 2001a, p.
131) and a consistent separation between movement and party elites (interview
0203082).
A Pattern and a Puzzle: Adopting the Movement Platform Party
Model
The divergence in development between the Social Democrats and Greens
in Sweden described above is illustrative of a broader pattern across Eu-
rope. Parties often originate in social movements,3 but those founded before
World War II have evolved in fundamentally different ways than those with
movement roots post-1945. The former parties first loosened their program-
matic and then their organizational links to the movements that gave rise to
them. Thus they exemplify the well-established development of (mainly So-
cial Democratic) movement parties with strong organizational and program-
matic links to (labour) movements towards electoral-professional, catch-all par-
ties (Kirchheimer 1966, Panebianco 1988, Przeworski & Sprague 1986) that
largely lack these movement links and pursue median voter-focused strate-
gies (Downs 1957). Since 1945, however, parties with movement roots have re-
tained their programmatic links to movements, while shedding organizational
links early in their development. That is, instead of evolving to an electoral-
professional party model, they have adopted what I define as a “movement
2See chapter 3 and appendix B for more details on the interview data.
3The notable exception are older, liberal and conservative parties originating from elite net-
works inside the political system. See Shefter (1994) on internally and externally mobilized
parties; cf. also Katz & Mair (1995).
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platform party” model, in which a party continues to stress the policy demands
of the movement from which it originated, but retains only weak organizational
connections to that movement.
Figure 1.1: Linkages between Political Parties and Social Movements: Pre-
World War II Movement Parties
   Organizational Connection 
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Strong  Social Democratic and  
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Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the different evolution of pre- and post-
World War II movement parties. Figure 1.1 shows that movement parties
with pre-World War II origins, i.e. Social and Christian Democratic parties
(Bartolini 2000, Kalyvas 1996), started out with tight organizational connections
to the movement from which they originated. They additionally represented the
movements’ policy demands in their platforms and the electoral arena, i.e. had
a programmatic connection to the movements.4 These parties then proceeded to
first shed their programmatic commitments to movement goals (along the solid
arrow from top-left to the bottom-left cell), strongly broadening their electoral
appeal and success, before in a second, later phase of their development, abol-
ishing their organizational links to movements (along the dashed arrow from
4I define movement parties by these two characteristics, i.e., by originating from a social
movement with both organizational and programmatic connections to that movement. For de-
tailed definitions of all central terms see chapter 2.
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the bottom-left to the bottom-right cell).
Parties with movement roots after World War II have mainly included Green,
regionalist, radical right, Pirate, and the recent anti-establishment parties in the
European South. Those parties evolved differently than their Social and Chris-
tian Democratic predecessors as illustrated in figure 1.2. They did shed their or-
ganizational connection to social movements early in their development (along
the arrow from the top-left to the top-right cell), but have retained their pro-
grammatic links to movements.5
Figure 1.2: Linkages between Political Parties and Social Movements:
Post-World War II Movement Parties
   Organizational Connection 
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Thus movement parties with origins in the 19th century developed into the
electoral-professional parties (Panebianco 1988) that dominate the contempo-
rary European party systems. Since the Second World War, however, movement
parties have adopted a model under which they are organizationally discon-
nected from the movements, but maintain strong programmatic ties to them –
a movement platform party model. Few of these movement platform parties
5See chapter 3 for details on the development of the different movement party families.
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have become large parties on a national level, and until the recent surge of anti-
establishment parties in Southern Europe, none had joined the party system as
a central player. Why did these parties diverge from the established pattern of
party development that had brought earlier movement parties unprecedented
success and established them as the main center-left and center-right parties in
their respective party systems?
The decision of these movement parties to manage their relationship with
the movement from which they originated by adopting the movement plat-
form party model is puzzling. In doing so, European parties with movement
roots seem to have chosen the worst of two worlds. First, by organizationally
detaching themselves from the movements, these parties largely forgo the con-
siderable benefits of mobilizing voters through social movement organizations
(SMOs). The anti-nuclear movement in Germany, for instance, managed to turn
out an estimated 170000 protesters within the first four days after the nuclear
disaster in Fukushima (Knight 2011), decades after the supposed peak of the
movement’s mobilization. The ability to tap into these mobilizing structures
would provide a political party with an enormous advantage in terms of get-
ting out the vote. Second, instead of making use of the strategic (programmatic)
flexibility they have presumably gained through organizational decoupling by
diluting programmatic appeals and adopting a catch-all strategy, reaping the
electoral benefits of attracting a broader electorate located around the median
voter, these parties remain committed to their respective movements’ core is-
sues. The interview data presented in chapter 3, for instance, show that the
German Green Party still goes to great lengths to ensure that its policy decisions
are acceptable to a majority of environmental movement organizations.6 Why
6For example, interview 010406 with Naturschutzbund Deutschland (Nature and Biodiver-
sity Conservation Union).
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do these parties not either push for closer cooperation with the movements (i.e.
shift back towards the ideal-typical movement party) or completely sever their
ties and reap the electoral benefits of the professional-electoral model without
organizational or programmatic connections to social movements?7
Existing Explanatory Approaches
The continued existence of movement platform parties is puzzling for much of
social science theory, which expects new (movement) parties to either moderate
their programmatic zeal or maintain tight organizational links to movements.
I argue that much of its difficulty in accounting for that outcome is due to the
lack of systematic attention that is paid to the influence of civil society on insti-
tutionalized politics in general, and in this case to how the strategic constraints
of the electoral market empower movements vis-a´-vis parties in particular.
Much of the literature on party origins and evolution relies on a rational-
ist approach that focuses on the incentives of office as well as benefit seekers
to construct effective vehicles to further their interests (Aldrich 2011). As such
these theories highlight party elites’ interests and lose sight of movement par-
ties’ bottom-up origins and strong roots in civil society. Work in this tradition
could make sense of the organizational separation between movements and the
parties they spawn, which increases party elites’ political flexibility, but not of
the parties’ continued programmatic links to movements. Office seekers by def-
inition, and benefit seekers because they can only realize their benefits through
the spoils of office, should be focused on achieving stable and continued gov-
7This does not exhaust the options movement platform parties have to change their setup,
but represents the most obviously appealing alternatives.
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ernment participation. The likelihood of governing, however, is not maximized
by linking a party to relatively narrow interests (like the protection of the envi-
ronment or digital privacy), mobilized by movement activists outside the insti-
tutionalized political system. Furthermore, as I will demonstrate in chapter 4,
even the organizational separation is not, as these rationalist approaches would
expect, driven by the preference of party elites for flexibility, but rather the result
of decision making inside the movement and associated SMOs.
Moreover, many conventional approaches continue to view movement par-
ties through theoretical lenses designed to analyze the historical development of
Social Democratic parties from movement to mainstream, electoral-professional
parties. They build on the classical insights of Michels (1915) about parties’
internal dynamics to centralize power with elites, as well as research demon-
strating how Social Democrats’ decision to dilute their programmatic appeals
in order to win allies outside the working class set them on a path to contin-
ued programmatic moderation (Przeworski & Sprague 1986). In doing so, these
approaches do not have an explanation for why newer movement parties have
avoided this evolution away from the movements’ programmatic demands, de-
spite the lack of organizational movement connections.
Finally, the literature on niche parties8 (Meguid 2005) has provided anal-
ysis of many of the parties studied in this project, including Green, regional-
ist, and radical right parties. Similar to the rational approaches to party evo-
lution, however, the movement roots of many of these parties have received
no systematic attention, even though these roots continue to shape niche par-
ties in fundamental ways. Moreover, the niche party literature cannot explain
8While some parties are both movement platform and niche parties these are by no means
identical concepts and there are parties that are niche, but not movement platform parties and
vice versa. See chapter 2 for a detailed discussion and definitions of these concepts.
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why niche parties, when exogenous shocks allow them them to escape their
niche party status, do not make the transition to programmatically less-focused
electoral-professional parties. Why, for instance why do new challenger parties
like Podemos profit from the decline of center-left parties in the aftermath of the
sovereign debt crisis, instead of the long-established center-left Green parties?
As this project will demonstrate below, the answer as to why (Green) movement
platform parties are not able to make the necessary transformations towards an
electoral-professional model, even in moments of great opportunity, is found in
the strategic behavior of social movements that locks movement platform par-
ties into their policy links to these movements.
Overview of the Argument: Movement Parties, Social Move-
ment Organizations, and Saturated Electoral Markets
I argue that the explanation for why modern movement parties neither moder-
ate their programmatic zeal nor remain organizationally linked to movements,
but instead turned to the movement platform party model, lies in the joint in-
centive structures faced by movement parties and their “affiliated” social move-
ments. Loosening organizational ties allows movement organizations to retain
their full mobilizational potential and influence on policies independent of gov-
ernment composition. The small parties originating in these movements do not
have the resources, however, to make SMOs change their behavior. Yet, they
also cannot break with their movement origins programmatically because they
rely on voters who are disappointed with the dominant electoral-professional
party models and who demand concrete programmatic linkages in specific is-
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sues areas from the party they support. That is, given the saturation of the elec-
toral market on the established left-right dimension by electoral-professional
parties, movement parties (need to) continue competing on a different program-
matic dimension than the economically focused mainstream parties to win these
issue voters.9 Even in a time of growing partisan dealignment, movement plat-
form parties would endanger their electoral survival by moving to a catch-all
strategy because they would risk losing the vast majority of their core electorate
much more quickly than they would be able to attract new voters. This situation
is largely due to the parties’ movement roots as they exist in an environment in
which movement organizations have both the incentives and means to monitor
party behavior from the electoral sidelines and inform issue voters about their
evaluations. Since a negative performance review from movement organiza-
tions could lead to a massive loss of core supporters, these organizations can
exert enormous influence on movement platform parties and party elites will
continue to take cues from social movement organizations and focus on their
parties’ core issues. Thus, in this environment leaders of movement parties are
strongly incentivized to turn to the movement platform party model that retains
programmatic linkages and a core, if niche electorate.
The Importance of Party-Movement Interactions
Demonstrating the important consequences of interactions between social
movements and political parties contributes to closing the long existing gap be-
tween these two areas of inquiry and highlights the value of systematically link-
9Alternatively movements and the parties they spawn can repoliticize economic competition
and advocate for positions closer to the left pole on that dimension, as recent developments in
Southern Europe illustrate. I will discuss this possibility in more detail in chapter 7.
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ing institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political participation
(McAdam & Tarrow 2010, McAdam & Tarrow 2013). Existing work in this vein,
mainly focused on state-movement relationships, has identified significant ef-
fects of movement activity on institutionalized politics ranging from their influ-
ence on public policy (see e.g., McAdam & Su (2002)) to the influence of move-
ments as channels of representation more generally (Johnston 2011). Move-
ments are thus influential political actors, but their impact on party politics
remains understudied. This is particularly puzzling considering the plethora
of both historical and contemporary connections between them.10 These party-
movement interactions influence the political development of European coun-
tries in at least three distinct ways:
1. Parties considered “fringe” when they emerged have, in conjunction with
social movements, shaped politics in important ways in the past. Exam-
ples range from historical cases like the Italian fascist party gaining power
with the help of the movement it originated in (Morgan 2004) to the Green
and right-wing populist parties, which together with the movements around
them established a new axis of competition in European party systems
(Ha¨usermann & Kriesi 2015).
2. In the context of growing electoral dealignment (Herna´ndez & Kriesi 2016)
smaller and new parties with movement roots have opportunities to grow
and turn into major players by winning over former mainstream party sup-
porters. In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis the relevance of these
parties has increased even further, as evidenced by the rise of new, leftist
movement parties, like Podemos and Syriza, in Southern Europe and the re-
10Research in the U.S. context has produced some studies in this vein on both historical
(Redding 1992) and contemporary (Heaney & Rojas 2015) party-movement relations.
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cent Austrian presidential elections in which the two candidates in the run-
off represented a Green and a radical right party.11
3. Even with moderate parliamentary representation, movement platform
parties have become important players in Europe due to the predominance
of coalition governments. Movement platform parties often hold the balance
of power and significantly influence policies either as coalition partner or
by providing minority governments with the necessary support (e.g., Bale &
Bergman (2006)).
Thus because movement platform parties are important actors in contemporary
politics it is central to understand the structures of these parties, the policies
they implement when in government, and how they reshaped the makeup of
contemporary party systems in Europe.
Additionally, the project contributes to a better understanding of how devel-
opments in contemporary movement activism might influence future parties
that arise from social movements. By focusing on the movement platform party
type, the dissertation highlights an ideal type that is likely to gain in impor-
tance, as many recent parties with roots in social movements have been founded
as movement platform rather than ideal-typical movement parties. Internet ac-
tivism has made it possible for contentious collective action to occur and even
to lead to the formation of political parties without the existence of mediat-
ing movement organizations with which a party could establish organizational
links (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, Bennett & Segerberg 2013).12 The Swedish Pi-
11The candidate connected to the Austrian Greens ran as an independent, but was supported
by the Green Party and had been its leader for more than a decade.
12There remains a debate about how dramatically modern communication technology has
changed the means available for overcoming collective action problems. Tilly & Wood (2013, pp.
107-108) remind us that at a minimum the effects of technological changes are not deterministic
and are always mediated by their context. Furthermore they argue that while technology lowers
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rate Party, focused on issues like copyright law and information-related issues
more generally, serves as a prime example of a political party that is rooted
in a social movement and represents its programmatic concerns, but from its
inception only had weak organizational links to the movement. Movement or-
ganizations focusing on these issues are largely absent in the Swedish context
and the Pirate Bureau from which the party took its name and much of its fram-
ing, though not its elites, had vanished by 2010. But beyond Pirate parties, the
internet has also been used as a tool to organize political activity and a party in
the recent anti-establishment movements in Southern Europe. Turner (2013), for
instance, shows how the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) party
was built using online tools. Thus, because of their increased relevance, parties
with strong programmatic connections to one or more social movements, but
lacking organizational links, deserve more scientific attention.13
Besides shedding light on a variety of important empirical phenomena and
outcomes, like the nature of partisan competition and future of party organi-
zation, this dissertation also contributes to theory development in the social
sciences by highlighting the important and often overlooked role of civil soci-
ety actors in shaping institutionalized politics. Through “bringing civil society
back in” this project takes the bottom-up origins of movement parties seriously
and contributes a systematic analysis of the dilemma inherent in the movement
party type. On one hand these parties have incentives to move away from their
the costs of action for one group, it also excludes those without access to the specific technology
from collective action (Tilly & Wood 2013). The latter fact might go a long way to explain the
Pirate Parties’ reliance on young voters (Eisel 2012, p. 3).
13Arguably even the earlier 20th century movement parties in Europe never developed or-
ganizational connections to the movements they originated in that were as strong as those of
Socialist Parties in the 19th century (Kitschelt 2003, Kitschelt 1989). Thus they were already
partially on their way from ideal-typical movement to movement platform parties during their
early years.
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movement in order to broaden their electoral appeal,14 while on the other hand
they remain strongly tied to the movement due to the ever-present threat of
losing their core support. One central reason as to why modern movement par-
ties have managed this dilemma by evolving into the movement platform party
model lies in the more powerful position of social movements vis-a`-vis the par-
ties they spawned after the Second World War. Accordingly, this study sheds
light on the development of parties with movement roots in less tumultuous
times than the time period in which Social Democratic parties matured, which
included World Wars I and II, as well as the Great Depression. Illuminating how
movement demands and activists are incorporated into the political systems of
Western Europe since 1945 thus provides insights in how these processes de-
velop in stable liberal democracies.
In sum, we can only understand the development of these parties by explic-
itly acknowledging the agency of movement organizations and theorizing the
strategic interaction between social movements and political parties. As this
dissertation will demonstrate, even though movement platform parties have
shed their organizational links to social movements they remain fundamen-
tally shaped by the strategic decisions these movements make. This influence
is particularly important with respect to the parties’ policy platforms, behav-
ior in government, and electoral strategies. Thus, social movements, through
their influence on movement platform parties, shape institutionalized politics,
including the parliamentary arena, to a considerable degree. Moreover while
movement platform parties, due to their movement roots, are in many ways
a most likely cases for being shaped by civil society actors, the results of this
14This does not presuppose office- or vote-seeking goals (Mu¨ller & Strøm 1999). Even if the
party is completely policy-driven it still requires electoral success to meet policy goals. Electoral
success is a necessary condition to achieve government participation or force competing parties
to adopt some movement demands in order to limit the appeal of the movement party.
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project also indicate that the influence of social movements extends far beyond
movement platform parties. Accordingly research programs and theorizing in
social science theory would profit from more consistently linking movements in
particular, and civil society in general, to institutionalized politics.15
The argument developed here also has strong normative implications with
respect to the quality of representation in advanced industrialized democracies.
Mainstream parties have retreated from civil society, weakening the links be-
tween citizens and their governments (Katz & Mair 1995, pp. 8-15). I argue
that movement platform parties provide a partial democratizing antidote to
this trend because they offer concrete programmatic linkages sought by certain
groups of citizens, i.e., they broaden representation by appealing to voters who
care deeply about issues that the mainstream parties largely ignore. Through
these linkages they (re)integrate citizens into the democratic process who are
disaffected with representative democracy or did not have a “political home.”16
That is, movement parties bring these voters, who range from strong propo-
nents of Scottish independence championed by the Scottish National Party to
those in the new middle class (della Porta & Diani 2006, p. 55) represented
through Green Parties, into the democratic process.
Two qualifications with respect to this democratizing effect are in order.
First, movement parties on the radical right, like the Front National in France
(Goodliffe 2011), do integrate some citizens, but also pursue the goal of limit-
ing participation and access to the state for other groups of citizens. Second,
it is possible that pacifying the previously disaffected voters and integrating
15See chapter 4 and 6 for details on how movements shape the party model and policy plat-
forms of parties, as well as chapter 7 for a discussion of how this influence extends beyond
movement platform parties.
16On the increasing disaffection with contemporary democracies see Dalton (2008, pp. 241-
258).
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them into the electoral process takes the energy out of more contentious forms
of political participation, which might have accomplished more fundamental
changes in how modern democracies are organized. Thus, these parties might
serve as a kind of safety valve, but not always a productive one when more
fundamental changes are required in society.
Dissertation Outline
The following chapter presents the theoretical framework sketched above by in-
troducing the literature on party-movement interactions in general and relevant
ideas regarding the linkages between the two kinds of actors in particular. In the
process it provides definitions of central concepts. The chapter also introduces
the alternative explanations summarized above in more detail, before present-
ing the theoretical approach of this dissertation and discussing how it improves
on existing approaches.
The third chapter discusses the case selection and data collection for this
project, before providing a short overview of Social and Christian Democratic
movement parties’ evolution from movement to electoral-professional parties.
The chapter continues by contrasting that evolution with the development of
the four parties and social movements studied in detail in this project. Case
studies introduce the Swedish and German Green and Pirate parties, as well
as the environmental and digital movements17 in those countries. Drawing on
party and movement elite interviews conducted during fieldwork in Sweden
17I use the term “digital movement” to denote organizations and activists focusing on issues
of copyright reform, the protection of privacy, and generally information-related issues. This
movement makes extensive use of electronic means of communication. Thus, the term reflects
both the content and the most prominent form of activism.
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and Germany in 2013-2014, an original survey of Swedish Green party mem-
bers, and data from participant observation of party conferences and political
events as well as primary and secondary sources, the chapter traces the de-
velopment of these parties and movements. Specifically, it demonstrates that
the Green parties and environmental movements are only loosely connected
organizationally, but they retain strong programmatic ties. Thus the chapter
demonstrates that Green parties developed from movement to movement plat-
form parties. The Pirate parties, however, while clearly rooted in a social move-
ment, corresponded more closely to the movement platform party ideal type
from the beginning, as they never developed strong organizational connections
to the movements that spawned them in the first place. Drawing on secondary
sources and expert survey data on a wider range of parties, the chapter also
demonstrates that the development of movement parties towards the move-
ment platform party model can be generalized to Green, Pirate, regionalist, and
radical right parties across the continent.
The remainder of the dissertation is structured along the two dimensions
that (can) link social movements to political parties. The fourth chapter focuses
on the organizational connections between social movements and the parties
that emerged from them. It investigates why movement organizations and “as-
sociated” parties are organizationally separate despite the potential mobiliza-
tion benefits for parties and coordinating benefits for movements. Drawing on
material collected during fieldwork, the chapter first highlights the motivations
of movement leaders and demonstrates that they keep their organizations dis-
tant from any political party in order to be able to mobilize citizens beyond
those sympathetic to one political party and to retain their influence on gov-
ernments independent of partisan political composition. SMO leaders are also
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skeptical about parties as vehicles for policy change more generally. Party elites
are incentivized to accept this status quo partially because they are not in a po-
sition to make movement organizations change their behavior and partially be-
cause they expect a strategic sharing of tasks between parties and movements to
be beneficial. Organizational demands further contribute to the organizational
separation of parties and movements.
The following two chapters center on the programmatic connection between
movements and movement platform parties and explore why and how it was
retained. The fifth chapter investigates why movement platform parties do not
make use of the supposed freedom they gained by organizationally decoupling
from movements to pursue a broader electorate. The chapter shows that the
electoral success of movement platform parties is strongly tied to their pro-
grammatic connection to movement demands, because pre-existing electoral-
professional parties appeal to and bind the majority of voters along the econom-
ically dominated left/right spectrum, leaving only voters interested in other
programmatic dimensions up for grabs. The chapter provides evidence for
this on three different levels. It first employs multilevel complementary log-log
models analyzing micro-level data from two waves (1999 and 2009) of the Eu-
ropean Election Studies to show that movement parties do rely on voters who
value concrete programmatic linkages. In a second step, the chapter uses an
original country-level dataset on movement platform party success and policy
gains to show that delivering on the programmatic platform positively influ-
ences party support, while government participation without policy gains leads
to significant electoral losses. Finally, it turns to the meso-level and uses inter-
view data to present evidence that party leaders are sensitive to their core elec-
torates and specifically develop their campaign strategies and platforms accord-
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ingly. The interviews also demonstrate that movement organizations strategi-
cally make use of movement platform parties’ dependence on issue voters to
exert pressure on these parties. This pressure pushes parties to remain true to
their programmatic core because party elites are acutely aware of SMOs power
to inform and influence the parties’ core electorate.
The sixth chapter explores in more detail how the programmatic connection
is retained in the absence of strong organizational links and direct cooperation.
Based on interviews, survey, and further data from fieldwork it identifies the
indirect channels through which movements influence movement platform par-
ties: 1) public pressure exerted by SMOs on parties during electoral campaigns,
2) a limited number of grassroots party activists that are also active in move-
ments and bring the latter’s demands into the party,18 3) movement party elites
consciously adopting publicly available movement positions or seeking out the
organizations’ advice on a case-by-case basis, and 4) think-tanks/political foun-
dations. It also illustrates how a failure of these mechanisms can contribute to
the electoral decline of movement platform parties. It does so drawing on case
studies of the Swedish and German Pirate Parties, which lost their representa-
tion in parliaments when programmatic alignment with the digital movement
ceased to be provided through the mechanisms outlined above.
The dissertation concludes with a final chapter, which considers the find-
ings’ implications for the nature of and research on party-movement interac-
tions. In the process it highlights the implications for political participation and
representation in contemporary democracies. On the one hand, movements and
movement platform parties are highly successful in opening up avenues for par-
18This is where the more participatory character of many movement platform parties remains
relevant.
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ticipation for programmatically motivated citizens, whose issues and concerns
were not represented previously by existing parties and civil society actors. On
the other hand, since a majority of these parties originated in new social move-
ments and have a middle class bias, this development has the potential to fur-
ther increase the gap between those with the resources to participate and poorer
citizens who will increasingly be left behind. The chapter also discusses how the
project’s findings illuminate and possibly extend to newer parties with move-
ment roots, like Podemos, in the European South, as well as party-movement
interactions in other parts of the world. Finally, it provides an overview of ques-
tions left open by this dissertation, as well as those that have newly arisen based
on the findings presented in this project.
20
CHAPTER 2
THEORY: MOVEMENT PARTIES, SOCIAL MOVEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS, AND SATURATED ELECTORAL MARKETS
Most European political parties that have entered the electoral arena since
1945 have their roots in social movements. As highlighted in the previous chap-
ter, over time these parties have shed their organizational, but not program-
matic connections to the movements that spawned them. They did so in spite
of the numerous downsides that adopting the movement platform party model
entails regarding mobilizing electoral support. This chapter will develop a the-
oretical account explaining this development and its contrast with earlier move-
ment parties’ evolution into electoral-professional parties. The chapter first pro-
vides a short summary of the (extremely limited) state of knowledge regarding
the interactions of social movements and political parties, before a second sec-
tion theorizes the connections between movements and parties with movement
roots. In a third section, the chapter discusses existing work on political par-
ties with movement origins and shows that these approaches have difficulties
explaining the development of contemporary movement parties towards the
movement platform party model, because they have lost sight of the influence
of civil society actors on party evolution. A fourth section develops a theoret-
ical account explaining the prevalence of the movement platform party model
by highlighting the agency and influence of social movements with respect to
political parties in saturated electoral markets.
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Social Movements and Political Parties
Social movements are “sequences of contentious politics that are based on un-
derlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, [. . . ] which
develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful oppo-
nents” (Tarrow 1998, p. 3). The social networks that these movements are based
on are usually deeply rooted in civil society, while political parties act in the in-
stitutionalized political arena (and often are among the “powerful opponents”
Tarrow (1998) references). I follow Epstein (1980) in defining political parties
as “any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect government office-
holders under a given label” (Epstein 1980, p. 9). Drawing on this wide defini-
tion of parties is advantageous here, because it includes groups with significant
bottom-up influence and civil society links, like movement parties. Definitions
that center on elites (e.g., Aldrich (2011)) narrow the focus to an extent that of-
ten leads authors to overlook the significant degree to which institutionalized
politics are shaped by civil society (see the discussion of Aldrich and rationalist
approaches more generally in the section on alternative explanations below).
As highlighted in the introduction, the study of social movements and polit-
ical parties has long been conducted on separate tracks which rarely intersected
(McAdam & Tarrow 2010). This is partially the result of the relatively late emer-
gence of a research agenda on social movements’ political outcomes (Amenta,
Caren, Chiarello, & Su 2010, p. 289), though studies in the field have recently
become more common (Amenta et al. 2010, Walgrave & Vliegenthart 2012).
Work in this vein has addressed questions such as under what circumstances
movements achieve the outcomes they seek (e.g., Cress & Snow (2000)) and
institutionalized political actors are occasionally considered in these studies,
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mainly as the addressees of movement action. Scholars have, for instance, in-
vestigated under what circumstances protest leads to parliamentary or gov-
ernmental reactions (Fassiotto & Soule 2017, McAdam & Su 2002, Walgrave
& Vliegenthart 2012). Scholars of social movements have only recently stud-
ied political parties as important players shaping parliamentary and govern-
mental responses to movement activity with Hutter & Vliegenthart (forthcom-
ing) demonstrating that opposition parties are more likely to respond to street
protest than parties in government.
Additionally, on both sides of the Atlantic the relationships between political
parties and interest groups have received some attention. In the U.S. context, in-
terest group endorsements in elections have been shown to exert strong effects
on how voters, especially those who ideologically break with their preferred
party on the issue of an interest group’s endorsement, evaluate candidates
(Neddenriep & Nownes 2014). Moreover, Koger, Masket, & Noel (2009) have
shown that the Democratic and Republican national party organizations are a
central part of a liberal and conservative “network of interest groups, media,
other advocacy organizations and candidates” (Koger, Masket, & Noel 2009, p.
633), respectively. By contrast interest group relationships with political par-
ties in Europe are characterized by a low level of institutionalization, though,
as in the United States, the partisan origins of interest groups play a role in
shaping these interactions (Rasmussen & Lindeboom 2013). They are moreover
moderated by the institutional context, i.e. these interactions mirror the specific
party-political cleavages that dominate a country (Otjes & Rasmussen 2015).
These studies shed light on important channels of representation, but a specific
focus on social movements is lacking in this literature. While some SMOs have
institutionalized into forms similar to traditional interest group organizations,
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political contention remains central to how social movements exert their influ-
ence (cf. chapter 6 of this study). Moreover, because of this focus on contention,
social movements’ mobilizing structures often center on mobilizing many peo-
ple at one specific point in time. That is, movements are in a much better, and
for parties more valuable, position to influence election outcomes by mobilizing
on election day.
Consistent attention to party-movement interactions has been relatively re-
cent and mostly limited to four lines of research that focus on distinct aspects
of these interactions. First, there are case studies of interactions between spe-
cific social movements and parties, for instance regarding the tensions inside
and between the Irish Republican movement and Sinn Fe´in in the late 1970s
and early 1980s (Ross 2006), the views activists in the women’s movements
in the U.K. and U.S. hold of political parties (Evans 2016), and a comparison
between the Dutch Labour Party and Italian Christian Democrats as a most-
and a least-likely case, respectively, of being influenced by the ecology move-
ment (Piccio 2016). Second, researchers have focused on how movements shape
parties under the specific conditions of democratic transitions in South Africa
(Klandermans 2015) and Latin America (Almeida 2010). Third, scholars have
elucidated the conditions that drive social movement activists to the electoral
arena in general (Farrer 2014) and with a focus on New Social Movements in
Europe in particular (Rucht 1994, p. 313)1. Students of political parties have also
investigated what factors determine which side of the party-movement divide
activists decide to participate in once both sides are well-established (Ramiro &
Morales 2014). Finally, the recent wave of social movements responding to the
1See also Rohrschneider (1993a) for an analysis of New Social Movements’ influence on
mainstream party models.
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European debt crisis and austerity politics2 and the parties that they gave rise
to have spawned significant interest in party-movement interactions (see e.g.
della Porta, Ferna´ndez, Kouki, & Mosca (2017) for a systematic analysis of these
new parties). This literature is beginning to systematically highlight the im-
portance of party-movement interactions and Charalambous & Ioannou (2017),
for instance, demonstrate that the absence of anti-austerity protest in Cyprus is
rooted in the way political parties in the country connect to civil society.3
McAdam & Tarrow (2013) reacted to this lack of systematic research into
the link between social movements and electoral politics by outlining mecha-
nisms and processes linking the former to the latter (McAdam & Tarrow 2010,
McAdam & Tarrow 2013).4 This project responds to McAdam and Tarrow’s call
for a systematic connection between social movements and elections by illumi-
nating the interactions between social movements and the parties that they once
spawned. I begin by theorizing the (potential) links between social movements
and political parties, before demonstrating that existing approaches cannot ex-
plain the currently pre-dominant model of these links in Western European and
outlining a theory accounting for this contemporary pattern.
2See della Porta (2015) for an overview of these movements.
3Earlier, Hutter (2014) had also touched on the role of parties sponsoring protest in the con-
text of a new cleavage separating those preferring further international integration from those
who prefer national demarcation.
4For the foundational work on a research program focusing on mechanisms, processes, and
episodes, see McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly (2001). See also chapter 6 of this dissertation for mecha-
nisms linking movement demands to party platforms.
25
Connecting Social Movements and Political Parties
Much of the recent work that has systematically looked at connecting social
movements with political parties and the electoral arena has centered on North-
ern and Latin America. Based on the extensive evidence of Democratic (ac-
tivist) involvement with the U.S. peace movement Heaney & Rojas (2015) show
that partisans entering a movement shape its character and illustrate how the
withdrawal of these partisans in the aftermath of electoral success led to a
decline, as well as radicalization of the movement (see also Heaney & Rojas
(2011)).5 Moreover, recent work in both sociology and political science focus-
ing on party development over longer time horizons demonstrates how social
movements have fundamentally shaped the two major U.S. parties. McAdam
& Kloos (2014) show that social movements capturing Democrats and Repub-
licans at different times and moving them away from the political center is a
central cause for the increasing political polarization in the United States. Sim-
ilarly, Schlozman (2015) traces how alliances between social movements and
political parties, in which the former lend organizational support to the latter in
exchange for ideological concessions, have shaped American political develop-
ment (Schlozman 2015, p. 18).6
With respect to Latin America, the recent wave of ethnic movement parties
(see e.g. Madrid (2012)) has led to an increased interest in the interactions be-
tween parties and movements. Anria & Cyr (forthcoming) show that building
intensive rather than extensive linkage with social movements – i.e. links that
5See also Redding (1992) for early work on how party founding in North Carolina during
the Populist era led to what Hadden & Tarrow (2007) have defined as social movement spillout.
6See also Mildred Schwartz’s work on theorizing party-movement interactions in the U.S.
and Canada (mainly with a sub-national focus), which draws heavily on organizational theory
borrowed from the analysis of firms (Schwartz 2010, Schwartz 2006).
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integrate social actors directly into the party organization rather than through,
for instance, programmatic concessions – helps parties to manage conflicts be-
tween different parts of their base. Santiago Anria (2016), on his own, has ex-
amined when local grassroots organizations can limit oligarchic tendencies in
party leadership focusing on candidate selection in the Bolivian MAS. Analyz-
ing the role of the political left in “deepening democracy” after authoritarian-
ism, Roberts (1998) suggests that on the Latin American left the relationships
between parties and movements can be summarized in three models: a van-
guard model in which the party dominates the movement, an organic model
with blurred lines between the movement and the party, and finally an elec-
toralist model in which the party respects movement autonomy. He argues that
these models “are closely related to specific types of political programs and or-
ganizational characteristics in leftist parties” (Roberts 1998, p. 76).
Notably, these two dimensions – programmatic and organizational – along
which parties and movements can be linked emerge consistently from this liter-
ature. Sometimes linkage or dissolution of such linkage on one dimension leads
to a dissolution on the other dimension. For instance, once the organizational
connection between Democrats and the peace movement collapsed after the
2008 election because Democratic partisans stopped being active in the move-
ment, that movement radicalized and shifted away from the Democratic Party
in terms of its program (Heaney & Rojas 2011). On other occasions changes
on one dimension do not affect the other. The New Left activists, identified by
McAdam & Kloos (2014) as one of the movement actors driving partisan po-
larization, have long demobilized and thus lost their organizational connection
with the Democrats. Yet their programmatic influence on the party remains.
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Thus a connection between political parties and social movements can oc-
cur on two distinct dimensions – programmatic orientation and organizational
profile – as shown in Figure 2.1. A party is programmatically aligned with a
social movement if the party consistently highlights the core issues of the move-
ment, as well as advocates policies close to movement demands. This allows the
programmatic dimension to vary from complete agreement (a shared program-
matic focus and identical policy proposals, which is a hypothetical condition,
approximated best by the mid-19th century trade union movement and Socialist
parties in their earliest days) to complete divergence (different issue-focuses and
strong disagreement on policy proposals, being approximated, for instance, by
the digital movement in Germany and the Christian Democratic Party7).8 Note
that the term programmatic connection refers to a specific connection with an
existing and mobilized social movement. While this also implies that movement
parties connect to voters in a programmatic way, it does not imply that other
parties do not also rely on programmatic connections to voters. In fact, party
competition for voters in Europe has largely remained programmatic in nature
and eschewed alternatives like clientelistic linkages (Kitschelt 2006a). The other,
mainstream parties, however, do not have a strong programmatic connection to
a specific social movement.
I define an organizational connection between a political party and an ex-
7The Christian Democrats are focused on economic issues and when taking positions on
privacy, for instance, tend to prioritize security, state-control, and company interests over digital
freedoms.
8The largest, active opposition here is not between actors showing complete divergence, but
between actors that have the same issue focus, but entirely opposing policy proposals. That
is, the largest conflict should be expected, for instance, between radical right parties and pro-
immigration NGOs, and not between these parties and the union movement where policies
diverge too, but the issue focus is different (though trade unions have often been a strong part
of contemporary, anti-racist mobilization). Since this dissertation focuses on movements and the
parties to which they gave rise, these conflicting actor combinations (either because of complete
divergence or because of a shared issue-focus with conflicting policy preferences) are beyond
the scope of this study.
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ternal actor as the existence of a) formal links that allow external actors to in-
fluence the party (like e.g. shared membership in an organization and party or
an organizational unit inside the party that gives an official voice and inter-
nal representation to the social movement), b) routinized interactions (as, for
instance, regular meetings of the party and movement elites), and c) shared po-
litical elites. This definition allows the organizational dimension to vary from
complete symbiosis (shared leadership with strong formal and informal links
between party and movement, as for instance in the case of some early Social-
ist parties and trade unions) to complete independence (with no shared elites,
formal links, or informal interactions, as for instance the relationship between
the German environmental groups and the liberal Free Democratic Party in the
early 2010s [interviews 010406, 010410]). Along this dimension the vast majority
of post-1945 movement parties have moved from relatively close organizational
links to loosening these links significantly. This is not to argue, however, that
there are not some remaining organizational connections (mainly in the form of
informal interactions) or that there is no variation in the strength of these links
between different movement platform parties or party families, but that they
have severely weakened.
Figure 2.1: Linkages Between Political Parties and Social Movements
  Organizational Connection 
  Strong Weak 
Programmatic 
Connection 
Strong Movement Party Movement Platform Party 
Weak Club Party Electoral-professional Party 	
As illustrated in figure 2.1, parties that have strong connections to a social
movement on both dimensions are ideal-typical movement parties, like the Eu-
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ropean Socialist parties in the 19th century. These parties are the movements
in the electoral arena. Parties that lack these connections on both dimensions
are termed “electoral-professional parties” (Panebianco 1988), since they rely
on a professional staff, instead of a base in civil society, and are focused primar-
ily on electoral success. The electoral-professional label will subsume catch-all9
(Kirchheimer 1966) and cartel parties10 (Katz & Mair 1995), like today’s main
center-left (Social Democratic) and center-right (Christian Democratic) parties,
as well as smaller professionalized parties like the Dutch D66. I define polit-
ical parties that retain organizational cooperation, but no longer have strong
links to the original programmatic goals of the movement as “club parties,”
because they remain tied to a specific social group. The influence of union of-
ficials on and within the Austrian Social Democratic Party for instance contin-
ued to be strong in the 1970s, even though the party’s programmatic appeals
were far removed from traditional Socialist, let alone revolutionary demands
(Kitschelt 1994, pp. 225, 272). Thus parties that have shed their programmatic
ties to the social movements that gave rise to them have usually moved away
from a policy- to a vote-seeking profile.11 Finally, “movement platform par-
ties,” i.e. those that retain strong programmatic links to movements, but are
9As Williams (2009) summarizes “[f]ollowing Kirchheimer, catch-all parties can be identified
by their size as larger mainstream parties, by their pursuit of votes at the expense of ideology, by
their centrist and often inconsistent party platforms designed to appeal to ever wider audiences,
and by their organizational style that is elite driven” (Williams 2009, p. 539). Thus, since they
aim at winning support from the broadest possible set of sectors in society, catch-all parties can
afford neither concentrating on one issue area, nor adopting the precise demands of a move-
ment for fear of alienating voters. Kirchheimer (1966) described this as the “limited integration”
between the catch-all party, interest groups, and voters (Kirchheimer 1966, pp. 192-195).
10Cartel parties collude with other parties and “become agents of the state and employ the re-
sources of the state [. . . ] to ensure their own collective survival” (Katz & Mair 1995, p. 5). In that
way they have receded from civil society, both programmatically and in terms of organizational
connection to societal groups and organizations, including social movements.
11This does not imply that the reverse is true, i.e. that parties with programmatic links to
movements are always policy-seeking. While this might be the case for the movement party
ideal type, I will argue below that no assumptions need to be made about movement platform
parties, because for them vote- and policy-seeking strategies do not represent a trade-off, but
rather overlap.
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organizationally decoupled from them, are the focus of this dissertation. Most
parties that originated in West European social movements post-1945, including
regionalist, Green, radical right, and more recently Pirate parties and Southern
European anti-austerity/establishment parties have adopted this party model
(see also Kitschelt (2003) and for the German Greens in particular Mayer & Ely
(1998, p. 7)).
As discussed in the introduction and illustrated in figure 1.2, these post-1945
movement parties seem to follow a different path than their Social Democratic
predecessors. The older movement parties consistently evolved into electoral-
professional parties. They first moved towards the club party model by shed-
ding their programmatic zeal for revolution and expanding their appeal to a
broader set of working and middle class voters (Przeworski & Sprague 1986, pp.
40-45). For example, the German Social Democratic Party’s vote in favor of the
war credits necessary for World War I demonstrates as clearly as possible that
the party had not only given up on revolutionary goals, but even on the idea
that the class cleavage should supersede any divisions artificially introduced
by national borders. In most cases, Social Democrats have furthermore organi-
zationally decoupled from the movement and thus moved towards being orga-
nized as electoral-professional parties.12 But not only Europe’s dominant center-
left party family has gone through the evolution from movement to electoral-
12The most notable exception to this development is the British Labour Party which retains
strong organizational and financial links to the trade unions. The British unions however
are known to have been relatively conservative in their programmatic goals in the first place
(Bartolini 2000, p. 71). Moreover, even in the British case the relationship with the unions has
been increasingly strained with the “Schro¨der-Blair Paper” (cf. Schmidt-Beck & Tenscher (2008))
and Tony Blair’s “Third Way” approach (Coates 2000, p. 6). This trend has continued more re-
cently when allegations that the Unite union rigged Labour’s candidate selection process in the
Falkirk constituency led to a party vote to reduce the organizational links to the unions sig-
nificantly (BBC 2014). Jeremy Corbyn’s ascension to the Labour leadership has stopped this
development for now and reestablished a closer relationship to the union movement (see, for
instance, Grice (2017); cf. also the discussion in chapter 7).
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professional parties. Stathis Kalyvas argues that Christian Democrats in many
respects mirror Social Democratic parties (Kalyvas 1996, p. 264). Christian
Democratic parties were the result of movements driven by Catholic laymen
and often established against the preferences of the Church and conservative
elites. As such, from the beginning these parties had a more strained relation-
ship with movement actors who had to negotiate their position between parties
and the Church. The Christian Democratic parties detached themselves from
the Church early in their evolution (Kalyvas 1996, p. 18). In pursuit of a broader
set of voters Christian Democratic parties “were deradicalized in the process,
becoming part of the very institutions they initially rejected” (Kalyvas 1996,
p. 264). Accordingly, the two party families that represent the two dominant
center-left and center-right parties in almost all West European countries have
both gone through the process of losing their programmatic and organizational
links to the social movement actors that gave rise to them.
Their pattern of evolution stands in stark contrast to movement parties
born into the “frozen” party systems of post-1945 Western Europe (Lipset &
Rokkan 1967), which shed their organizational links to social movements over
the first decades of their existence, but retained close links to the movements’
policy goals. That is, these parties adopted the movement platform party model.
Thus the central research question this dissertation addresses is why parties that
originated in movements post-1945 have adopted this model and diverged from
the evolutionary path of earlier movement parties. By extension, this project
will also speak to questions of how these parties manage their relationships
with social movements and why they have made different decisions than the
Social and Christian Democratic parties that came before them. The following
section discusses existing approaches that address some of these issues, before
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I outline my own theory in the final section of this chapter.
Alternative Explanations
While little work has focused on illuminating parties’ links with social move-
ments in particular, work in three traditions has shed light on the parties
this dissertation focuses on and their evolution. These approaches, rooted in
rational-choice accounts of party evolution, the analysis of older and in par-
ticular Social Democratic movement parties, and the study of niche parties re-
spectively all illuminate some aspect of party-movement interactions but, as we
will see below, cannot account for their choice of the movement platform party
model.
The first group of theories applies a rationalist approach with a focus on
elite preferences to explain the origins and evolution of political parties. In John
Aldrich’s (2011) prominent account of U.S. parties, he argues that the central ac-
tors in a party are office seekers (Aldrich 2011, p. 17).13 In his view these office
seekers face three central problems and creating political parties helps them to
solve these problems (Aldrich 2011, pp. 19-22). Besides regulating the access
to public office and allowing the creation of stable voting blocs that solve so-
cial choice problems and avoid voting cycles,14 parties help office-seekers solve
the collective action problem15 of mobilizing voters (Aldrich 2011, pp. 105-109).
From this perspective, the decision to retain a strong link to a particular social
movement is puzzling as it impedes the goal of mobilizing the largest number
13Also see Ostrogorski (1970b) for a similar, much earlier account of the U.S. developments
Aldrich (2011) focuses on.
14See Arrow (1951) on voting cycles.
15See Olson (1965) for a general theory of collective action problems.
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of voters in order to win office. The programmatic positions required to retain
the link to a movement can be interpreted in two ways. First, as taking posi-
tions far away from the median voter and thus the programmatic locus of main-
stream parties (Downs 1957) thereby giving up competing for the largest part of
the electorate. A second interpretation is that movement platform parties and
the movements from which they are spawned add new dimensions to politi-
cal competition. Again, competing on these new dimension, which are at least
early on not prioritized by the majority of voters, is not a strategy to maximize
the chance for winning office. Moreover, despite their increasing relevance none
of the alternative, new dimensions like the one between the poles of material-
ism and post-materialism (Inglehart 1997), of which environmental movements
and Green parties can be seen as an expression, have so far supplanted the
main left/right divide, which is dominated by economic issues (Ha¨usermann
& Kriesi 2015, pp. 222-227).
The second actor Aldrich (2011) highlights are benefit-seekers, who provide
resources needed by office-seekers in exchange for patronage by those politi-
cians (Aldrich 2011, p. 18). Again, these actors do not profit from narrowing
a party’s programmatic appeal to those sympathetic to a specific social move-
ment, as it lessens the chance for office-seekers to access the government re-
sources needed to extend patronage to benefit-seekers. While Aldrich (2011)
highlights that after 1960s the nature of benefit-seekers has moved from those
seeking patronage to ideological activists seeking policy change (Aldrich 2011,
pp. 187-188), chapter 3 below shows that a similar reinvigoration by (move-
ment) activists has not occurred in the European context. On the contrary,
movement and party activism are increasingly distinct fields with their own,
separated sets of (potential) actors (cf. Ramiro & Morales (2014)).
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Not only do these approaches have difficulties accounting for the retention
of strong programmatic links with movements, their correct prediction that the
organizational connection between parties and movements will disappear over
time would expect party elites to be the actor that pushes for the dissolution of
those links in order to increase their own flexibility in achieving office-seeking
goals (see e.g. Kitschelt’s discussion of trade union links to Social Democratic
parties (Kitschelt 1994, p. 225)). Yet, as chapter 4 below demonstrates, the orga-
nizational separation is largely driven by movement elite preferences.
Extensions of the rationalist approach have been made to specifically allow
for the analysis of movement parties. Kitschelt (2006b) defines movement par-
ties as those making low investments in solving collective action and social
choice problems. Thus, he retains the focus on problems faced by party elites
and predicts a change away from the movement party model to occur depend-
ing on changes in the opportunity structure relating to the salience of a party’s
core issue, policy changes, and government participation (Kitschelt 2006b, p.
288). While these factors are clearly relevant, the party elite focus of this ap-
proach blinds it to the importance of social movement strategies in shaping the
models parties (can) adopt. The approach also fails to explicitly recognize the
possibility that organizational and programmatic links between a party and a
movement are shaped in different ways. This dissertation will demonstrate that
not only the dissolution of organizational links discussed above, but also the
retention of programmatic links is the result of strategic choices of social move-
ments (and party reactions to those strategies).
A second group of approaches traces the evolution of Social Democratic par-
ties from movement parties with tight programmatic links to the union move-
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ment to electoral-professional, catch-all type parties. These approaches expect
all movement parties to moderate, diversify, and increase the vagueness of their
programmatic platform in search of a broader electoral base beyond move-
ment sympathizers. The most prominent account in this vein is Przeworski and
Sprague’s work on European Social Democracy (Przeworski & Sprague 1986).
They show that because workers did not come to dominate advanced indus-
trial societies to the extent that appealing to them on class-centered platforms
facilitated winning parliamentary majorities, Social Democrats broadened their
appeals to include other socio-demographic groups beginning with potential
allies in agricultural and later the middle classes (Przeworski & Sprague 1986,
pp. 33-45). This programmatic broadening, however, undermined the party’s
ability to focus programmatic appeals on “workers’ interests” and thus led to
a drift not only from the union movement, but towards competing electorally
based on policy offerings that would maximize the vote targeted at individual-
rather than group-interests (Przeworski & Sprague 1986, pp. 45-55). Why newer
movement parties have not similarly tried to broaden their programmatic ap-
peals, especially considering their relatively meager electoral results, remains
puzzling from this viewpoint.
The expectations these approaches have for movement parties’ organiza-
tional connections to movements build on early insights from studies of political
parties by Ostrogorski (1970a) and Michels (1915) and are more in line with the
empirical observations. Based on the historical development of parties in the
United Kingdom, Ostrogorski (1970a) argued that parties made “electioneer-
ing” more complicated, requiring increasing professionalization of their organi-
zations and thereby making the party “worker” the central player in the party
organization (Ostrogorski 1970a, e.g. pp. 592-593). Similarly, Michels’ (1915) fa-
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mous “iron law of oligarchy” is based on the assumption that the bureaucratic
structures of a party apparatus, due to their increasing complexity, would even-
tually empower elites within these parties, among other reasons because party
members did not possess the necessary skills to effectively control those elites.
Thus, these approaches expect increasing professionalization of political parties
and that the party elites empowered in that way will move their organization
away from its organizational roots in social movements. While professionaliza-
tion16 and a move away from parties’ bottom-up roots can indeed be observed
(cf. chapter 3), this project, as discussed above, will demonstrate that this is not
the work of party elites.
Thus both the rationalist approach and theories developed to account for
the evolution of earlier movement parties expect a focus on winning elections
through programmatic broadening and moderation (the “electoral” in electoral-
professional party), as well as a professionalization of the party bureaucracy
limiting outside influence and connections (the “professional” in electoral-
professional party). Yet we have not observed the programmatic de-linking of
movement parties since 1945 and the organizational separation was driven by
movement actors, rather than party elites’ preferences.
Finally, there have been literatures on each of the movement platform party
families (see chapter 3 for an overview), often focused on explaining their ap-
pearance and electoral success, as well as occasional attempts to classify some
of their similarities, e.g. as new challenger parties (Hino 2012) or anti-political
16This professionalization also highlights that the retention of programmatic links is not com-
pletely driven by a larger influence of policy-driven activists in internally more democratic par-
ties (Lehrer 2012). While many movement platform parties remain more participatory than
mainstream parties and chapter 6 will show that movements influence party platforms through
a shared activist base, the parties also have experienced some level of professionalization (see
e.g. Burchell (2001a) with respect to Green parties) that significantly empowered party elites,
whose preferences and interests are not (automatically) aligned with the activist base.
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establishment parties (Abedi 2004). The most fruitful strain of research, how-
ever, has come from conceptualizing Green, radical right, and regionalist par-
ties as niche parties (Meguid 2008). Meguid (2005) defines niche parties as po-
litical parties that focus on limited programmatic appeals regarding issues that
are not easily located alongside the traditional, class-dominated left/right di-
mension (Meguid 2005, pp. 347-348). The resulting literature has contributed
much to our understanding of partisan dynamics in Europe including the con-
ditions under which mainstream parties can limit niche party success (for in-
stance Pardos-Prado (2015) and Meguid (2008)) and even how niche parties
influence trade policy (Camyar 2012). Depending on the definition of “niche
party,” which has become a topic of debate,17 niche parties and movement plat-
form parties are overlapping, but by no means identical concepts. Movement
platform parties are defined through their programmatic connection to a social
movement. While this is the case for many niche parties, not all of them remain
programmatically connected to an existing movement. Adams et al. (2006), for
instance, include Communist Parties in their analysis of niche parties. The rad-
ical (union) organizations that gave rise to these parties have long ceased to
exist and can accordingly not interact with and exert pressure on parties in the
way environmental movement organizations do with respect to Green parties,
for example. Moreover, not all regionalist parties have had mobilized social
movements as their origin. Furthermore, as discussed above, more recent so-
cial movements spawned parties like Podemos in Spain that had strong char-
acteristics of the movement platform party model from their inception.18 These
parties successfully compete on the mainstream, economic left/right dimension
17See Meguid (2005), Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow (2006), Wagner (2012), and Bischof
(2017) for four distinct approaches.
18See Go´mez-Reino & Llamazares (2015, pp. 18-21) for the organizational struggles within
Podemos and the move from grassroots to a structure more focused on the national leadership
of Pablo Iglesias.
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(by outflanking the mainstream parties on the left) and are thus not niche par-
ties in Meguid’s (2005) definition. In short, while many parties included in the
analysis below are both niche and movement platform parties, there are niche
parties (e.g., Communists) that are not movement platform parties, as well as
movement platform parties (e.g. Podemos) that are not niche parties.19
More important than the definitional differences is that the niche party liter-
ature struggles to explain movement platform parties’ adherence to their pro-
grammatic links to movements. Meyer & Wagner (2013) argue that niche par-
ties should moderate when faced with disappointing electoral results. Yet, as
the example of the Swedish Greens in the introduction above illustrates, many
movement platform parties have retained their programmatic link to a move-
ment even though they achieved comparatively little electoral success and did
not experience consistent improvement of their electoral fortunes. Moreover,
after the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe weakened the attachments of
many voters to mainstream parties (Herna´ndez & Kriesi 2016), many niche par-
ties with movement roots were at first glance best positioned to profit from that
development. Green parties, for instance, were established center-left parties
which by delinking from the movements which gave rise to them and stressing
their economic positions could have replaced the mainstream center-left parties
damaged by the European crisis. Yet new challenger parties filled that role and
Green parties remained static in their movement platform party model. This
behavior is particularly puzzling in light of research on niche parties’ electoral
performance demonstrating that while highlighting niche issues is electorally
advantageous for young parties, these advantages of “nicheness” (i.e. remain-
ing tied to movement demands in the case of niche parties with movement
19See figure E.1 for an illustration of the overlap and differences between the programmatic
and niche party concepts.
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origins) diminishes over time (Zons 2016). I will argue below that the reason
why work on niche parties struggles to account for the sustained niche-focus of
many niche parties with movement roots is that it overlooks these roots and the
agency of social movements.
In sum, the three approaches most suitable to analyzing the evolution of
movement parties cannot explain their consistent transformation into move-
ment platform parties. Because they are either focused on party elite behavior
(rationalist approaches to party development and studies of Social Democrats’
evolution) or narrow the relevant actors to parties and their voter base (the niche
party literature), these approaches overlook the deep roots of these parties in
civil society and how they are shaped by social movements’ tactics to hold them
accountable. I will lay out this argument in detail below.
The Argument: Movement Platform Parties as the Result of So-
cial Movement Strategies and Saturated Electoral Markets
I argue that the answer to the puzzle of why contemporary movement parties
adopt the movement platform party type lies in how party elites’ room for ma-
neuver is constrained by social movement elites’ preferences and strategies, as
well as the saturated West European electoral markets and the preferences of
those voters left up for grabs in those markets. Social movements maximize
their policy influence through organizational separation from all political par-
ties, while at the same time exerting policy-pressure on those parties. Political
parties with movement roots do not have the resources to prevent SMOs seeking
to organizationally distance themselves from the parties they spawned. More-
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over, due to a combination of SMO pressure regarding policies and the pro-
grammatically motivated nature of their core electorates, these parties also lack
opportunities to broaden their electoral appeal beyond movement platforms.
Thus, this dissertation argues that what looks like a disadvantageous way
for former movement parties to manage their relationships with the movement
is actually the result of highly party elites strategically reacting to social move-
ment pressure and the limitations of their environments. By adopting the move-
ment platform model these parties maximize electoral success, which for most
of these parties equals survival as parliamentary parties due to their small size.
I will discuss the incentives for movement and then party elites with respect
to organizational and programmatic connections between them in distinct sub-
sections below. Both the reasoning here and the evidence in subsequent chap-
ters focuses on parties that have successfully established themselves in at least
some parliaments (be they subnational, supranational, or federal) in their re-
spective countries. That is, the question of when new parties are formed and
under which circumstances they become successful parliamentary parties is be-
yond the scope of this project.20
Incentives for Social Movements
While social movements are inextricably linked to the parties that originate from
them in the parties’ early days, I argue that social movements should seek to
loosen their organizational connection to those parties. There are three distinct
20There is a rich literature on these questions. See Bolleyer (2013, pp. 24-30) for an overview
and Farrer (2014) for the specific question when (movement) activists turn to party activism to
push their policy agenda.
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reasons that incentivize movements and their organizations to do so. First, be-
ing perceived as a partisan organization will severely limit their ability to build
support for their goals, both on the level of activists and donors and on the level
of political elites. Social movements need to build a broad coalition reaching far
beyond the supporters of one particular political party to achieve their desired
policy change. Being perceived as affiliated, or worse a “front organization,”
for a political party will severely limit SMOs’ chances to recruit the necessary
activists and donors, because the organizations’ appeal will remain limited to
those sympathetic to that one party. Thus, organizational separation from the
party spawned by the movement will increase SMOs’ mobilizational potential.
With respect to political elites, organizational separation furthermore allows for
working relationships with other parties and thus influence on policy, inde-
pendent of the partisan composition of the government. Both of these factors
weigh particularly heavy in the context of electoral systems characterized by
proportional representation that dominate in Western Europe, as the resulting
multi-party systems create more and smaller parties (Duverger 1972), making
strong ties to only one of them even less desirable. Movement parties are, ad-
ditionally, especially poor potential partners for close cooperation, since their
electoral success is often uncertain in the beginning and has remained severely
circumscribed even in later stages of their development. As described in the
introduction, for instance, the Swedish Greens struggled to gain parliamentary
representation for the better part of a decade after their founding and lost that
representation again after just one legislative period. Thus, social movement
organizations are incentivized to establish contacts with all relevant, not com-
pletely adversarial political parties, but organizational ties with none. Aiming
for this kind of role “between” the political parties is a strategy only open to
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contemporary SMOs, because they find themselves in a different environment
than their union predecessors, who could not hope for cooperation from the
existing liberal or conservative parties, leaving the new Socialist parties as the
only credible partners.
Second, many movements that gave rise to movement platform parties or-
ganized activists who are very skeptical about the efficacy of political parties
for achieving policy change and accordingly about cooperating with those par-
ties. Aware of the Social Democratic experience and their drift from the work-
ers’ movement described above, these so-called New Social Movements (NSMs)
(Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni 1995) often saw establishing more
direct democratic models of participation, avoiding the “iron law of oligarchy,”
as an explicit goal (Kitschelt 1993). Thus, these movements and their activists
consciously adopted a model different from the “old left” and kept their dis-
tance from party politics, seeing it as tainted by self-interest instead of serving
the larger public interest. Despite this skepticism these New Social Movements
were the origins of Green parties and also influenced leftist regionalist parties,
like the Welch Plaid Cymru (McAllister 2002), and Pirate Parties (e.g. Haas &
Hilmer (2012) for the German case). Those activists, however, that did not en-
gage with the party founding process are more likely than their predecessors in
the union or Catholic laymen movements to harbor views critical of parties and
to eschew organizationally connecting with them.
Third, the organizational separation should furthermore be expected as a
natural consequence of the party founding process which forces movement ac-
tivists and sympathizers to make a choice between dedicating their time and
effort to party or movement activism. While some might be able to split their
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time equally, most activists are (over time) likely to focus on one area of activism
or the other. For elites in particular it will be almost impossible to remain firmly
rooted in both the party and the movement, considering the time investment
required for these positions. This process should lead to a particular strong sep-
aration of a movement and party sphere in NSM-driven movement parties, as
those activists who are willing to make some programmatic compromises and
potentially take over government responsibility, will enter the party early. Oth-
ers, who preferred a more stringent, non-parliamentarian movement approach,
will have stayed outside of the party or left it early on. Thus, founding the party
separates the movement into two sets of actors that share policy goals, but do
not agree about the best way to reach them and are thus unlikely to retain strong
organizational ties in the long term. This might explain findings showing that
civil society organizations and Green parties in Spain rely on different sets of
(potential) activists (Ramiro & Morales 2014).
The only clear benefit an organizational connection with a party would
offer social movements is to serve as focal point for the various activist cir-
cles of the movements, for example as an agenda setter during electoral cam-
paigns. As Tarrow (1998) argues (new) social movements have evaded Michels’
(1915) “iron law of oligarchy” through increasingly decentralized structures
(Tarrow 1998, pp. 129-132). Without coordination however, these movements
are threatened by inefficiency and thus “the most effective forms of organiza-
tion are based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted local units linked
by connective structures, and coordinated by formal organizations” (Tarrow 1998,
p. 124) (emphasis added). Yet there is no reason SMOs cannot play the coordi-
nating roles themselves and would need to rely on a party for this function. In
fact some movements have explicitly created umbrella organizations, like the
44
German League for Nature, Animal Protection and Environment, to coordinate
the activities of different SMOs. Thus, in sum, social movements and their orga-
nizations have three distinct incentives grounded in maximizing their program-
matic influence, skepticism about the motives and efficacy of political parties,
and the dynamics of aging organizations to organizationally separate from the
parties they spawn.
With respect to programmatic links, however, movements have no reason to
advocate for distance between party and movement as long as the lack of orga-
nizational connections is clear. Even if the party remains small, having a party
that articulates movement demands in the parliamentary arena and potentially
in governments can be helpful in many ways. As long as the party exists, the
political opportunity structure is a little more open for the movements, since
they have a set of elite allies (Tarrow 1998, pp. 79-80). In fact, many contempo-
rary movements are uniquely positioned to exert pressure on political parties
and since they have partially institutionalized (cf. chapter 3 for a discussion
of the parties relevant to this project and the movements that surround them)
and can make use of a wide variety of tactics ranging from political contention
to interest group-style approaches like lobbying. However, earlier movements,
like the labour movement, also have brought pressure down on the parties they
spawned, but could not prevent the programmatic drift of those parties. The
next subsection will theorize why contemporary movement parties made dif-
ferent decisions than their Social and Christian Democratic predecessors and
cannot escape the movements’ policy pressure.
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Strategic Incentives for Movement Parties
With respect to an organizational link, I argue that movement platform parties,
which as described above have few resources to offer movements, are forced
to accept the organizational separation desired by SMOs. Under these circum-
stances party elites have no other alternative than to accept the growing organi-
zational distance from the movement and to try to capitalize on it by realizing
so-called “positive radical flank effects” (Haines 1988). As soon as the party
and movement are (perceived as) separate actors and the party takes a more
moderate position than the movement, the movement becomes a radical flank
to the party,21 which constrains party behavior. Parties with movement roots
are likely to be more moderate than the movements which spawned them be-
cause participating in elections and formulating platforms requires being more
specific about policies and their timetables, which will often lead to modera-
tion in order to specify “realistic/achievable” goals. The Scottish National Party
(SNP), for instance, as a party of regional government that negotiated the inde-
pendence referendum of 2014, faced the Radical Independence Campaign, an
alliance of groups to the left of the SNP also campaigning for independence
(Scotland Herald 2012). In the case that the party is in a position to shape pol-
icy having to make compromises to pass legislation becomes even more likely
(cf. Kitschelt (2006b, p. 285)). The plans for a nuclear energy phase out devel-
oped by a Green Party-backed government in Germany, for instance, were not
21Moderates and radicals are relative concepts (Haines 1988, pp. 7-8). They can be distin-
guished via the strategies they pursue, which I define, following Szymanski (2003) as the choices
social movements (and movement parties in this case) make about how to define and pursue
their goals (Szymanski 2003, p. 5). The level of contentiousness on these two dimensions, goal
definition and the repertoire of action used to pursue it, are likely to correlate. This is especially
likely in the case under study here where moderates are parties and by definition focus at least
some energy on participation through the accepted mechanism of elections, and furthermore
have strong incentives to also moderate goals.
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far reaching enough for many in the anti-nuclear movement and the movement
has been critical of the outcomes generated by the plan (e.g. Stay (2009)).
For moderates (the party in this case) the existence of radical flanks can have
positive or negative effects (Killian 1972, Haines 1988). On the one hand, rad-
icals can help moderates to keep the movement’s issue on the agenda. When
moderates can point to a clear separation from radicals, the latter’s presence
can furthermore lead to outside support and access to decision makers for mod-
erates, and eventually contribute to goal attainment (Haines 1988, pp. 5-11).
Moderate civil rights organizations in the United States, for example, received
increasing donations from corporations, the federal government, and founda-
tions (i.e. establishment actors) during the escalation of the civil rights move-
ment towards the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s (Haines 1988, pp. 127-128).
Furthermore not only movement organizations can profit from radical flank ef-
fects. The radical right Danish People’s Party, for instance, benefited from pos-
itive radical flank effects, since its xenophobic frames were more acceptable to
the electorate due to the presence of another party that was even more radical
in its xenophobic appeals (Rydgren 2004, p. 487). On the other hand, negative
radical flank effects might hurt the party when radicalism undermines the legit-
imacy of the movement as a whole or pulls moderates too far from the center
of public opinion or the median voter, respectively.22 Thus, with organizational
separation forced upon them by the movement, party elites should work to re-
alize positive radical flank effects to at least mitigate the loss of the movement’s
mobilizational potential.
22Haines (1988) argues that both negative and positive radical flank effects will almost always
coexist and that the net effects are decisive (Haines 1988, p. 176). He finds that positive radical
flank effects consistently prevailed in the U.S. civil rights movement. Positive effects have also
been identified by others studying the civil rights movement (Jenkins & Eckert 1986).
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Turning to the programmatic connection, the need to take a somewhat more
moderate position than the movement to achieve positive radical flank effects
is not the only incentive to loosen programmatic ties with the movement. Pro-
grammatic connections, additionally limit the parties’ abilities to achieve elec-
toral success because they make it difficult for voters outside the movement core
to identify with the party. This is a major problem where movement activists
represent a relatively small sub-set of the electorate. In sum, programmatic ties
lock movement parties into policy platforms that limit party leaders’ abilities
to appeal to a broader electorate and react to shifting voter distributions in a
flexible manner.
Thus, in the absence of organizational links with movements whose mobi-
lizational potential might make up for the downsides of a programmatic move-
ment connection, movement platform party elites face strong incentives to also
decouple from the movement programmatically to broaden their parties’ elec-
toral appeal. Even if these elites are exclusively focused on policy change they
will have an interest in winning a significant number of votes and parliamen-
tary seats. This is the case independent of whether the parties are office/vote-
seeking (Downs 1957) or policy-seeking (Mu¨ller & Strøm 1999, de Swaan 1973),
because even for the latter electoral success is a precondition for policy influ-
ence, either through government participation or being a large enough threat to
another party which will then adopt some of the movement’s policy demands.
Theoretically three different ways of becoming more appealing to broader
electorates are available to party elites. First, they could follow the trajec-
tory laid out by older movement parties and move towards an electoral-
professional party model with broader and/or more vague programmatic ap-
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peals that are targeted at the median voter rather than movement activists
(Panebianco 1988, Katz & Mair 1995). Second, movement platform parties
could adopt segmented programmatic appeals to different constituencies, al-
lowing them to retain core voters, while sending different and broader appeals
to other voters (cf. Luna (2014) on segmented representation). Finally, they
could shed the programmatic nature of their appeals altogether and adopt an
anti-establishment, populist model, attracting voters by presenting themselves
as representatives of the “true people” in the struggle against an entrenched,
corrupt elite (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012a).
Why do movement parties not make use of these strategies and reap their
electoral benefits? I argue that their ability to do so is circumscribed by the
strategic environment into which contemporary movement parties are “born.”
They face both a different party-political space and a different civil society en-
vironment than pre-World War II movement parties. With respect to the for-
mer and unlike the world that defined the choices of earlier movement par-
ties, European politics are already dominated by electoral-professional parties
(Panebianco 1988), which appeal to the electorate on broad and vague plat-
forms. Movement parties are compelled to break with this model and enter
the electoral arena with concrete programmatic linkages in specific issue ar-
eas. These linkages are typically offered on a different axis of competition
than the dominant left/right divide about economic policy (cf. Hug (2001))
and the electoral appeal of these parties is mostly based on these program-
matic stands, which differentiate them from mainstream parties. Examples
for this are abundant. The SNPs commitment to Scottish independence, even
after the lost referendum in 2014, is not in doubt, and the party is already
pushing for another referendum in light of the British decision to leave the
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European Union (Stone 2016). Green Parties have achieved nuclear phase-
outs in Germany (Ru¨dig 2002) and left a government over the construction of
new nuclear power plants in Finland (Sundberg & Wilhelmsson 2004). Finally,
many studies have shown that “anti-immigration messages are the core issues”
(Rydgren 2007, p. 244) of radical right parties and this focus is plainly visible
across Europe. A recent prominent example is the Sweden Democrats who al-
most managed to bring down the Swedish minority government in late 2014
(Svenska Dagbladet 2014a).
Thus while movement parties might attract some protest and anti-
establishment voters, for their core support these parties rely on issue voters:
those who demand policy change regarding the movement parties’ area of fo-
cus in particular (e.g. independence or increased autonomy for Regionalist par-
ties). The nature of issue voting, i.e. voting based on which party’s platform is
closest to a voter’s issue preferences, has long been debated in political science
(Borre 2001, pp. 9-15). The literature has focused on questions of how parti-
san attachments relate to issue voting and which of these two factors exerts
a stronger influence on the vote decision (RePass 1971, Broh 1973), as well as
the relative strength of issue voting compared to evaluations of party leaders
(Bellucci, Garzia, & Lewis-Beck 2015). Recently, however, studies have started
to recognize that contextual factors (Lachat 2011) and the characteristics of par-
ties in particular (Hellwig 2014, Gerber, Nicolet, & Sciarini 2015) can moder-
ate the level of issue voting. While I agree that party characteristics are re-
lated to issue voting, I depart from this literature by arguing that citizens differ
in how interested they are in being able to vote on the issues. Many voters
seem to be satisfied with the broad, economic programmatic linkages of main-
stream parties. These voters rely on habitual identities (Campbell, Converse,
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Miller, & Stokes 1960), assessments of the governments performance on the
economy (Powell & Whitten 1993, Anderson 2000), or the personality of can-
didates (Aarts, Blais, & Schmitt 2011) to make their vote decision. However,
those citizens who have a strong preference for casting a vote based on clear
policy choices will flock to movement and movement platform parties. That
is, these parties have strong incentives to compete on a different issue dimen-
sion beyond broader left/right economic issues and/or offer more specifically
described policy platforms.
Thus, my argument is in line with the observation that“[t]he dimensional-
ity of the political space has increased and electorates are more fragmented”
in advanced capitalist societies and “[a]s a consequence, models built around
dichotomous constituencies (Left vs. Right, labor vs. capital) in one dimen-
sion provide limited analytical leverage” (Beramendi, Ha¨usermann, Kitschelt, &
Kriesi 2015, p. 3). Different voter types demand programmatic linkages on dif-
ferent dimensions, and those who are dissatisfied with the mainstream parties’
focus on an economically dominated left/right dimension – where Socialists,
Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Conservatives cover dif-
ferent positions along that dimension – find a “political home” with movement
platform parties stressing, for instance, issues of environmental protection, re-
gional independence, or immigration.
The origins of contemporary movement parties and the environment in
which they find themselves outlined in the previous paragraphs also prevents
movement (platform) parties from turning to alternative strategies which would
reduce their programmatic links and deploy either a catch-all, segmented, or
populist strategy in order to attract voters currently attached to one of the
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electoral-professional parties. These three strategies are not attractive options
because movement platform parties co-exist a) with a saturated party system
and b) strong, professional movement organizations in civil society (Meyer &
Tarrow 1998b). Due to the existing partisan competition movement platform
parties chances of picking up new voters by diluting programmatic links to the
movement would be extremely circumscribed, since voters satisfied with the
mainstream parties and their programmatic focus already have a variety of par-
ties from which to choose. It is not clear why one more option that is hard to dis-
tinguish from the other parties would induce mainstream party voters to switch
their party preference. At the same time, cutting all links to the movements and
diluting programmatic appeals will lead to the loss of most of the movement
party’s initial supporters. Thus the assumption that there is a trade-off between
vote- and policy-seeking behavior is fallacious for movement platform parties
(see also Adams et al. (2006, p. 514)) and these strategies are mutually reinforc-
ing rather than conflictual for them.
Moreover strong movement organizations in civil society have the means to
quickly inform core electorates about a party’s performance on its core issues.
These organizations will identify any attempt by a party to deviate from its core
programmatic commitments by broadening their appeals. Thus SMOs have the
means to incentivize large groups of core voters to punish movement platform
parties’ attempts to “escape” their programmatic niche by (threatening) absten-
tion. In the same way they can counter attempts of movement platform parties
of sending different signals to different groups in society (i.e. segmenting their
appeals) or adopting a populist strategy by keeping core voters informed about
these deviations from movement interests. Thus, cutting links to the movements
and diluting programmatic appeals will lead to the loss of most of a movement
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(platform) party’s initial supporters. This is particularly true, since these par-
ties’ issue-focused core electorates are likely to be tuned in to the messages of
SMOs working in the relevant sector.
It is unlikely that movement platform parties can make up this fast loss of
core voters quickly enough by attracting new voters. This risk is even more
severe because most movement platform parties are small and any significant
loss of electoral support can endanger their parliamentary survival. Thus, with
movement platform parties being locked into a programmatic electoral niche,
movement organization elites are in a unique position to pressure movement
platform parties to remain true to their issue focus, and SMOs, even in the
absence of organizational links to the movement platform parties, hold strong
sway over these parties. Accordingly, making the move towards another party
model is not a winning strategy for most movement platform parties and situ-
ating themselves concisely in an ideological minority of issue-driven voters is a
vote-maximizing choice for them.
This equilibrium is only shattered when mainstream parties weaken and
allow (new) movement (platform) parties a path to pick up voters formerly
attached to one of the mainstream parties by competing on the economic
dimension, for instance when an external shock leads to widespread anti-
establishment sentiments. Podemos in Spain has achieved this kind of break-
through in the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis and exemplifies
how movement platform parties can escape electoral niches and reach main-
stream status when large numbers of voters become detached from traditional
parties.23 It is noteworthy that even under these circumstances it were mostly
23A so far hypothetical, alternative path to break the equilibrium would occur if the orthog-
onal (non-economic) dimension became more salient than the main, economic dimension for a
significant number of voters, allowing movement platform parties to extend their niches.
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new parties like Podemos or parties revitalized due to a renewed (program-
matic) influx from social movements, like Syriza, that profited from the dis-
illusionment with mainstream parties, rather than the pre-exiting movement
platform parties, like Green parties, which remained locked into their issue di-
mension due to their core electorates and SMO pressure.
Why then, if movement parties are “trapped” in the movement platform
model, do electoral-professional parties not successfully compete with these
parties for the programmatically-driven voters? Mainstream parties too have to
balance the expectations of their core electorate with potential gains that can be
made by going after movement party voters. Developing and highlighting po-
sitions on new dimensions of competition risks losing some of their voters, who
disagree with the (new) concrete policies. For example, many core supporters
of Social Democratic parties with a preference for economic growth would be
wary if those parties were to adopt environmental policies that would threaten
growth and the jobs (perceived to be) tied to that growth. Furthermore, main-
stream parties often face serious restrictions in their knowledge about the (po-
tential) strength of a new movement party and the size of the electoral dam-
age they might suffer from the new party (Hug 2001). At the same time win-
ning over movement party voters is a long-term process as the credibility of an
electoral-professional party to deliver on concrete policies is initially low. Voters
will assume that if the position taken on the new issue conflicts with positions
on the economic left/right divide, mainstream parties will always prioritize the
latter over the former. Thus, current mainstream party leaders are faced with
the certain loss of some voters and only long-term chances to attract new vot-
ers from a small programmatically-driven minority of voters. For most leaders,
faced with short term concerns about reelection, this is hardly an attractive strat-
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egy.
The situation for modern movement parties is thus fundamentally different
from the party systems Social Democratic parties encountered in the late 19th
century and 20th century (Bartolini 2000). When Social Democrats diluted their
programmatic appeals to attract voters outside the working class, first the old,
then the new middle class (Przeworski & Sprague 1986, pp. 40-45), the electoral-
professional party model still had to be developed and their main electoral com-
petition consisted of liberal and conservative parties still organized in elite party
models (Duverger 1954, Katz & Mair 1995). Therefore Social Democrats faced
little competition for voters (potentially) attracted to a catch-all party model, as
the electoral marketplace was not yet saturated. They also had the considerable
advantage of mobilizing newly enfranchised voters, whose demands created
unoccupied ideological space into which the Social Democratic parties moved.24
With full suffrage achieved, mobilizing newly enfranchised voters is not an op-
tion for newer parties with movement origins.
To summarize, movement platform parties’ supply of programmatic link-
ages, which is inherent in their origins in social movements, is matched by a
demand for these types of linkages from issue voters. This demand, in turn,
was created by mainstream party developments towards electoral-professional
models, which failed to provide these issue-specific programmatic linkages (on
new dimensions). Social movement organizations have the ability to provide is-
24Because the incorporation of the working class ended the enfranchisement of new social
classes, Lipset & Rokkan (1967) expected West European party systems to be frozen thereafter,
since no new ideological, unoccupied space would become available. At least for Green par-
ties it is possible to argue that societal changes cumulating in the rise of the new middle class
(Kriesi 1989) provided a similar opening in the societal and ideological space. The concept and
explanatory power of the new middle class for new social movements, however, is contested
(see della Porta & Diani (2006, p. 55-64) for a summary of the debate and Dolezal (2010) for
differences within the new middle class and their relationship to supporting Green parties).
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sue voters with information about parties’ commitments to their core issues and
it is thus in movement platform parties’ interest to sustain strong programmatic
connections to the movement in order to avoid criticism from SMOs and retain
their core electorate. That is, in the light of having to accept the loosening of
organizational ties driven by SMO preferences, moving towards the movement
platform party ideal type is the most attractive option for movement parties.
The following chapter will describe the data I collected to test the theoretical
expectations laid out in this chapter and present an overview of the relevant
movement (platform) party families.
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CHAPTER 3
PARTY-MOVEMENT RELATIONS: FROM MOVEMENT TO MOVEMENT
PLATFORM PARTIES
After the preceding chapters have introduced the puzzle and theoretical
approach, this chapter will empirically verify the existence of the puzzle laid
out above. Accordingly, this chapter will show that contemporary parties with
movement roots are programmatically aligned, but organizationally separated
from the movements in which they originated. The chapter will first explain
the case selection for the in-depth study of four party-movement dyads and
describe the data collected on those dyads. It then provides a synopsis of pre-
1945 movement parties’ evolution into mainstream, electoral-professional par-
ties, which has set the expectations for movement party development in much
of the political science literature. The remainder of the chapter contrasts this
development with that of post-World War II movement parties. This part of
the chapter starts with a historical overview of the Swedish and German Green
parties, being exemplary cases of established movement platform parties, be-
fore another section summarizes the development of the Pirate parties in the
same countries, which struggle to establish themselves as relevant actors. These
sections draw on data from elite interviews, primary sources, and a survey of
Swedish Green party members, as well as a number of existing datasets and sec-
ondary literature to show that these parties remain programmatically aligned
with the movements that gave rise to them. The same data sources are em-
ployed to demonstrate that in spite of this programmatic alignment all four par-
ties exist in clear organizational separation from the movements that gave rise
to them. That is, along all three dimensions of a potential organizational connec-
tion (formal links, routinized interactions, and shared elite networks) links are
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either completely absent or only maintained at an extremely limited level. The
chapter furthermore provides evidence that not only the four parties studied
in detail, but parties with post-World War II movement roots more generally
(mainly Green, Pirate, regionalist, and radical right parties) have adopted the
movement platform party model. A final section summarizes the findings by
highlighting how the models of organizational connection to movements that
parties employed in their evolution differ depending on whether a party origi-
nated from a movement before or after the Second World War.
Case Selection and Data
This project investigates how and why parties with social movement roots af-
ter 1945 have adopted the movement platform party model. For that purpose
it draws on quantitative analyses of data on parties and voters across (West-
ern) Europe, as well as detailed case studies of the nexus between Green parties
and the environmental movement, along with Pirate parties and digital move-
ments1 in Germany and Sweden. The data from these case studies, including
information collected through interviews with party and movement leaders, a
party member survey, and participant observation is ideal for investigating how
party and movement elites interact, since they allow me to analyze dyadic pairs
of actors (movement platform party elites/movement elites in the movement
that gave rise to that party). Thus, it is possible to identify the beliefs on which
behavior is based and how that behavior is perceived by the other relevant ac-
tors.
1I use the term “digital movement” to denote organizations and activists focusing on issues
of copyright reform, the protection of privacy, and generally information-related issues. This
movement makes extensive use of electronic means of communication. Thus, the term reflects
both the content and the most prominent form of activism. For more details on the movement,
see below.
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Among the advantages of the case study approach is its “capacity for ad-
dressing causal complexity,” as well as the ability to “closely examine the
hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases”
(George & Bennett 2005, p. 19). This dissertation draws on both of these
strengths. First, it uses the four party-movement dyads to illuminate and ex-
plain the complex process of organizational separation between the parties and
the movements which gave rise to them by analyzing the factors that led to that
separation and the causal beliefs of party and movement elites that stabilize it
(see chapter 4). Second, the dissertation traces the mechanisms that continue to
programmatically connect the parties to the movements and allow movement
platform parties to retain their core electorates in spite of their organizational
separation from the movements (see chapters 5 and 6).
Focusing on these four party-movement dyads has several advantages. By
selecting a movement platform party family at a relatively early point in its
development (Pirate Parties) along with one that is well-established (Green Par-
ties), the study includes parties that represent the variation along the dimension
of party evolution towards a successfully established movement platform party.
That is, the study focuses on one party family, the Pirates, whose prospects were
unclear at the time the research was conducted and who struggled to establish
itself and another party family, the Greens, that has successfully completed the
transition to a stable movement platform party model. Thus, this project draws
on a diverse case selection technique (Gerring 2007, pp. 97-101) and in that way
guards against bias introduced by different stages of party development.2 This
will prevent assigning causal importance to factors that are present not only
2Of course not all potential movement parties are eventually founded and some social move-
ments abstain from creating a party. As discussed in chapter 2 this question is subject to a large
literature on new parties and is beyond the scope of this project, which addresses only move-
ment parties that have actually been created and possess a relevant electoral potential.
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in those parties that have successfully adopted the movement platform party
model, but also with respect to those still in the process of transition. In that
way the project also avoids exclusively selecting parties that have been success-
ful in establishing themselves and prevents “survivor bias.”
Second, including parties that focus on two fundamentally different issue
niches (the environment and information-related issues) ensures that inferences
about the development of movement platform parties are not unique to the
structure of social movements and/or parties in one issue area.3 Third, broaden-
ing the study to include the parties from two different countries guards against
drawing conclusions based on the peculiarities of one national context. Swe-
den and Germany were selected because they a) were two of the few countries
that had both electorally relevant Green and Pirate Parties4 and b) allowed a
most-similar cases design (Seawright & Gerring 2008, pp. 304-306) with respect
to potential moderating institutional variables. Both countries are established
multiparty democracies with electoral systems that translate votes proportion-
ally into seats for the lower chamber.5 Furthermore, both countries have a simi-
3This, of course, does not automatically mean that these results are representative for and
travel to other movement platform parties, for instance those originating in regionalist or radical
right, nationalist movements. It does, however, make generalizability more likely by identifying
the factors that matter in at least two, fundamentally different party-movement dyads, for many
of which there are no obvious reasons why they should not travel beyond Green and Pirate
parties. I will return to the issue of generalizability and to areas for further research in chapter
7.
4The other countries in which the Pirates and Greens achieved some form of supranational,
national, or significant representation on a state level are Iceland, where both parties hold seats
in the national parliament, and the Czech Republic, where both parties are represented in the
upper chamber.
5This is the case even though the German electoral system is technically a mixed system
with elements of both majoritarian and proportional representation (Norris 1997). Proportional
electoral systems dominate the European continent and thus Sweden and Germany are also
representative of most countries in Europe with respect to the electoral system, which is a central
variable shaping party strategy. This increases the likelihood that the results travel beyond
the particular case studies conducted here. For a study that investigates small party behavior,
in particular that of Green parties, in European countries with majoritarian electoral systems
(France and the United Kingdom), see Spoon (2011).
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lar electoral threshold that parties need to overcome to win representation in the
national parliament (four percent in Sweden (Larsson & Ba¨ck 2008, pp. 140-141)
and five percent in Germany (Rudzio 2003, p. 198)6). Thus, these countries are
similar with respect to central variables that potentially affect party strategies
and behavior with one exception: federalism. While Sweden is a centralized
country, Germany’s states have governments and parliaments with powers in
the areas of education and cultural policies, as well as the state administration
(Rudzio 2003, p. 373). That is, movements and parties work in different oppor-
tunity structures7 and in the German case, movements have, for instance, the
possibility of engaging with state parties and governments, while parties simi-
larly need to divide their resources between the different levels. Thus, drawing
on data from both countries allows the study to rule out the possibility that a
federal structure influences how and why parties with movement roots trans-
form into movement platform parties or to identify the ways in which it does
matter.8
Fourth, the study focuses on empirically important cases. The German
Greens, who participated in a national government from 1998-2005 and as of
June 2017 are represented in the government in 10 of Germany’s 16 states, are
one of the most successful Green parties. Additionally, the Swedish Pirates were
the original impetus for Pirate parties across the world after their 2009 break-
6In Germany it is technically possible to win a district directly and gain a Member of Par-
liament in that way, independent of the national results of a party. Furthermore, winning three
seats in this way guarantees a parliamentary group proportional to the vote won nationally,
even if it is below five percent (Rudzio 2003, p. 198). The German Greens, however, have never
won more than one district directly and the Pirate Party has never been close to winning an
electoral district directly, so that this way of winning representation was not a serious strategic
option for either party.
7See Tarrow (2011, pp. 26-28) for an overview and Kitschelt (1986) for an application to the
European anti-nuclear movement.
8The results of this study suggest that a federal structure does not fundamentally alter the
way in which movement platform parties and movements interact or the strategic calculus of
elites on both sides.
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through in the European elections. Fifth and finally, because of the German
Green Party’s success there is a large literature on the party which allows the
analysis to draw on extensive secondary sources about the party’s history and
comparing its current relationship with the environmental movement with ear-
lier stages of its’ development.
The data collection for these case studies included 74 interviews with party
elites in the four parties, as well as movement leaders in the environmental and
digital movements in Sweden and Germany. The interviews were guided by
10 questions that focused on both the interactions of parties and movements in
general, as well as on three potential arenas of interaction – electoral campaigns,
platform formulation processes, and elite recruitment – in particular. Interview
partners in political parties were also selected on these three potential arenas of
interaction (i.e., those likely to be involved in planning and executing national
campaigns, formulating the platform, and/or having oscillated between move-
ment and party in their careers). When sending interview requests to movement
organizations I requested an interview with the person in the organization most
familiar with interactions with political parties. The interviews were recorded
and subsequently transcribed and coded using a combination of hypothesis,
structural, and causation coding (Salda˜na 2013) in Atlas.ti.
The following analyses also draw on participant observation at Green party
conventions in Germany and Sweden (both in 2014), two Pirate party conven-
tions in Germany (in 2013 and 2014), and at Almedalensveckan 2014, a yearly
Swedish political event on the island of Gotland. Additionally I fielded a sur-
vey among members of the Swedish Green party in 2014, including questions on
their activism with in the party as well as in movements. A detailed description
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of all data sources can be found in the appendix.
From Movement to Mainstream: Social and Christian Demo-
cratic Parties
As a first step in analyzing party-movement relationship, this chapter turns to
the historical experience of Social and Christian Democrats, whose transforma-
tion into mainstream parties has set the expectations for movement party evo-
lution in Europe.
Social Democracy in Europe
I n the second half of the 19th century, Socialist and Social Democratic parties9
started to appear across the European continent to represent the interests of the
growing working class. They grew out of the labor and trade union movements
and “were, in general, the extension of or parallel to organizations that were
already active in the corporate channel [i.e. unions]” (Bartolini 2000, p. 244).
The order in which parties and movement organizations developed differed
between countries; while in Great Britain, for instance, the Labour Party was
founded by the unions, Social Democrats in the Netherlands formed connec-
tions to the labor movement after the inception of the party (Gallagher, Laver, &
Mair 2011, p. 240). The “prevalent” relationship between unions and parties
“was interlocking, with overlapping ancillary organizations, leadership, and
activities” (Bartolini 2000, p. 256). Thus Socialist parties and the labor move-
9I use Socialist and Social Democratic parties interchangeably in this dissertation.
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ment established strong formal and routinized informal links between their or-
ganizations, as well as a shared a network of elites. In Belgium, for instance,
“[u]ntil World War II, candidates and party figures were almost exclusively
trade unionists” (Bartolini 2000, p. 258) and the Swedish movement established
collective membership in the SAP and the LO, Sweden’s main union organiza-
tion (A˚mark 1992, p. 68).
With respect to ideology, as Sassoon (1996) points out “there was no neces-
sary causal link between the rise of an organized labour movement and the
ideology of socialism” (Sassoon 1996, p. 5), but in continental Europe some
form of Marxist socialism dominated the movements as well as the parties
they spawned (see also (Bartolini 2000, pp. 69-86)).10 That is, most Socialist
and Social Democratic parties aimed to overcome capitalism and pushed for
a fundamental restructuring of societies achieved by means of a “dictatorship
of the proletariat.” While “[b]efore 1914 there was very little difference between
the orthodox Marxist position represented by [Karl] Kautsky, and those, such
as Lenin, who after 1914 would denounce him as a social-patriot and rene-
gade” (Sassoon 1996, p. 20), a broad increase in the working class population
and issues with incorporating them into the movement, the First World War,
and the Russian Revolution in 1917 led to a radicalization of the movement
(Bartolini 2000, p. 87). This radicalization precipitated a split between the re-
formist and revolutionary wings of the movement and led to the breakaway of
communist parties in many countries (Bartolini 2000, pp. 97-109).
Not only did the Socialist and Social Democratic parties adopt reformist ide-
10The notable exception in Europe was always the British Labour party, which was dominated
by a less radical “trade unionism” (Bartolini 2000, pp. 70-72) and only after 1918 “unequivocally
espoused socialism when it adopted a new constitution and programme that year” (Hamilton
1989, p. 61).
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ologies, but they also moved to further moderate their programs afterwards.
This move away from a more fundamental restructuring of society was moti-
vated by the search for new electoral allies beyond the working class, which
had stopped growing well before reaching more than 50% of the population in
West European countries (Przeworski & Sprague 1986). In particular, the rise
of the “new middle classes” of (white-collar) employees incentivized this move
(Przeworski & Sprague 1986, p. 43), and the core of the new programmatic ori-
entation, “the democratization of society, the welfare state, and the regulation
of the labour market,” had already been foreshadowed in the German Social
Democratic Party’s 1891 platform (Sassoon 1996, p. 24). Thus, these parties
abandoned even a reformist strategy towards (a socialist) structural transfor-
mation and with it the “programmatic nationalization of the means of produc-
tion” (Przeworski 1985, p. 38). Przeworski & Sprague (1986) famously argued
that these moves weakened Socialists’ ability to mobilize along the class cleav-
age and thus their ability to challenge capitalism in a fundamental way. More
recently, Social Democrats in Europe, under the influence of the “Third Way,”
have moved even further to the political center (and median voter), creating ad-
ditional challenges for maintaining long-term voter attachments (Karreth, Polk,
& Allen 2012).
The extremely strong organizational ties between Socialist parties and trade
unions have been strained and severed over time. Moschonas (2002) ar-
gues that “[t]here is no doubt that a ubiquitous and progressive loosening of
the links between socialist parties and trade unions is currently in progress”
(Moschonas 2002, p. 132). In most West European countries connections be-
tween the parties and trade unions were loosened and many formal organiza-
tional ties completely abandoned. The timing of these changes varied between
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parties, but they often occurred (long) after the parties’ programmatic transfor-
mations. In Belgium, for instance, the party cut its formal links with the affili-
ated trade union organization right after World War II (Delwit 2013, p. 62), while
in Denmark a similar process only occurred in the 1990s (Christensen 2013, p.
96). In fact, based on a recent overview of Social Democratic parties across Eu-
rope (Waele, Escalona, & Viera 2013), the situation in Denmark, where the re-
lationships between the LO, the country’s trade union congress, and the Social
Democratic Party are “complicated as LO is generally seen as Social Democratic-
leaning while the party maintains its political independence of the trade union
movement” (Christensen 2013, p. 96) describes the situation in many West Euro-
pean countries well. In sum, while ties between Social Democrats have loosened
and many formal connections have been severed, some of the once extremely
close ties remain, in particular with respect to informal coordination.
Christian Democrats in Europe
Social science has paid more attention to movements and parties of the left
than the right (Kitschelt 1994, p. 1) and that is especially true for the sparse re-
search conducted on the movement roots of several Christian Democratic par-
ties (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen 2010). While in some countries, like Sweden
(Larsson & Ba¨ck 2008, pp. 87-88), a confessional party did not establish itself
until the second half of the 20th century, the Christian Democratic parties in
Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy had their roots in social
movements of the late 19th century. The Catholic church initiated mass mobi-
lization in defense of the role of religion and the church in society and politics
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against the rising tides of liberal democracy,11 but the formation of confessional
parties from the movements occurred against the preferences of Church lead-
ers (Kalyvas 1996). The church had only reluctantly turned to electoral forms of
pushing back against the state and intended for the shift from civil society tactics
to be temporary (Kalyvas 1998). Instead, church leaders’ concerns about losing
control over these organizations proved well-founded, and the initial success
of pro-church coalitions empowered activists in the movement (organizations),
who formed permanent Christian Democratic parties (Kalyvas 1996).
Thus, from the very beginning Christian Democratic parties had extremely
strained relationships with the movement organizations spawned by the
Church and the Church itself and, in fact, found themselves in competition for
members with the Church (Kalyvas 1996, p. 174). Accordingly, an indepen-
dent movement could not fully develop, as it would have stood in between
the Church and the Christian Democratic parties as competing actors. Never-
theless the Catholic lay organizations were strongly connected to the Christian
Democratic parties, which often directly arose out of these organizations, trans-
formed for electoral purposes. In Belgium, for instance, the leader of the largest
lay Catholic organization rose to be Prime Minister in 1884 (Kalyvas 1996, pp.
190-192).
The conflict with the Church also shaped the ideological profiles of Christian
Democratic parties:
[C]onfessional parties resented the church’s attempts to control and
subdue them. They fought for their autonomy and shifted their po-
litical priorities away from clerical issues [. . . ] Paradoxically, the end
result of their emergence was the gradual irrelevance of religion in
11Accordingly these parties, despite the collective term “Christian Democracy” that we apply
to them, often had anti-democratic elements (Warner 2012, p. 260).
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western European politics (Kalyvas 1998, p. 308).
Christian Democracy became an integrative force across class and other di-
visions (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen 2010, p. 187). It did so by not focusing on
a coherent (and by nature exclusionary) ideology and by integrating “Roman
Catholic doctrine” in a way that “aimed beyond the scope of traditional ’politi-
cal Catholicism’ and even to alter it” (Pridham 1976, p. 147). These origins laid
an ideological groundwork that eased the transition to a catch-all profile, al-
lowing the Christian Democrats to become the conservative counterpart to the
transformed center-left Social Democratic parties.
In sum, both the Social and Christian Democratic parties in Europe were
founded in fundamental ideological opposition to the state in its contemporary
form and over time deradicalized to become integrated in it. Later in their de-
velopment, they also shed most of their organizational links to the movements
in which they originated and took the profile of an electoral-professional party,
which included de-emphasizing a clear ideology (Panebianco 1988, p. 264).
The following sections will show that the development of two domi-
nant center-left and center-right party families in Europe from movement to
electoral-professional parties stands in stark contrast to the evolution of contem-
porary movement parties towards the movement platform party model. Parties
with movement roots founded after the Second World War quickly left their or-
ganizational connections to movements behind, but maintained an ideological
profile that remains in line with movement demands. Compared to their So-
cial and Christian Democratic predecessors, these parties were also much less
successful in attracting voters. The following two sections will first discuss the
two party-movement dyads studied in detail (Swedish and German Greens and
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Pirates and the “associated” environmental and digital movements), before an-
other section is dedicated to introducing each European party family with post-
World War II movements roots (i.e. Green, Pirate, regionalist, and radical right
parties).
Green Parties and Environmental Movements in Sweden and
Germany: From Movement to Movement Platform Parties
The Green parties in Sweden and Germany both originated in their respective
country’s environmental and anti-nuclear movements in the early 1980s. This
section will present a short overview of first the Swedish and then the Ger-
man party’s development, before providing evidence that these parties have
shed their organizational, but maintained their programmatic links to the move-
ments, i.e. that they have adopted the movement platform model.
Sweden: Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na
As in many other European countries Sweden first experienced bird and animal
protection efforts in the second half of the 19th century, about a century before
a new environmental movement was mobilized during the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s (Bostro¨m 2008). The environmental movement also spawned the core
of anti-nuclear mobilization during the 1970s (Jamison, Eyerman, Cramer, &
Læssøe 1995, p. 41). The Swedish Green party, Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na (Green
Environmental Party), grew out of these movements after a 1980 referendum
on nuclear energy (Ru¨dig 1990, p. 328) in which the most anti-nuclear energy
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alternative gained almost 40% of the vote, but was defeated by a compromise
option (Bennulf & Holmberg 1990, p. 167). As a result, movement leaders from
“The People Campaign Against Nuclear Power,” the group organizing the anti-
nuclear forces in the referendum, hoped that there was electoral potential for
a party that took up the issue and founded Miljo¨partiet in 1981 (Bennulf &
Holmberg 1990, p. 167). Despite being founded by movement activists and
leaders, social movement organizations themselves did not directly participate
in the party founding process (interview 020308).
The new party consciously adopted a structure that diffused power through-
out the party in response to the experiences of Social Democratic parties
(Gaiter 1991, pp. 24-25), whose drift away from their original setup towards
electoral-professional parties (Panebianco 1988) was seen as a result of the em-
powerment of an organizational elite (Michels 1915). This was reflected in cre-
ating accessible and democratic executive bodies, as well as in the decision to
have two, not one, party leaders and in referring to party leaders as Spra˚kro¨r,
spokespersons.12 Moreover, MP created autonomous sub-national party organi-
zations, far-reaching voting rights for members, and relied on rotation of offices
(Burchell 2002, pp. 108-110). Thus, the party made use of both decentraliza-
tion and some non-hierarchical elements in its organizational structure. Even
though over time Miljo¨partiet has “professionalized” and adjusted its structures
accordingly, which includes the streamlining of the national party organization
and relaxing rotation rules for office, it retains a participatory internal structure
(Burchell 2001a, p. 131). Members, for instance, continue to elect regional and
national representatives and all members can participate, though not all vote,
in national party conventions (Burchell 2001a, p. 130). Moreover, Miljo¨partiet’s
12In order to avoid confusion with public relations spokespersons I will continue to refer tor
Miljo¨partiet’s two Spra˚kro¨r as party leaders, rather than spokespersons.
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local and regional parties remain “relatively autonomous” from national-level
decisions (Burchell 2001a, p. 130).
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Figure 3.1: Electoral Results: Swedish Green Party
Electorally, taking environmental and nuclear issues to the ballot box was
rewarded with little electoral success at first, as figure 3.1 illustrates. It took the
Greens until the 1988 election to overcome the Swedish four percent threshold
for representation and enter parliament. This election is often referred to as the
“environmental election” in Sweden (Bennulf 1995, p. 128), because concerns
about nuclear energy had increased significantly in the aftermath of the Cher-
nobyl disaster (Holmberg 1988),13 and the environment more generally became
a central issue in the election (46% of respondents in the Swedish Election Study
identified it as one of the most important issues (Bennulf & Holmberg 1990, p.
165)). The party lost parliamentary representation again at the next election in
13For an overview of the development of Swedish nuclear policy in the aftermath of Cher-
nobyl, see Nohrstedt (2008).
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1991, but has since returned to parliament with relatively stable electoral re-
sults that show a small upward trend peaking at 7.3% of the vote in 2010. The
Swedish Green Party, together with the Left Party, supported a Social Demo-
cratic minority government between 1998 and 2006 (Bale & Bergman 2006) and
it has been in a minority coalition government with the Social Democrats since
2014.14
The Swedish Greens continue to operate in an environment with an active
environmental movement that has institutionalized over time and in which
the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Naturskyddsfreningen; short:
SNF), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and Greenpeace play the central roles
(Bostro¨m 2008). While the level of environmental protest has declined since the
late 1980s, it remains part of the repertoire of a more institutionalized move-
ment15 that has moved into a new phase in which it integrates “environmental
concern into social and cultural life more generally” (Jamison & Ring 2003, p.
232). In this phase a separation of work between environmental organizations
seems to have emerged in which some, like the WWF, act more like interest
groups, while others retain stronger contentious elements and (continue to) act
more like social movement organizations, such as the People Campaign against
Nuclear Power/Nuclear Weapons (Folkkampanjen mot Ka¨rnkraft-Ka¨rnvapen).
14Miljo¨partiet had gathered previous government and coalition experience on various occa-
sions at the local and municipal level (Burchell 2001b).
15The SNF has been the leading group organizing these protest since the 1980s and through-
out the early and mid-1990s (Jamison & Ring 2003, p. 226).
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Germany: Bu¨ndnis ’90/Die Gru¨nen
In Germany, as in Sweden, the origins of concern with environmental issues
lie in the 19th century (Markham 2008a, p. 44). The League for Bird Protec-
tion (Bund fu¨r Vogelschutz), which transformed over time into one of the coun-
try’s central environmental organizations, the Nature And Biodiversity Conser-
vation Union (Naturschutzbund Deutschland; short: NABU), was founded in
1899 (Markham 2008a, p. 220). After (West) Germany’s post-World War II eco-
nomic recovery, interest in environmental issues received a boost and activists
organized themselves in local citizens’ initiatives focused on environmental and
anti-nuclear activities, which were soon loosely connected through the Bun-
desverband Bu¨rgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (Federal Alliance of Citizens’ Ini-
tiatives for Environmental Protection; short: BBU) (Markham 2008b, pp. 95-96).
The nuclear debate, especially, led to strong and direct contentious action and
police pushback that one observer describes as deploying “almost civil-war-like
means, at the height of the conflict in 1976 and 1977” (Wagner 1994, p. 264).
This mobilization led movement leaders and activists to consider the elec-
toral route, which for some also held the promise of reducing and avoiding the
violent clashes with the state that accompanied direct action (Hoffmann 2002,
p. 68). As in the Swedish case discussed above, attempts to directly involve
SMOs in the party founding process, especially the BBU, proved unsuccessful
(Raschke 2001, p. 708). The first green, rainbow, and alternative lists emerged
to contest local and state elections in the late 1970s. The federal German Green
party, Bu¨ndnis ’90/Die Gru¨nen (Alliance ’90/The Greens),16 grew out of these
16The party was founded as “Die Gru¨nen” in West Germany and merged with “Bu¨ndnis
’90,” a group of civil rights and pro-democracy activists from East Germany in 1993, after the
country’s reunification.
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lists and was established in 1980, with a strong influx from the environmental
and anti-nuclear movements, as well as feminists and groups from the extreme
left (the so-called K-Gruppen) (Hoffmann 2002, p. 68-69). This, in comparison
to its Swedish counterpart, broader and more anti-establishment focused move-
ment base of the German Greens led to a more radical party (Jahn 1993, Mu¨ller-
Rommel 1985). The contemporary German Greens, however, have evolved
away from their “anti-party party” approach (Abedi 2004, p. 48) and are not
fundamentally dissimilar from Miljo¨partiet.17
In terms of its organizational setup, the party adopted a structure that val-
ued “grassroots-democracy,” but professionalized over time without losing the
distinctiveness of its participatory party model (Frankland 2008). As in the case
of their Swedish counterpart, Bu¨ndnis ’90/Die Gru¨nen retained an important
role for party members and local party organizations, while the largest depar-
tures from the grassroots model can be observed with respect to the party’s
leadership structure (Frankland 2008, pp. 36-37), where, for instance, rules that
prohibited holding internal party posts at the same time as elected office were
loosened (Frankland 2008, p. 34).
As figure 3.2 illustrates the German Greens’ electoral trends after entering
parliament in 1983 mirror Miljo¨partiet’s experience. The party fell short of Ger-
many’s five percent threshold in the first election after reunification. As op-
17Due to their more varied movements roots, the German Greens, more than their Swedish
counterparts, mix their focus on environmental issues with other concerns of the New Left, like
women’s rights and nuclear proliferation (Hino 2012, pp. 17-31). They are thus often classified
as pursuing “rainbow,” as opposed to “purist” green politics (see Ru¨dig (1985) for the origins
of that distinction). The (new social) movements mobilizing around some of these other issues,
however, like the women’s and peace movements, have demobilized more and institutionalized
less than the environmental movement. Accordingly, their abilities to shape the Green Party’s
development are extremely circumscribed and are beyond the scope of this study. Future studies
should investigate how aggregating several, as opposed to just one movement, in a political
party influences party development and party-movement relationships.
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Figure 3.2: Electoral Results: German Green Party
posed to the Swedish Green experience of completely losing parliamentary rep-
resentation, however, the party indirectly retained eight Members of Parliament
(MPs), because a common list of the new Eastern German Greens and “Bu¨ndnis
’90,” a group of civil rights and pro-democracy activists from East Germany,
gained 6.1% of the vote in the territory of the former German Democratic Re-
public for which special rules applied in this first post-reunification election
(Klein & Falter 2003, pp. 46-47).18 The party, however, rebounded at the next
election and its electoral results have shown a slight upward trend since then.
The Greens have been part of state government coalitions with all other ma-
jor parties in Germany19 and in 1998 formed a federal governing coalition with
the Social Democratic Party (Lee 2000), which won reelection once before being
18The West German Greens merged with their East German counterpart the day after the
federal election of 1990 and with “Bu¨ndnis ’90” in 1993 (Klein & Falter 2003, pp. 47-48).
19That is the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Left.
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defeated at the polls in 2005.
Similar to the Swedish case, the German environmental and anti-nuclear
movements ran out of steam and mass-mobilization has decreased dramati-
cally since the 1980s (Markham 2008b, pp. 101-103). At the same time, environ-
mental issues became increasingly less polarized and SMOs professionalized
(Markham 2008a, pp. 153-163). The contemporary movement is represented by
a large number of environmental movement organizations of which the NABU,
Greenpeace, the Bund fu¨r Umwelt und Naturschutz (Friends of the Earth Ger-
many; short BUND), and the WWF are the most important (Markham 2008a, p.
219). While protests have become less contentious and their number declined in
the early 1990s, they rebounded later in that decade and retained a strong focus
on energy and nuclear issues (Rucht & Roose 2004, pp. 84-89).
In sum, both the Swedish and German Greens have established themselves
in their respective party systems, while the movements around them have pro-
fessionalized and institutionalized, but remained active. The following subsec-
tions will show that parties and movements have shed most of the limited orga-
nizational connections that originally linked them, but remain strongly aligned
programmatically.
Organizational Separation: Over-time Divergence
From the beginning, the (formal) organizational connections that Green Par-
ties built to the environmental and anti-nuclear movements were much weaker
than, for instance, those that tied together the trade union movement and the
early Socialist parties in Europe together. There were some connections between
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the German Green Party and the environmental movement, however, which
took the form of the so-called Eco-Funds (Raschke 2001, p. 505-507). These
funds collected financial resources acquired by the party and used them to sup-
port grassroots movement projects, like setting up grocery stores specializing
in organic food. These funds, however, ceased to exist in the 1990s (Raschke
(2001, p. 507); interview 010305). The Swedish Greens had even less of a formal
organizational connection to the movement, and a former leader of the party
described that situation as follows:
it proved very difficult to base a new political party on the move-
ments directly [. . . ] [S]o we started without the movements directly,
but of course a lot of individuals active in these movements also
joined this new project. (interview 020308)
This partially reflects the fact that the Swedish environmental movement
had an early parliamentary orientation in which many movement leaders were
already attached to other political parties (Jamison et al. 1995, pp. 59-60). The
movement’s reluctance to build organizational links with parties has remained,
and later attempts to build these connections, for instance, by bringing them in
as co-founders of the think-tank Miljo¨partiet set up in 2005, failed (interview
020306).
Thus, formal links between the party and movement were absent or van-
ished in the early years of the parties’ development. But in neither the Swedish
nor the German case have they been replaced by routinized informal interac-
tions. Movement organizations consistently stress their commitment to a non-
partisan approach. In the interviews conducted for this project 88.2% of in-
terviewed environmental SMO leaders highlighted this approach, described a
preference for staying away from party politics altogether, or rejected the term
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“cooperation” with respect to political parties. As one movement leader sum-
marized:
On principle, we do not engage in cooperation with parties. We have
rather strong guiding principles of non-partisanship, which are im-
portant to us. [. . . ] We also did have requests from parties, whether
they could distribute certain flyers from us [. . . ] at their events and
we do not do that on principle. (interview 010411)
Moreover, beyond this general distance from party politics, environmental
organizations take particular care not to be seen as being connected to their
country’s Green party20 (interviews 010406, 020301, 020302). While informal in-
teractions exist, for instance initiated by MPs’ efforts to seek advice regarding
parliamentary motions, they are not routinized in Sweden: “I would say eight
out of 10 contacts or so are spontaneous. When I decide five minutes before
that I need to get a hold of them” (interview 020302; similar 020305, 020308).
In Germany some limited routinized and non-public(ized) interactions exist,
since the party invites the central environmental movement organizations for
a meeting “once or twice a year without a specific cause” (interview 010305).
But the frequency of these interactions is much reduced compared to patterns
in the party’s early days (interviews 010301, 010308). While, for instance, the
movement and party were once closely connected with respect to mobilizing
for protest, today politicians are not welcome as speakers at those protests (in-
terview 010301), and cooperation for the purposes of mobilization is organized
in larger alliances that often include several parties and organizations, allow-
ing the SMOs to avoid a close association with one particular party (interview
010306).
The organizational distance is particularly large during electoral campaigns
20I will analyze the movements’ reasoning for this approach in chapter 4.
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when SMOs become even less willing to engage in informal and cooperative
contacts. More than two-thirds (70.6%) of interviewed Green party and environ-
mental movement leaders indicated that interactions between them, or move-
ments and parties more generally, reach a nadir during election campaigns. As
a German Member of Parliament stated: “[it] has become well-established that
one does not make strategic arrangements during electoral campaigns” (inter-
view 010304). This is in line with McAdam and Tarrow’s (2013) finding that elec-
tions and movements in Europe have become increasingly decoupled (McAdam
& Tarrow 2013, p. 341).
Finally, the third element of an organizational connection, a shared network
of elites, is also absent. A former member of the German parliament described
party and movement elites as “rather separated”:
One is of course maybe a member of NABU or BUND. But one has
either an identity as a Green, that is working in a party, [. . . ] or I
consider myself a representative of an environmental organization
[. . . ] Even if I am a member of both. And I know few who run
counter to that, so to say. (interview 010308)
A former leader of the Swedish Greens described this separation in a similar
way:
I mean most of us are members [of environmental organizations].
[. . . ] But I am an absolutely non-active member [. . . ] And I think
that is probably the same for those who are in parliament and in the
party central board and so on. Most of them are not at the same time
in the central board of any of these organizations. (interview 020308)
The data from the party member survey in Sweden support this conclusion.
More than three quarters of the surveyed members (76.2%) reported that they
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spent more time working for the party than for the movement. Only 14.3% of
respondents spent equal time on their party and movement activities and thus
could be characterized as truly being rooted in both the party and movement.21
Thus, the relationship between environmental movements and the two
Green Parties has shifted from the early days in which the same person could be
a representative of both the movement and the party. In those days of a shared
elite network, the same person would discuss the same policies and issues at
both party and movement meetings, described by a German Green as a “game
of ping-pong” (interview 010302). These kinds of interactions have ceased to
exist (interview 010302).
On the staff level, however, some overlap continues to exist. In both the Ger-
man and Swedish parties members of the staff were recruited from movement
organizations or went on to work for an SMO after being employed by the party
(interviews 010306, 010308, 020301, 020307). But even this overlap is heavily cir-
cumscribed. In both Sweden and Germany many SMOs expect those working
for them not to engage in party-political activities or at least not in party ac-
tivities above the local level (interviews 010402, 010413, 020401). Greenpeace
Germany, for instance, does not hire party members, even if they are not active,
for positions in which policy-relevant work is conducted or which represent the
organization in the media (interview 010411).
In sum, formal connections between the Green parties and the environmen-
tal and anti-nuclear movements were weak to begin with and have vanished
over time, without being replaced by either a shared set of elites or routinized
21Similar results are obtained if the analysis is limited to party members that were active in
the environmental and/or anti-nuclear movement, as the core movements spawning the party.
Most members focus on the party (69.3%), while the number of those splitting their time equally
between party and movement is small (16.8%).
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(informal) interactions.
Programmatic Alignment
While parties and movements have organizationally gone their separate ways,
they remain closely aligned programmatically. Both sides have programmati-
cally developed in similar ways over time and the Green parties’ focus on envi-
ronmental issues remains strong.
From the beginning the Swedish environmental movement was character-
ized by a pragmatic attitude and over time it has adopted “an eco-modernist
discourse” (Bostro¨m 2008, p. 234). The Green party similarly has increasingly
become more amenable to seeing economic growth and environmental protec-
tion as compatible (Elander 2000). In Germany, by contrast, both the movement
and party were more radical in the beginning (Jahn 1993). However, with the
passing of time, as in Sweden, both the environmental movement and the Green
party moderated their positions (Markham 2008b, Talshir 2002).
Moderating their issue positions, however, by no means indicated that
Miljo¨partiet and Die Gru¨nen had moved away from the environment as their
central policy concern (Sundstro¨m 2011, Blu¨hdorn 2009). The Swedish Greens,
for example, ran their 2014 national election campaign under the slogan “Policy
must be warmer. Not the climate”22 (Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na 2014, p. 2). Data
on the programmatic orientation of political parties from the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (CHES),23, summarized in table 3.1, further illustrates this continued fo-
22Swedish: “Politiken ma˚ste bli varmare. Inte klimatet” (Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na 2014, p. 2).
23The CHES (Bakker, Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Koedam, Kostelka, Marks, Polk, Rovny, Schu-
macher, Steenbergen, Vachudova, & Zilovic 2015, Bakker, DeVries, Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly,
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cus on the environment. The tables summarizes information from the two most
recent waves of the survey (2010 and 2014) on the salience the Swedish and
German Green parties assigned to the environment, as well as on the positions
these parties took on the issue. Higher values indicate higher salience and less
pro-environmental positions respectively.
Table 3.1: Programmatic Orientation of Miljo¨partiet and Die
Gru¨nen
Country Party Salience En-
vironment
(2010)
Position En-
vironment
(2010)
Most
Important
Issue (2014)
Position En-
vironment
(2014)
Sweden
Miljo¨partiet 8.86 1.07 Environment 1.45
Other Parties 5.31 4.83 0 4.97
Germany
Die Gru¨nen 9.33 2.33 Environment 0.37
Other Parties 5.39 5.59 0 4.80
Data Source: CHES; Salience: 0-10, with 10 being the highest salience; Position 0-10, with 0 being the most pro-
environmental positions. Data for other parties are the means for the other parliamentary parties and the number
of times another parliamentary party focused on the environment as its most important issue, respectively.
The data show that in both Sweden and Germany the Green parties are fo-
cused on the environment, which remains their most important issue and enjoys
extremely high salience.24 Moreover, they exhibit extremely pro-environmental
positions.25
Marks, Polk, Rovny, Steenbergen, & Vachudova 2015) collects data on parties’ issue positions
and their salience to these parties through expert surveys. I rely on data from the 2010 and 2014
waves of the survey, for which 343 (2010) and 337 (2014) experts evaluated 237 (2010) and 268
(2014) parties, respectively.
24In the CHES 10 indicates the highest possible salience of an issue, measured on a 0-10 scale.
Salience was not included in the 2014 wave, while the most important issue item was not part
of the 2010 wave.
25The CHES measures the position on a 0-10 point scale with 0 corresponding to “Strongly
supports environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth.”
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Table 3.1 also summarizes the average salience and positions regarding the
environment for all parties represented in the national parliaments of Sweden
and Germany respectively. This data demonstrates that the Greens’ issue-profile
is unique as the remaining parliamentary parties pay much less attention to
the issue and take positions more orientated towards economic growth. No
parliamentary party exists, either in Sweden or Germany, that places higher
salience on the environment or takes a more pro-environmental position than
the country’s Green party.26
Party leaders confirm the impression that the Greens highly value their pro-
grammatic connection to the environmental and anti-nuclear movements. A
Swedish Green MP stated with respect to the SNF, the country’s central envi-
ronmental organization, “[W]e are on the same side” (interview 020305), and
a former leader described the relationship as follows: “It’s not always that we
think exactly the same, but usually we end up being quite close to each other”
(interview 020307). It is also noteworthy that the Green parties seek particu-
lar programmatic closeness to movement organizations when they face diffi-
cult decisions. The German Greens consulted closely with central SMOs during
the run-up to a crucial vote on a nuclear energy phase-out (interview 010412).
Along the same lines, the Swedish Greens anticipated that if they were to par-
ticipate in government and could implement a nuclear phase-out they would
need to establish a similarly close relationship (interview 020307).
The survey of Miljo¨partiet’s members provides further evidence of the close
26That is, in both countries the Greens remain niche parties (Meguid 2008) though the size of
their issue niche might vary over time depending of the positions other parties take (Meyer &
Miller 2015). Note, however, that the argument developed in this dissertation does not depend
on movement platform parties being niche parties. Movement platform parties are defined
by the absence of an organizational connection and a retained programmatic connection to a
movement, not by being the only party that highlights the issue. See chapter 2 for a discussion
of research on niche parties and how it relates to movement platform parties.
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programmatic alignment of the party and movements, with the vast majority of
respondents (87.3%) indicating that they had never perceived the goals or strate-
gies of the party to be in conflict with NGOs or movements that they were active
in.27 One respondent stated that: “A lot of what was proposed in programs and
propositions from the party originated in the environmental movement.”
Pirate Parties and Digital Movements in Sweden and Germany:
Emergence as Movement Platform Parties
The two Pirate parties originated in social movement activity focused on in-
creasing privacy, changing copyright law, and more generally on issues that
stem from the increasingly central role information plays in contemporary so-
cieties. Questions about file sharing and copyrights in a digital world often
were an early focus of the movement. While at first glance this might seem like
a relatively narrow issue, and it has so far, as we will see below, mobilized a
smaller constituency than the environmental movement, Demker (2014) argues
that Pirate parties are the expression of new fundamental cleavages, which are
arising because “[t]he communicational revolution has trumped the struggles
over territory and material resources in such a way that new relevant cleav-
ages are forming around the production, transfer and legitimacy of knowledge”
(Demker 2014, pp. 191-192).
The movement also makes extensive use of electronic means of communica-
tion. That is, in order to achieve mobilization this movement and the “associ-
27The number is nearly identical (86.7%) if the analysis is limited to respondents who were
active in the environmental or anti-nuclear movements.
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ated” parties draw heavily on digital media (the efficacy of digital media for this
purpose is widely discussed, cf. Beyer (2014b) and Bennett & Segerberg (2011);
for a more skeptical view see Tilly & Wood (2013, pp. 107-108)). I will use the
term “digital movement” to denote organizations and activists in this move-
ment, since the term reflects both the content and the most prominent form of
activism.
Sweden: Piratpartiet
In Sweden, the early central issue capturing public attention was file-sharing
and the related copyright implications (Lindgren 2013). The movement’s most
influential and prominent group of activists was Piratbyra˚n (Pirate Bureau),
which Burkart (2014) describes as “a loose collective of anarchistic technophiles”
(Burkart 2014, p. 17), and whose name is a play on a pro-copyright lobby-
ing organization called the Anti-Piracy Bureau. From its inception in 2006,
the Swedish Pirate Party, Piratpartiet, was programmatically aligned with the
movement by stressing the reform of copyright law, abolishing patents, and
protecting privacy in their declaration of principles (Miegel & Olsson 2008, p.
210), and even borrowed its name from Piratbyra˚n. The party was, however,
not founded by core movement activists or leaders but by political entrepreneur
Rick Falkvinge (interview 020203), who was frustrated by establishment parties’
refusal to take the issue seriously and realized the draw of the “Pirate” label
and related activism for young people. That is, in contrast to the two Green
parties discussed above, the Swedish Pirate Party was founded as a movement
platform party with strong programmatic, but weak organizational links to the
movement.
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Table 3.2: Electoral Results: Piratpartiet
Year Vote Share in % Seats
2006 0.63 0
2009 7.13 1 (2)
2010 0.65 0
2014 2.23 0
2014 0.43 0
(Election Year) Results in italics are European elections Due to an adjustment
of the number of seats in the EP, Piratpartiet was assigned a second seat
during the 2009-2014 legislative period.
Data Source: Do¨ring & Manow (2016) and Valmyndigheten (2016)
The party adopted an extremely participatory internal decision making
structure (Bolleyer, Little, & von Nostitz 2015) and conducts its party conven-
tions online (interview 020102). Piratpartiet also encourages its members to act
independently in the name of the party, based on the so-called “three-pirate
rule” that its founder advocates: “if three activists agree that something is good
for the organization, they have a green light to act in the organization’s name”
(Falkvinge 2013, p. 78). As table 3.2 illustrates, the Pirate Party’s electoral break-
through came with its election to the European Parliament (EP) in 2009,28 when
the party’s core issues were high on the political agenda due to a number of
legislative processes that touched on the central issues of the party’s platform,
including the implementation of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement
28Since both the Swedish and the German Pirate parties elected their only representatives to
a parliament above the local (Sweden) or state (Germany) level in European elections, I report
both national and European election results here. The two Green parties discussed above also
often performed better in European than in national elections, since in the former they profit
from vote switching (Hong 2015). These parties also rely on an unusually educated electorate
that is more likely to turn out (Dolezal 2010), which is especially important in European elec-
tions, when general turnout drops significantly, giving Green parties an advantage.
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Directive (IPRED) (Erlingsson & Persson 2011, p. 123). The party won 7.1% of
the vote in that election and with it one seat in the EP.29
Since then, however, the party has not been able to repeat that electoral suc-
cess, either in European or national elections, and the movement that inspired
the party has demobilized since the peak of its activity in 2009/2010. The Pirate
Bureau closed down in 2010 (Miegel & Olsson 2012) and grassroots mobiliza-
tion declined (interview 020203) without the movement making a transition to
more institutionalized forms.
Germany: Piratenpartei
In Germany, civil society activism on what became the core issues of the Pirates
goes back at least to opposition against a “Volksza¨hlung” (population census)
the German government wanted to conduct in 1983 (Quack & Dobusch 2013,
p. 209). More recently government initiatives to implement the retention of in-
ternet use data and to implement internet blocks30 have caused new activism
and led to the creation of central movement organizations like the AK Vorrat
(combating data retention) and AK Zensur (combating internet censorship).
The German Pirate Party, Piratenpartei, was founded in 2006 and recruited
from “internet-savy core groups,” before the government initiatives for internet
blocks in 2009 motivated a second wave of supporters to join the party (Hensel
29Because the distribution of seats in the European Parliament between member countries
was adjusted later during that legislative session Sweden gained seats. One of these was as-
signed to the Pirates, whose representation accordingly increased to two seats.
30The government wanted to block certain websites to combat online child pornography,
while the opponents of internet blocks argued that the same goal could be accomplished
without censorship by deleting the relevant websites, rather than instituting internet blocks
(Gu¨rbu¨z 2011, pp. 39-40).
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& Klecha 2013, p. 51). During the same period the party increasingly shifted its
programmatic attention from issues of copyright law to civil rights (Bartels 2009,
pp. 183-184). The AK Vorrat is often seen as a central organization from which
activists entered the Piratenpartei (Hensel & Klecha 2013, pp. 88), leading to a
significant spill-out (Hadden & Tarrow 2007) of activists from the movement to
the party (interview 010202).
Like their Swedish counterpart, the German Pirate Party adopted an ex-
tremely participatory internal decision making structure, including the use of
online decision-making tools (Bolleyer, Little, & von Nostitz 2015). In contrast
to Piratpartiet, however, it conducts its party conventions in physical locations.
Table 3.3 demonstrates that the German Pirates have not achieved a break-
through on the national level, but between 2011 and 2012 the party managed
to clear the five percent hurdle in four state elections and elected parliamentary
groups to those state parliaments.31
Table 3.3: Electoral Results: Piratenpartei
Year Vote Share in % Seats
2009 2.0 0
2009 0.9 0
2013 2.2 0
2014 1.4 1
(Election Year) Results in italics are European elections
Data Source: Do¨ring & Manow (2016) and NSD (2016)
Since those electoral successes, however, the party’s popularity has declined
31The four states were Berlin, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, and Germany’s most populous
state North Rhine-Westphalia.
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and it failed to elect members to the national parliament and only secured
one of Germany’s 99 seats in the elections to the European Parliament in 2014.
The digital movement in Germany, however, has successfully institutionalized,
drawing on pre-existing organizations focused on civil rights like the Humanist
Union, and organizations founded during a more contemporary phase of move-
ment mobilization, like the Free Software Foundation Europe or Wikimedia.
Organizational Separation: “It’s not our kind of party”
While the Green parties, as described above, had some weak formal links to the
environmental movements, the Pirate parties never developed these kinds of
links to the digital movement. A Pirate representing the party in a German state
parliament described this as follows:
I believe in the history of the Greens there was an understanding that
it is the party of the movement organizations [. . . ] I do not believe
that there are many organizations in the internet-policy area, who
say: “the Pirates that is our party.” (interview 010101)
These comments were echoed by a representative of a movement organi-
zation in the same country, who argued that “it is not the case that we have
adopted the Pirates as our parliamentary arm” (interview 010201). A Swedish
activist who was involved in the Pirate Bureau summarized their approach suc-
cinctly: “when the Pirate Party formed it was quite obvious that this was not
an option for us to be involved in, because we don’t trust and we don’t work
with parties. It’s not our kind of party.” (interview 020205).32 One example of
32See chapter 4 for a discussion of generalized anti-party attitudes of movement elites. The
skepticism among Pirate Bureau elites was both towards parties in general and Piratpartiet and
its leader in particular.
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tangential formal cooperation between the party and movement exists in Swe-
den. Movement activists and members of Piratpartiet’s youth wing have set up
Kopieringskassan (K-kassan), an insurance system that covers fees incurred for
those caught in illegal file-sharing. Even here though the collaboration is driven
more by personal relationships and is limited, for instance in the sense that K-
Kassan would not use the listserv of Piratpartiet’s youth wing to promote its
activities (interview 020206).
With this kind of organizational distance, it is unsurprising that there are
also almost no routinized informal interactions between the two Pirate parties
and the digital movements in their respective countries. Similar to the situation
of contemporary Green parties described above, representatives for 83.3% of in-
terviewed digital SMO leaders highlighted non-partisanship, rejected the term
“cooperation” with respect to political parties, or displayed a broad negative
attitude towards parties as vehicles for political change. Accordingly a Pirate
member of a German state parliament summarized: “To say that such an orga-
nization cooperates directly with the party? Rather not. That is, one very much
tries to separate the whole [thing]” (interview 010104). Another representative
of the party described the situation in similar terms:
Regularly, that [collaborations] did not happen. That is, in the sense
that one really had permanent dialog partners or regular meeting, in
that form not. (interview 010112)
In the same vein, a board member of the Swedish Pirates highlighted the
absence of routinized interactions in the following way: “So mostly when we
cooperate with organizations, it’s on a case to case basis” (interview 020101).
Election campaigns are, as between Greens and the environmental move-
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ment, a period in which the existing contacts decrease even further. The run-up
to elections was described by 60% of Pirate party and digital movement inter-
view partners as a time in which the distance between party and NGOs grows
or in which SMOs generally keep their distance from party politics.33 A Swedish
Pirate summarized this as follows:
So when election time comes, most of the organizations that we
might have cooperation [with] and have at least partly the same
agenda in one issue or other, they don’t want to be associated with
us as a political party. (interview 020106)
While formal links and routinized interactions are largely absent, the Ger-
man Pirate Party has had an influx of movement activists, as described above.
Accordingly, some of the party elite are (former) prominent movement activists,
as for instance, Katherina Nocun and Patrick Breyer, who were both prominent
activists with the AK Vorrat and served as a member of the party’s national
leadership in 2013 (Nocun) and as a member of a state parliament (Breyer), re-
spectively (interview 010202). In Sweden, due to the foundations of the party
outside of the movement core and the demobilization of the movement, these
overlaps are essentially absent.
Programmatic Alignment
With movement origins only about a decade ago, both Pirate Parties remain
closely aligned with the movements’ policy focus and demands. Demker (2014)
describes the Pirate movement as follows: “It is anti-authoritarian and aims to
33The exception was the campaign for the 2009 European Parliament in Sweden, which led to
the Pirate Party’s breakthrough. I will analyze this campaign further in chapter 6.
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enhance civic liberties for youngsters, to give open access to culture through
the internet and to improve personal integrity and human dignity on the World
Wide Web” (Demker 2014, p. 188). This summary continues to describe both
the Swedish and German Pirates. While some changes in their platforms and
focus can be observed, like the German Pirates’ shift from a copyright to a civil
rights focus described above, and both parties have gone through a process to
broaden their party platforms by developing positions on all relevant policy
areas (interviews 010104, 020104),34 they have not abandoned their core issue
profiles, as the CHES data in table 3.4 illustrates.
Table 3.4: Programmatic Orientation of Piratpartiet and Piraten-
partei
Country Party Salience
Civil
Liberties
(2010)
Position
Civil
Liberties
(2010)
Most
Important
Issue (2014)
Position
Civil
Liberties
(2014)
Sweden
Piratpartiet 8.29 1.29 Civil Lib. 1.0
Other Parties 6.29 5.64 0 4.55
Germany
Piratenpartei NA NA Civil Lib. 2.0
Other Parties 6.33 4.15 0 4.39
Data Source: CHES; The German Pirate Party was not included in the 2010 wave. Salience: 0-10, with 10 being
the highest salience. Position: 0-10, with 0 being the most pro-civil liberties position. Data for other parties are
the means for the parliamentary parties and the number of times a parliamentary party focused on civil liberties
as its most important issue, respectively.
The data show that civil liberties remained the most important issue for Pi-
ratpartiet in 2014 and enjoyed a much higher salience for the Pirates than for the
34See chapter 6 for an analysis of these broadening processes and their effects.
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parliamentary parties in Sweden in 2010 on average.35 Piratpartiet also took a
more progressive position on the issue in 2010 and 2014 than any parliamentary
party in Sweden.36 The German Pirates remained similarly focused on civil lib-
erties in 2014, and while they were not included in the 2010 wave of the CHES,
the 2014 data show that they also took a more progressive position than the
German parliamentary parties on the issue.
Movement leaders also expressed that they see the Pirates as programmati-
cally largely aligned, though in Germany they did indicate that they had doubts
about the competence of the party to implement or communicate its goals (in-
terviews 010202, 010207). In Sweden, despite fundamental skepticism about
parties as vehicles for policy change, Piratpartiet’s work in the European Par-
liament enjoyed a largely positive evaluation from central movement activists
(interviews 020203, 020205).
European Movement Parties after World War II
Greens and Pirates are not the only party families with movement roots that
have emerged in Europe since 1945. Before the Green parties entered electoral
competition, regionalist parties had become a factor in many European democ-
racies with regions that were interested in increased devolution or even inde-
pendence (De Winter & Tu¨rsan 1998). Radical right parties followed suit, estab-
lishing themselves as a significant presence in many countries in the 1980s and
early 1990s (Kitschelt & McGann 1995). This section will shortly introduce all
35Salience was measured on a 0-10 scale, with 10 corresponding to the highest salience.
36The CHES measures the position on a 0-10 point scale with 0 corresponding to “Strongly
promotes civil liberties,” while 10 indicates “Strongly supports tough measures to fight crime.”
93
four party families and demonstrate, drawing on data from the Chapel Hill Ex-
pert Survey and secondary literature, that organizational separation accompa-
nied by close programmatic alignment describes many post-World-War II par-
ties with movement origins beyond the four party-movement dyads discussed
in detail above.
Green Parties
The Swedish and German Green parties are two cases of a much larger party
family that was spawned in the 1970s and 1980s by environmental and anti-
nuclear movements (see Mu¨ller-Rommel (1989) for an early overview). While
the electoral strength of these parties varies considerably (the strongest parties
are found in Germany and Austria), they have established themselves as leg-
islative parties in most West European countries and participated in the gov-
ernments of Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, France, and Ireland. Spain rep-
resents the exception with extraordinarily weak Greens, while in Norway and
Denmark (formerly) Socialist Parties have included the Green agenda in their
program.37 Historically, there has been some variation in Green parties’ issue
focus between “purist” Greens, exclusively focused on the environment, and
“rainbow” Greens, who incorporate other New Social Movements and their is-
sues, like women’s rights and pro-peace stances (Ru¨dig 1985). As we will see
below, however, environmental issues and movements are central to all of these
parties and in many countries the other NSMs have demobilized to a much
larger and institutionalized to a much smaller degree than the environmental
37Besides the Socialist Left Party, which incorporated an environmental agenda in its plat-
form, a weak Green party that entered the national parliament for the first time in 2013 exists in
Norway.
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movement. Thus, for all Green parties, a focus on the environmental and anti-
nuclear movements which represent these parties’ most salient issue focus in
civil society is warranted.
These parties have largely organizationally decoupled from the movements
in which they originated and that process took place relatively early in the par-
ties’ evolution. Dalton (1994), in a study based on data on environmental orga-
nizations in 10 European democracies from 1986, finds that with the exception
of Friends of the Earth groups in Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy environ-
mental groups “have been visibly absent when new green parties were formed”
and that these groups “often insulate themselves from partisan politics, even
when green parties are involved” (Dalton 1994, p. 220). As early as in the mid-
1990s, his interviews revealed “strong apartisan norms” within environmental
organizations (Dalton 1994, p. 221). Since then these parties have, in Rihoux &
Franklands (2008) terms, developed from “amateur-activist” to “professional-
activist” parties (Rihoux & Frankland 2008) (see also Burchell (2002)). This evo-
lution, as well as the above mentioned participation of some Green parties in
national governments, led to a further distancing from the social movements in
terms of party organization (Poguntke 2002, pp. 136-137).
In terms of their programmatic orientation, Green parties have remained
strongly focused on the environment. Table 3.5 provides an overview of the pro-
grammatic stances of West European Green parties by summarizing data from
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.38 This data shows that, despite the variation
between “purist” and ”rainbow” Greens discussed above, all parties assign ex-
tremely high salience to the environment and take strongly pro-environmental
38See table D.1 in the appendix for a list of parties included in the calculation of these statistics.
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positions.39
The Danish Socialist People’s Party40 (SF) is the only West European Green
party included in the survey for which the environment was not the most im-
portant issue in 2014. Even for this party, however, the environment ranks high
in salience, being SF’s most important issue after redistribution and public ser-
vice provision.41
Table 3.5: Programmatic Orientation: Green Parties
Salience Position Environment Environment Position
Environment Environment MIP top 3 MIP Environment
(2010) (2010) (2014) (2014) (2014)
Green parties 8.98 (.19) 1.25 (.17) 11 12 1.06 (.12)
N 11 11 12 12 15
Data Source: CHES; Salience: 0-10, with 10 being the highest salience; Position 0-10, with 0 being the most pro-
environmental position. Data are means with standard errors in parenthesis. MIP is the number of parties for
which the environment was the top/among the top three issues.
Thus, in sum, the Swedish and German Greens are representative of Green
parties in West Europe as a whole in the sense that these parties decoupled
from the movements in which they had originated during the first two decades
39In 2010 there is no data on Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland. In the 2014 wave data
on the most important issue is not available for Luxembourg and Norway. Thus there are 15
parties included in the calculation of the 2014 position mean, including the Green parties from
Luxembourg (De´i Gre´ng), Norway (Miljøpartiet De Grønne and Sosialistisk Venstreparti), and
Switzerland (Gru¨ne/Les Vertes/Il Verdi), but fewer parties with respect to the other measures.
40The Socialist People’s Party was founded in 1959 as a split from the Danish Communist
Party and sought to combine democracy and socialism. It was, however, also the party in Den-
mark that over time incorporated the demands of the New Left into its platform (Arter 1999,
p. 130). The party is moreover a member of the European Green Party, the umbrella group of
Green parties across the European continent.
41For the Socialist People’s Party these three issues were also very close in terms of salience
when measured on a 10 point scale in 2010. The environment was valued at 7.45, redistribution
at 7.27, and public service provision at 7.64.
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of their existence. At the same time, however, they retained their focus on the
environment as their top issue and continue to take strong positions in favor of
environmental protection.42
Pirate Parties
As discussed with respect to the Swedish and German cases above, Pirate par-
ties originated in civil society activism around issues brought to the forefront
by modern information societies (cf., Demker (2014)), including issues of copy-
right, privacy, and democratic participation. Along with the Icelandic Pirates,
who are represented in the national parliament, the Swedish and German par-
ties were the most electorally successful. The parties’ international umbrella or-
ganization, Pirate Parties International, has member parties from 40 countries,
including 14 states in Western Europe43 (Pirate Party International 2016).
The development of Pirate Parties and their organizational structure has so
far attracted much less attention than that of the Greens, but from the very
beginning both their commitment to member participation and the transna-
tional character of the movement did not lend themselves to the development
of strong connections on an organizational or elite level. In a study of the Pi-
rate parties in the UK, Belgium, and Germany, Bart Cammaerts (2015) finds that
“the Pirate Parties are organised with overall weak national structures and very
strong and active branches localised in places where there is a critical mass of
42This conclusion runs counter to some accounts in the literature that stress estrangement
from the movements (for instance della Porta et al. (2017, pp. 190-191)) and often do not take the
ideological development and moderation of the movement and associated organizations into
account.
43The West European countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.
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people willing to engage and act” (Cammaerts 2015, p. 29). Moreover, for the
German and Swedish cases Bolleyer, Little, & von Nostitz (2015) show that this
commitment to democratic equality in the organizational structures of the par-
ties created the tendency for a strongly fluctuating and largely passive rank and
file membership. These tendencies, coupled with the decentralization described
above, do not allow the development of strong, influential organizational ties to
social movement organizations through elite interactions. This separation be-
tween movement activism and party political efforts is furthered by the transna-
tional character of significant parts of the movement (Dobusch & Gollatz 2012),
which often goes along with a more limited focus on national party politics than
the activities of nationally-focused movements.44 Thus, from the beginning the
connection between Pirates and the movements from which they originated was
limited to an overlap at the grassroots, and if the Swedish and German case
studies conducted for this project are an indication of more general trends, this
overlap is becoming less influential (see the analysis in chapter 6).
Despite their recent inception Pirate parties have already gone through a
process of programmatic evolution, without, however, losing their links to
movement demands.45 Studying the programmatic orientation of five Euro-
pean Pirate parties,46 Ja¨a¨saari & Hilde´n (2015) find that the early core of Pirate
politics centered on the (inseparable) trinity of digital rights, composed of free
speech, privacy, and access (see also Burkart (2014, pp. 151-152)). Around this
trinity grew a set of core concerns about copyrights, patents, privacy, and, since
44See Keck & Sikkink (1998) and Tarrow (2005) for foundational work on transnational ac-
tivism. In fact, Burkart (2014) identifies pirates as “rooted cosmopolitans” in Tarrow’s terms
(Burkart 2014, p. 133). Though, see Beyer (2014a, pp. 142-143) for differences between the new
internet activism on freedom of expression and the focus of (transnational) social movement
theory.
45The Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positions only includes the Swedish and German
Pirates and accordingly no further cross-national data is presented here.
46Specifically those in the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, and Sweden.
98
concerns about the “perceived erosion of democracy” are widespread in many
Pirate parties (Fredriksson 2015, p. 913), the nature of (participation in) mod-
ern democracies more generally (Ja¨a¨saari & Hilde´n 2015). While this trinity
remains important, file sharing has become a less central issue and these parties
have broadened their programs to take positions on a wider range of issues47
(Ja¨a¨saari & Hilde´n 2015). In summary, Ja¨a¨saari & Hilde´n (2015) conclude that
“[t]he common theme of the Pirates’ stance on both core Pirate issues and other,
more conventional political issues [. . . ] is the emphasis on individual auton-
omy” (Ja¨a¨saari & Hilde´n 2015, p. 882). This programmatic orientation chimes
well with a movement whose “’utopian messages’ [. . . ] are based on ideas of in-
dividual freedom and autonomy” (Lindgren & Linde 2012, p. 157) and in which
Piratbyra˚n as a central actor had declared that file-sharing was an issue that had
been passed by the times and facts (interview 020203).
Thus, the Pirates emerged from an even less-institutionalized movement en-
vironment than the Greens, often going along with few organizational connec-
tions to these movements. They do retain their core programmatic focus, how-
ever, while going through a process of developing positions on all relevant po-
litical issues.
Regionalist Parties
Regionalist parties, as a party family (see De Winter & Tu¨rsan (1998) for an
overview), espouse a wide variety of ideologies on the left/right spectrum
(Massetti 2009, De Winter, Go´mez-Reino, & Lynch 2006), but are bound together
47I will discuss this broadening process and its consequences in more detail for the German
and Swedish cases in chapter 6.
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by a shared focus on gaining some form of devolution for their region at the
minimum and independence at the maximum. The most prominent examples
of these parties are found in Belgium, where the linguistic cleavage structures
much of the partisan competition, Spain, where regionalist parties are most rel-
evant in Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, and the United Kingdom,
where regionalism is strong in Scotland and Wales.
The origins of regionalist parties are less unified than those of Green or Pi-
rate parties. Some have relatively recent roots in social movements, while others
had early origins in what Lipset & Rokkan (1967) have described as the conflict
between subject and dominant cultures that resulted from the national revolu-
tions. Even in countries with the latter, older regionalist parties, however, “the
mid-years of the twentieth century often saw a ’swallowing up’ of these sorts
of parties by larger political movements” (Ware 1996, p. 40). The pre-1945 in-
carnation of the Welsh regionalist party Plaid Cymru, for instance, has been
characterized as having both traits of a social movement and a pressure group
(McAllister 2002, p. 92ff).
Research on the success of regionalist parties has focused on a variety of fac-
tors ranging from institutional factors, like electoral systems, and economic ex-
planations to strategic accounts (see Lublin (2014, pp. 8-14) for an overview).
Their movement connections, however, have received far less attention (see
Van Atta (2003b) for a notable exception that focuses on the movement con-
text of regionalist parties). Lieven De Winter (1998) argues based on 12 case
studies on West European regionalist parties that most of these parties “do not
merely have good relations with the broader ethnoregionalist social movement,
but are the core of this movement” (De Winter 1998, p. 232). He, however,
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also identifies three regions (Flanders, Catalonia, and the Basque country) in
which the movement is not entirely reliant on the regionalist party as a polit-
ical ally and “can (temporarily) shift their support between ethnoregionalist
parties” (De Winter 1998, p. 232). Overall, De Winter (1998) classifies seven
of 12 parties as the core of the movement, three as the party most supported
by the movement, and another two parties as parties co-existing with a move-
ment around them, which are, however, not the party most supported by that
movement (De Winter 1998, p. 233). Moreover, detailed country studies reveal
more variation between regionalist parties with respect to their movement con-
nections. In a comparative study of Plaid Cymru and the Galician regionalist
party Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), for instance, Sydney Van Atta (2003a)
finds that while the latter party is well integrated into the region’s movement
sector, the connection between Plaid and the movement is more tenuous. The
BNG, for instance, retains close, though non-formalized links to a nationalist la-
bor union, while Plaid cannot rely on that kind of embeddedness in civil society
(Van Atta 2003a, pp. 85, 96).
Thus, the picture with respect to the organizational relationship between re-
gionalist movements and parties is much more varied than the relations be-
tween Pirate or Green parties and the movements that gave rise to them. Over-
all, though, there is at least a subset of regionalist parties that originated in
movements or was swept up in them (again) in the mid-20th century, and these
parties now co-exist with a largly organizationally decoupled movement sec-
tor. As mentioned in the previous chapter, even the Scottish National Party,
which De Winter (1998) classifies as the core of the movement, co-existed with
the Radical Independence Campaign, an alliance of groups to the left of the SNP
campaigning for independence, in the run-up to the Scottish independence ref-
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erendum of 2014 (Scotland Herald 2012). I will discuss the complications this
variation inside the regionalist party family introduces in the relevant sections
(see chapter 5) and return to its consequences in the concluding chapter.
Turning to regionalist parties’ programmatic orientation, table 3.6 illustrates
that regionalist parties have not left their behind programmatic focus on de-
centralization or independence for their respective regions.48 Specifically, they
take positions close to the pro-decentralization pole and the issue retains high
salience for these parties.
Table 3.6: Programmatic Orientation: Regionalist Parties
Salience Position Regionalism Regionalism Position
Regionalism Regionalism MIP top 3 MIP Regionalism
(2010) (2010) (2014) (2014) (2014)
Regionalist
parties
8.58 (.55) 1.35 (.40) 5 8 2.13 (.53)
N 11 11 10 10 10
Data Source: CHES; Salience: 0-10, with 10 being the highest salience; Position 0-10, with 0 being the most pro-
decentralization position. Data are means with standard errors in parenthesis. MIP is the number of parties
for which the regionalism was the top/among the top three issues.
That experts only classified five of the ten West European regionalist parties
with movement origins included in the CHES as focused on regionalism as a top
issue indicates that this group of parties is more diverse regarding the specificity
of its focus than the Green and Pirate parties discussed above. Some regionalist
parties stress their commitment to region in ways other than pushing for decen-
tralization, as for instance the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, which focuses
48See table D.1 for a list of parties included in the calculation of these statistics. Since in 2014
no data is available for the Chunta Aragonesista the number of observations from the 2014 wave
drops by 1 to 10 from the 11 relevant parties included in the 2010 wave.
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on the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority in the country, and Sinn Fe´in
in Ireland, which is advocating reunification with the North. Accordingly these
two parties are classified as considering “ethnic minorities” and “nationalism”
as their top issues in the CHES data, but they too remain focused on the goals
of the movements that once gave rise to them.49
In sum, the organizational connections between regionalist parties and the
movements in which they originated vary on the party-level, but as a party
family they remain focused on pushing for greater autonomy or independence.
Radical Right Parties
Most (new) radical right parties have their origins in the 1980s and early 1990s
(Kitschelt & McGann 1995) in strong opposition to the libertarian ideas the
New Social Movements and Green parties had introduced a decade earlier
(Ha¨usermann & Kriesi 2015, Bornschier 2010). Even though their electoral for-
tunes have often been volatile, as a party family they have become a constant
presence in Western Europe (Art 2011, Mudde 2007) and have been part of coali-
tion governments or supported minority governments in several countries in-
cluding Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
Movements of the political right have received much less scientific atten-
tion than (the new social) movements of the left (Hutter & Kriesi 2013) (see also
49Both parties are outliers with respect to the average parties studied in this project, since they
have their roots in the early part for the 20th century. The Swedish People’s Party is the result
of counter-mobilization of Swedish-speaking elites and middle classes when Finish nationalism
began its ascent in the early 1900s (Raunio 2006, pp. 126-127). Sinn Fe´in was founded in 1905 as
the party-political arm of the Irish Republican Movement and later the Irish Republican Army
(Feeney 2003). Both parties, however, remain surrounded by civil society activity on their core
issue (Raunio 2006, Feeney 2003).
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Minkenberg (2003)). Accordingly, and similar to regionalist parties, the rela-
tionships between radical right parties and nationalist movements are under-
researched. Since the rise of the radical right was not accompanied by move-
ment activity comparable to the new social movements that gave rise to Green
parties, Herbert Kitschelt (2006b) argues that radical right parties do not di-
rectly grow out of social movements, but ”create and displace social movement
practices” (Kitschelt 2006b, p. 286). Yet, while the mobilization of nationalist
movements is not comparable to the environmental movements of the 1970s,
the 1990s and 2000s have seen an increase of anti-immigration protest (Hutter &
Kriesi 2013) and there are varying levels of movement activities that surround
radical right parties across Europe. Art (2011) identifies the “nationalist sub-
cultures” of different countries as significant factors determining the success of
radical right parties. These subcultures can consist of civil society organizations
as well as looser networks of sympathizers and activists. Thus, they provide
not only acceptability of radical right ideology in society in general, but also
organizations that serve as training grounds for future party elites (Art 2011, p.
113), among other things.50 Moreover, even countries traditionally thought of as
having neither a strong, contemporary nationalist movement nor radical right
party have recently seen the rise of both. In Great Britain organizations like the
English Defense League mobilize anti-Muslim attitudes (Busher 2015). More-
over, after 2009 the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) abandoned
its strategy of acting as a pressure group focused on pushing the Conservative
Party towards (even) more Eurosceptic positions and began targeting “disad-
vantaged voters” by adding “strong nationalist, anti-elite and anti-immigration
50Art (2011) comes to the conclusion that “the foundations for radical right party building
were much stronger in France, Austria, and Flanders than they were in the Netherlands, Britain,
Sweden, and Wallonia” (Art 2011, p. 125). Italy has also been identified as a country with a
“preexisting network of right-wing nationalist organizations” (van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie
2005, p. 566).
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elements” to its appeals (Ford & Goodwin 2014, p. 108). In 2015 UKIP became
the largest party in the European elections and won almost 13% of the vote
(though due to a majoritarian electoral system only one seat) in the national elec-
tions. Similarly, in Germany the PEGIDA movement51 harnesses anti-Muslim
and anti-refugee sentiments (Geiges, Marc, & Walter 2015), and a new party of
the radical right, the “Alternative fu¨r Deutschland ”(Alternative for Germany;
AfD) (Berbuir, Lewandowsky, & Siri 2015) has won seats in 13 of Germany’s 16
state parliaments since its inception in 2013. The organizational connections be-
tween these movements and the radical right parties are often loose because of
the low level of institutionalization of nationalist movements, which prevents
formal organizational ties, and the desire of party leaders not be publicly asso-
ciated with fascist movements (Rydgren 2002, p. 50) or movement activity that
is reminiscent of (neo-)fascism.52
In terms of public mobilization, nationalist movements have, as discussed
above, often focused on protest against immigration or related issues, including
the presence of Muslims and refugees in West European countries. Radical right
parties have consistently shown a focus on the defense of a distinct national
culture, described, for instance, as “cultural homogeneity” (Kitschelt & McGann
1995, p. 20) or “nativism” (Mudde 2007, pp. 18-20) and with it the rejection of
immigration.53 Table 3.7 illustrates this issue focus by showing that immigration
51PEGIDA is an acronym for “Patriotische Europa¨er gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlan-
des” (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West).
52The extremely contentious nature of radical right movement activism, including violent
and illegal activity, often makes radical right parties sensitive to being associated with that ac-
tivity and thus complicates the scientific study of interactions between these movements and
ideologically-close parties.
53Mudde (2007) conceptualizes nativism “as an ideology, which holds that states should be
inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative ele-
ments (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state [. . . ]
The nativist dimension includes a combination of nationalism and xenophobia” (Mudde 2007,
p. 22).
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occupies the central role for most radical right parties across Europe54 and that
they display clear preferences for extremely restrictive immigration policies.55
Table 3.7: Programmatic Orientation: Radical Right Parties
Salience Position Immigration Immigration Position
Immigration Immigration MIP top 3 MIP Immigration
(2010) (2010) (2014) (2014) (2014)
Radical
Right
parties
9.49 (.16) 9.63 (.14) 8 9 9.53 (.13)
N 11 11 11 11 11
Data Source: CHES; Salience: 0-10, with 10 being the highest salience; Position 0-10, with 10 being the most anti-
immigration positions. Data are means with standard errors in parenthesis. MIP is the number of parties
for which the immigration was the top/among the top three issues.
It is noteworthy that beyond immigration, the ideological core of radical
right parties, and in particular the role economic positions play in it, is a matter
of significant academic debate.56 Kitschelt & McGann (1995) argued that ideal-
typical radical right parties take strong pro-market positions, while Mudde
(2007) criticizes this assumption and argues that for radical right parties the
economy is a secondary issue57 and that the parties “defend a nativist eco-
nomic program based upon economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism”
54See table D.1 for a list of parties included in the calculation of these statistics. The 2010 data
includes the Belgian Front National for which no data was available in 2014, while the 2014 data
includes the German NPD, which was not included in the 2010 wave.
55This is not to imply that radical right parties are a single-issue party focused exclusively on
immigration (see Mudde (1999) for a strong argument against the single-issue thesis), but that
these parties’ focus aligns with the movements’ focus and framing. Radical right parties might
well be the expression of a wider antagonism, with the new left representing the other pole of
the cleavage (Kriesi 2010), but this discussion is beyond the scope of this project.
56This discussion is connected to a debate about the most appropriate term to describe these
parties. For simplicities’ sake I use “radical right parties” here.
57This is in line with Rovny’s finding that radical right parties blur their positions on economic
issues while highlighting other issues to increase their support (Rovny 2013).
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(Mudde 2007, p. 137). Thus, the one issue focus radical right parties consis-
tently maintain across countries and time is identical with the issue nationalist
movements have focused and mobilized on. At the same time these parties are
at a minimum not formally connected to the nationalist movements on an or-
ganizational level, thereby showing most, if not all traits of movement platform
parties.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that movement parties before and after World
War II were not only ideologically rooted in movement demands, but also built
significant organizational connections to movements during their early devel-
opment. As table 3.8 illustrates Social Democratic parties in their early phases
of development deeply integrated the labor movement on all three dimensions
of organizational connections through high levels of formal connections, rou-
tinized interactions, and a shared network of elites. As described above, the
organizational connections of post-World War II movement parties were some-
what weaker, but still significant. These parties shared activists as well as a
relevant number of elites at their inception and established informal routinized
connections through these actors. Thus movement parties in both time periods
integrated social movements in their organizational setup, but the later “gener-
ation” of movement parties did so less completely.
Social Democratic parties’ evolution towards electoral-professional parties
led to a significant loosening of connections to movements, but as table 3.8 il-
lustrates, some links on all dimensions of organizational connections remained.
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Social Democrats combine this weakened level of organizational connections
with broad catch-all appeals that lack a strong programmatic connection to the
labor movement. That is, these parties are ideal-typical electoral-professional
parties.
Table 3.8: Models of Movement Parties’ Organizational Connec-
tions
Social Democratic Parties Post-WWII Movement Parties
Early Contemporary Early Contemporary
Formal Connections high low low absent
Routinized Interactions high medium medium low
Elite Overlap high low medium absent
Parties whose movement roots lie after 1945 have also gone through a pro-
cess of development in which they significantly loosened their organizational
ties to those movements. In most cases formal connections were completely
abolished and the shared network of elites vanished almost entirely. Only a low
level of routinized informal interactions remains. Combined with the contin-
ued ideological commitment to movement goals these parties thus adopted the
movement platform model.
The remainder of this dissertation is dedicated to explaining why contempo-
rary parties with movement roots have adopted the movement platform party
model instead of following earlier parties’ evolution to electoral-professional
models. The next chapter elucidates the reasons for the organizational separa-
tion of parties and movements, before chapter 5 turns its attention to the inter-
action of the voter base and party and movement elites’ reactions to that voter
base in order to explain the retention of close programmatic links between the
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two actors.
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CHAPTER 4
ORGANIZING INFLUENTIAL MOVEMENTS: WHY MOVEMENTS AND
PARTIES KEEP THEIR DISTANCE AS ORGANIZATIONS
The previous chapter demonstrated that movement platform parties were
founded with looser organizational connections to movements than their pre-
World War II predecessors and have largely shed the connections that did exist
in the first decades of their existence. This chapter explores why parties and
movements went their separate ways despite strong incentives for cooperation
in pursuit of shared policy goals. Both actors would, for instance, profit sig-
nificantly from the coordination of agenda-setting efforts and the pooling of
organizational resources for the purpose of mobilization. Why is this kind of
cooperation so rare?
The discussion in chapter 2 above provides initial expectations which help
to answer this question. In that chapter I argued that social movements have
strong incentives to push for organizational separation from the party they
spawned for two reasons. First, remaining above the partisan fray allows social
movement organizations to retain the support of citizens with different party-
political persuasions and to influence parties across the political spectrum. Sec-
ond, I argued that the New Social Movement roots of many parties with ori-
gins after World War II should lead to organizational separation, because elites
from these movements are particularly skeptical about parties’ ability to pri-
oritize movement policy goals over the organizational self-interest – including
vote/office-seeking behavior – of party elites. Third, the small political parties
these movements spawned have few resources to offer that are of interest to
SMOs. Party elites are accordingly incentivized to accept the separation and
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try to make the best of it by realizing positive radical flank effects. They can
achieve these effects by presenting themselves to the electorate as a less radical,
more reasonable version of the movements.
This chapter will provide evidence based on interview and survey data sup-
porting that all three of these factors incentivize organizational separation. It
also identifies organizational imperatives that lead to a separation of elites and
create further obstacles for cooperation as an additional reason for the separa-
tion. The chapter will address each of these four factors in a distinct section, be-
fore briefly discussing how the reasons for organizational separation have fluc-
tuated over time and across movement platform parties’ stages of development.
A final section concludes the chapter by highlighting how SMOs, contrary to the
historical experience of Social Democratic parties and many expectations in the
literature, are the central actors in pushing for organizational separation.
Movement Organizations and Non-Partisanship: Mobilizing
Support and Influencing Political Parties
As discussed in the previous chapter, the vast majority of SMO representatives
explicitly stressed the non-partisan approach their organizations are pursuing.
In line with the expectations laid out above, this is motivated by the belief that
genuine non-partisanship allow them to successfully engage with actors across
the political spectrum and thus enables SMOs to exert the largest possible influ-
ence on policy change. A representative of a German environmental organiza-
tion described the goal as being “acceptable” to actors on both the left and right
of the political spectrum (interview 010408).
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Because citizens and politicians are more likely to perceive SMOs to be in
some form of alliance with parties that are programmatically close to the move-
ment and share its historical roots, movement platform parties are particularly
affected by this desire for non-partisanship. Accordingly movement organiza-
tions sometimes have especially distant relationships with programmatically
close parties. As one Swedish environmentalist recalled: “we are criticized that
we are closely connected to the Green Party and the Left1 [. . . ], so we try to solve
that issue by not working too closely with them” (interview 020401).
Two distinct concerns drive movement organizations’ preference for organi-
zational distance from the movement platform parties to which they gave rise.
First, a concern about losing potential supporters, donors, and activists as well
as influence among those in the wider population who do not support the move-
ment platform party close to the movement. Second, the potential of endanger-
ing working relationships with other political parties, if the SMOs were closely
associated with a movement platform party.
With respect to influencing the wider public, SMOs accordingly highlight
their non-partisanship, which is ”essential for the credibility” of NGOs in the
view of a representative of the German Working Group against Data Retention
(interview 010201). This representative highlighted his concerns that citizens
receiving information from his organization could stop considering it reliable
and instead start perceiving the SMO as a “ lobby organization” for a particular
political party (interview 010201). Furthermore, movement organizations are
worried about the possibility of offending members and supporters with vary-
ing party preferences by being associated closely with any political party. One
1The Left Party, Va¨nsterpartiet, is a Swedish socialist party originating in the country’s
communist party, but has broadened its appeals to those issues important to the New Left
(Ersson 2008).
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SMO leader described this as follows: “We are, as virtually the entire [German]
environmental movement, party-politically neutral and do not see ourselves in
a particular closeness to any particular party. That would also be a bit diffi-
cult, because our membership affiliates itself with different parties” (interview
010404; similar 010413).
Survey data demonstrate that movement elites’ perceptions regarding the
varied nature of their supporters’ party-political preferences are accurate. Fig-
ures 4.1 and 4.2 show the party political leanings of citizens who are members
of or donated to environmental NGOs in Sweden and Germany.2 In both coun-
tries, sympathizers of the Green Party are overrepresented among the support-
ers of NGOs, but most other parties enjoy substantial support as well. In fact,
regarding both membership and donations the supporters of non-green politi-
cal parties together vastly outnumber the Green Party supporters. Accordingly,
organizations within the environmental movement would risk the majority of
their support base if they bound themselves exclusively to the Green party of
their respective country.3
Parties are well aware of SMOs’ desire for clear organizational distance and
understand that it is partially driven by concerns regarding the movements’
2The data is from the first wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) (NSD - Norwegian Cen-
tre for Research Data, Norway - Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC 2002).
Party preference was measured by polling whether citizens felt closer to one party “than all
other parties,” and then asking respondents to name that party. Members and donors were iden-
tified using the question “For each of the voluntary organisations I will now mention, please use
this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, if
so, which.” The organizations were described as “an organisation for environmental protection,
peace or animal rights,” and the relevant activities here were “Member,” and “Donated money,”
respectively. This question was only asked in the 2002 wave, making more recent comparisons
unfeasible. Design weights were applied.
3Figures displaying the results for those who participated in (see figure E.2) or volunteered
time (see figure E.3) with an environmental NGO are available in the appendix and lead to the
same conclusions. No relevant organization type for the digital movement was polled in the
ESS.
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Figure 4.1: Members of Environmental NGOs by Party Preference; Green
parties highlighted; Source: ESS
supporter base and influence. A Pirate Party representative in Sweden de-
scribed this as the SMOs wanting to “keep their space” (interview 020106) and
a Green politician in the same country summarized: “the social movements are
afraid of getting too involved with party politics, because they think that will
decrease their membership and that few people will listen if they are seen as
some part of the establishment” (interview 020301). Movement platform party
elites also recognize that their parties, as those ideologically closest to the move-
ment organizations, are often most affected by the movements’ strong prefer-
ence for non-partisanship: “the environmental movements are those most afraid
of getting too close to the Green Party [. . . ] Because they want to have members
who are Social Democrats, and Liberals, and everything. They don’t just want
to have Green members, because that will decrease their influence” (interview
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Figure 4.2: Donors of Environmental NGOs by Party Preference; Green
parties highlighted; Source: ESS
020301). For that reason the SMOs not only avoid organizational connections,
but go so far as to rarely contact only the (movement platform) party closest
to them when they engage with party politics and prefer to get in touch with
several parties at once (interview 020307). Naturally, the concerns about being
mistaken for a party-politically biased organization are highest during electoral
campaigns, when the public is tuned into politics, and thus the SMOs’ will-
ingness to cooperate with parties in any way comes to a full stop during those
periods of time (interview 020106).
Beyond concerns about being less attractive to supporters and influential
with respect to the general public, SMOs also worry that a close association
with one party could cause them to lose their influence on other parties and the
governments that they form. A representative of the Working Group against
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Internet Blocks and Censorship in Germany highlighted that non-partisanship
was particularly important for “being able to find a contact person in all par-
ties” (interview 010203). He explained that taking a clear party-political posi-
tion would lead to being identified with a particular party and thus losing the
ability to “put the issue forward” with other political parties (interview 010203).
Another SMO representative within the digital movement described the goals
of his organization has having a “neutral working relationship” with all politi-
cal parties (interview 010205). This desire to remain “capable of communicating
and connecting with all parties” also drives staffing decisions where individu-
als with clear party connections are not seen as ideal ambassadors of an SMO’s
message to the political sphere (interview 010406).4 More generally, some move-
ment leaders believe that a close association of their topic with a political party
(i.e. issue ownership) leads to other political parties abandoning the issue, mak-
ing it harder to achieve policy change (interview 010209).5
When cooperating with parties, one tactic that movement organizations
draw on to avoid offending other parties is to engage several parties at the same
time and include all of them in the process. A representative of Wikimedia in
Germany described how his organization pushed for a specific policy change
on the state level and that the Pirates were those who raised the issue in the
state parliament (interview 010201). During the process, however, Wikimedia
made sure to bring in the other opposition parties when formulating the spe-
cific motion and eventually even convinced the governing parties in the state
4See below for a more detailed discussion of the lack of elite overlap between movements
and movement platform parties.
5Recent research has shown that this concern is valid in some circumstances and regarding
some issues, like the environment, but not others, like immigration (Abou-Chadi 2016). Here,
however, movement leaders’ belief that strong issue ownership by one party would lead other
parties to ignore that issue is enough to create preferences for organizational separation from
any political party.
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to support that motion (interview 010201). In that way no parliamentary party
was left outside the process.
Again, as with respect to SMOs’ concerns about losing supporters, move-
ment platform party elites are also conscious of both movement organizations’
concerns regarding the loss of influence on other (mainstream) parties and the
effects of these concerns on SMOs’ relationship with ideologically close move-
ment platform parties. A former leader of the Swedish Green Party stated, talk-
ing about the SNF, a central environmental SMO in the country: “[T]hey are a
bit afraid of having too close relations to the Greens, because they think it will
affect their possibilities to work with other politicians in a negative way” (in-
terview 020307). Party elites also recognize that the social movement organiza-
tions’ preference for cooperating with several political parties at the same time,
for instance when organizing a seminar, stems from this desire to maximize
the movement’s influence on parties across the political spectrum (interview
020303). The same awareness exists regarding SMOs’ sensitivity to interactions
with parties during political campaigns when other political actors, like parties
and NGOs, particularly frown on these kinds of cooperation (interview 010109).
Movement platform parties, however, do not share the desire for distance
and organizational separation. On the contrary, several party leaders expressed
a desire for a closer relationship with the movements that gave rise to their party
(e.g., interviews 010105, 010307, 20102, 020301, 020307). A representative of the
German Greens highlighted that “cultivating and further extending and intensi-
fying” the party’s contacts to the movements is important to the party’s agenda
(interview 010306). In Sweden one of the reasons for establishing Miljo¨partiet’s
own think-tank, COGITO, was “to broaden the green sphere around the Green
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Party,” but SMOs were not interested in becoming founding members of the
think-tank (interview 020306). Movement platform party leaders also voiced
their preference for: cooperation during election campaigns (010112), increased
input from movement organizations into their policy formulation process (inter-
view 020307), and for candidates with prominent social movement backgrounds
in order to “increase the credibility” of the party’s list (interview 020102).
Especially during electoral campaigns this has led to frustration in move-
ment platform parties, where elites see the distance as harming the overall
cause, with one former Green MP in Germany describing the movements’ re-
treat from party politics during those periods as “a timidness that I also cannot
understand” (interview 010307). When the German Greens, for instance, were
facing strong negative press coverage for advocating to serve exclusively meat-
free meals in public canteens on one day of the week during the 2013 national
election campaign (Caspari 2013) the environmental movement organizations
did not publicly back up the party. A representative of Die Gru¨nen expressed
his dismay about the reluctance of SMOs to engage in this debate, which he saw
as driven by a fear of intervening in an election campaign: “In that case the or-
ganizations and movements did not get that this was not just about the Greens,
but actually about slaughtering the cause, also in public opinion” (interview
010305).
Despite this desire for closer cooperation and organizational connections,
movement platform parties are not in a position to change the SMOs’ preference
for organizational separation, because they have little influence to offer. These
parties are usually small and not in positions of political power. Accordingly
they are not attractive targets for lobbying efforts or cooperation (e.g., inter-
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views 010204, 020206, 020308) and movement organizations concentrate their
efforts on large (mainstream) parties, particularly those in government (inter-
views 010204, 010205). As described in the previous chapter, movement plat-
form parties are furthermore already programmatically close to the movement
and they are also perceived as such by SMOs (interviews 010207, 020401). A
representative of an environmental organization in Sweden described his orga-
nization’s relationship with the Green Party as follows: “But normally we don’t
put a lot of priorities in influencing them, because they are already on our side”
(interview 020401).
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail in chapters 5 and 6, parties
cannot exert pressure on SMOs to achieve closer organizational cooperation
and risk conflict, because they depend on positive evaluations from movements,
which creates a power imbalance between the two actors. One representative
of the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation described the organization’s
relationships to politicians as follows:
[T]hey are very afraid of us [. . . ] We always sort of play it out in
both media and member ways. We try to influence the members. We
have more than 200.000 members now [. . . ] [F]or a politician 200.000
members, that’s quite a good voter base. And then we also try to
communicate it through media. (interview 020401)
The power of SMOs over political parties derives partially from the higher
credibility NGOs enjoy in times when other political institutions, including par-
ties, are much less popular. A representative of Campact, a German progressive
movement organization pursuing an approach similar to MoveOn.org in the
U.S. that, among other things, works on environmental issues, described the sit-
uation with respect to the Greens as follows: “the accusation alone, that they do
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not represent the environment optimally harms them [. . . ] [I]t would be a ques-
tion of who the public believes and that NGOs at first have a higher credibility
is just the way it is” (interview 010313). Survey data supports this contention. In
the early 2010s, for instance, 66.1% of Germans and 69.2% of Swedes expressed
“a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in “environmental organizations,”
while only 23.9% and 42.2% respectively said the same of “political parties.”6
But even beyond criticism and credibility, movement platform parties rely
on their existing programmatic closeness and contacts with the movements in
order to push their agenda. A Swedish online activist argued that without
movement mobilization “nobody will listen” and pay attention to the cam-
paigns the Pirate Party runs or the protests it organizes. He, furthermore, ar-
gued that even in the European Parliament, where the Swedish Pirates enjoyed
representation at the time of the interview, Piratpartiet had to rely on the move-
ments as an implicit power base to push its agenda within the Green parliamen-
tary group that the Pirate MEPs had joined:
But they are influential in the Green group because they have all of
these organizations backing them up on specific issues [. . . ] I mean
the Green group, when they see the Pirate Party and then when they
see the ACTA [Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement] protests, the
Green group will say: “You know the Pirates are really important,
we need to have them with us. We don’t want these people against
us at least.” (interview 020203)
Thus, in this situation in which the movement platform parties cannot sin-
glehandedly change the movements’ preference for organizational separation
and distance, they are forced to accept the status quo. The attitudes within
6Source: World Value Survey; Data from 2013 for Germany and 2011 for Sweden (Asep/JDS
2016).
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movement platform parties regarding this situation range from respectful ac-
ceptance as expressed by a member of the Green Party’s national leadership
in Sweden, who stated that the environmental organizations “are very keen to
be independent of course and that is something we have to respect” (interview
020302; similar 010104 on the German Pirates and NGOs), to disappointment
and the belief that the impact of the entire (environmental) movement “is con-
siderably weakened” by the organizational distance between party and move-
ment (interview 010307).
The inability to work closely together is also self-reinforcing, because it leads
to competition for public acknowledgment as the driving force of policy suc-
cesses (e.g., interview 010105). Movement representatives, for example, criti-
cized the phenomenon of politicians appearing at protests for a short time and
receiving a large part of the media coverage (interview 010413), and parties
acknowledge that they work to appear prominently in media coverage (inter-
view 010112). A Swedish digital activist described the aftermath of the protests
against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which aimed to strengthen
international copyright enforcement, as follows:
Afterwards the Pirate Parties, they really wanted to take credit for
ACTA, but they were not the driving force. The driving force was
the other organizations like La Quadrature de Net and so forth. Even
Anonymous was more active than the Pirate Party. The Pirate Party
was just framing that as a formal political decision process. (inter-
view 020203)
In sum the organizational separation of movement platform parties from the
movements that gave rise to them is driven by the SMOs’ preferences. These
organizations want to remain non-partisan in order to maximize their supporter
base and influence on political parties across the political spectrum. Parties lack
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the resources to change this outcome.
Assumptions about Different Motivations and Distrust
Beyond the strategic considerations about influence maximization, movement
organizations’ desire for organizational separation from movement platform
parties is also grounded in assumptions about the driving motivations of party
actors. SMO elites described parties as inherently vote-seeking, while they char-
acterized their own attitude as policy-seeking (see Mu¨ller & Strøm (1999) on this
distinction). A central activist in the Swedish digital movement summarized
this as follows:
[I]t became quite obvious that the Pirate Party was trying to [. . . ]
gain seats in the parliament [. . . ] rather than maybe push the issues
in the right direction [. . . ] Because they tried to become [. . . ] if not
mainstream then maybe populistic [. . . ] Trying to gain votes for in-
stance, sometimes in pragmatic ways, because they took a step away
from actual internet politics. (interview 020205)
The survey conducted among Swedish Green Party members provides con-
tradictory results on whether these assumptions are grounded in reality. As
table 4.1 shows, when asked to rank the importance of intra-party democracy,
policy-, vote-, and office-seeking goals, the vast plurality of party members,
as well as office holders for the party and party elites (defined as those hold-
ing office above the local level), favors policy change as the primary goal for
Miljo¨partiet.7
7While there is social desirability bias to highlight policy gains as the most important reason,
it is mitigated by the anonymous nature of the survey and the opportunity to rank the different
goals rather than having to dismiss one or more of them altogether.
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Table 4.1: Primary Goal Miljo¨partiet Should Pursue in % of Re-
spondents
Party Members Office Holders Party Elites
Policy 52.90 51.85 45.45
Intra-party democracy 24.00 27.50 28.12
Office 18.30 13.58 12.50
Votes 8.33 8.54 12.12
N 156 82 33
Office Holders are the subset of Party Members holding any public or party office,
while Party Elites are defined as those members holding office above the local level,
i.e. are a subset of Office Holders.
There are also few differences with respect to the reasons members of the
Swedish Greens highlighted as driving their movement and party activism.
Figure 4.3 plots the means of responses to survey items asking for the impor-
tance of three potential reasons for joining the party or a social movement on
a scale ranging from 0, corresponding to not being “at all important” to 4, cor-
responding to “very important.” With respect to movement activity, only an-
swers from respondents who indicated they had been active in the environ-
mental and/or anti-nuclear movement, i.e., the two movements that gave rise
to Miljo¨partiet, are included. Figure 4.3 illustrates that both “realizing politi-
cal aims” and “meeting likeminded people” attracted respondents to the party
and movements, but “pursuing a career” in either played a much smaller role.8
The differences between reasons to join the party and reasons to join the move-
ments are negligible with the possible exception of joining for career reasons,
which seems to play a somewhat larger role for the party. Since, however, this
8Note that the three reasons (realizing the political aims of the party/movement, meeting
likeminded people, and pursuing a career) correspond to purposive, solidary, and material in-
centives to solve collective action problems, like political mobilization (Clark & Wilson 1961).
123
is a sample drawn from party members and thus by its nature includes those
who made a career inside a party, but not all those who focused on careers in
movements, this difference should not be over-interpreted.
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Figure 4.3: Mean Values of Reasons to Join Miljo¨partiet/Social Movements
There is some evidence though that people seek to realize different goals
in their party and movement activity. As reported in table 4.2, the correlation
between joining the movement to achieve policy change and being motivated
to join the party for the same reason is relatively low in general and lower than
that with respect to meeting likeminded people or pursuing careers. That is,
party members active in the environmental and/or anti-nuclear movement had
different reasons for their party and movement activity, especially regarding the
policy focus.
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Table 4.2: Spearman Correlations between Reasons to to Join
Miljo¨partiet/Social Movements
Correlation N
Policy Aims .26* 93
Likeminded People .43* 93
Career .31* 93
∗p < .05; only includes respondents who indicated that they had been active in the
environmental and/or anti-nuclear movement
Independent of whether these assumptions about different motivations ac-
curately reflect reality, they lead movement elites to believe that cooperation
would be unproductive at best and highly problematic at worst. This creates a
range of different attitudes towards political parties among movement actors.
As figure 4.4 illustrates these attitudes are spread out along a spectrum ranging
from an acceptance of the differences on one pole to seeing parties generally as
inefficient means to push for policy change in the center to a clear anti-party
attitude at the other end of that spectrum.
Acceptance Inefficiency of Parties Anti-Party
Figure 4.4: Spectrum of Movement Attitudes Towards Political Parties
On one pole of the spectrum attitudes are characterized by an acceptance
that the different contexts in which parties and movement organizations work
demand different ways of operating. This acknowledgment does not come
without criticism of party behavior, but it is relatively mild-mannered as illus-
trated by this summary given by a representative from a German environmental
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SMO:
[I]n politics one has to represent compromises and then one has an
environmental organization, which has very demanding environ-
mental claims. Accordingly, one will of course always criticize more
and say: “You are not dedicated enough.” Though there are indeed
some questions where the parties have not been dedicated enough,
because they said: “This won’t play well with the voters.” (interview
010403)
Similar attitudes were expressed by others in the German environmental
movement, who stressed the different roles that compromise and more far-
reaching demands play in parties and movements (interview 010407), as well
as the importance of issue-focused work (interview 10404), and remaining rad-
ical in demands (interview 010402) for movement organizations.
In the middle of the spectrum movement representatives, in the digital
movement in particular, see parties simply as inefficient ways of achieving pol-
icy change: “almost all political parties have old rules. It is very difficult to push
change in your political party” (interview 020202; similar 020206).
On the anti-party pole of the spectrum the belief that parties are inefficient
is combined with a more far-reaching critique of political parties. A Swedish
activist in the digital movement, for instance, saw parties as unable to engage in
direct action, since they would have to defend it to a larger public than activists
face, leading him to the conclusion that:
[T]he Pirate Party were more and more in a sort of political crisis, I
think. They wanted to be the hackers of the internet, but they had to
be boring politicians, because that’s what politicians do. So the at-
traction for young people I think declined a lot. I think that much of
the energy was converted from doing good things to maintaining a
political party that wanted to become [the] establishment. (interview
020203)
126
Moreover, the same activist also saw many of the Pirates activities’ on the
issues as driven by the desire to realize vote-seeking goals:
[A] political party do[es] things on a symbolic level to get voters, to
get political momentum, to get political credibility. They don’t do it
because it actually works. This happens sometimes with [a] political
party. And that’s very frustrating. Especially if you work hard and
then the Pirate Party will come and take all the credit for your work.
Because they want to use that to win elections. (interview 020203)
An activist who was involved with the Pirate Bureau, the central nucleus of
the Swedish digital movement, described the organization’s activists’ decision
to “not engage in party politics” as “deliberate” and voiced a clear preference for
“grassroots movements” continuing: “So when the Pirate Party formed it was
quite obvious that this was not an option for us to be involved in, because we
don’t trust and we don’t work with parties. It’s not our kind of party” (interview
020205).
While this anti-party attitude was especially strong within the Swedish dig-
ital movement, it was also expressed by representatives from other movements,
like the German digital movement, where one interviewee speculated that the
Pirates “might have done themselves a favor if they hadn’t founded a party,”
since “they are not being taken seriously anymore [, because] they work them-
selves into the ground with power-political games and are not that good sub-
stantively that one really accepts them as experts” (interview 010209). Similarly,
a representative of a German anti-nuclear group stated that parties “when they
have to decide between power and the cause” are more likely to come down on
the side of power (interview 010412).9
9The variety of attitudes towards parties within the same movements, the German environ-
mental movement in particular, might correlate with an implicit division of labour between
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Parties do acknowledge that one of their goals has to be the “gain of parlia-
mentary seats” in order to influence bills and “in an ideal case also indeed one
day the hope of government participation” (interview 010105). They see them-
selves as trying to balance this with policy goals: “we kind of need to balance
between being radical, like science tells us we need to be to save the planet,
but also to get the public to vote for the Green Party” (interview 020303). Party
elites also know that the movement does not always think they are finding the
right balance: “And I would say that Greenpeace sometimes would find us to
be too scared, too frightened, not ambitious enough in that transition” (inter-
view 020303). Occasionally these disagreements, as described with respect to
the anti-party attitudes of the Swedish digital movement, are insurmountable.
A Swedish Pirate Party leader summarized the situation as follows: “They think
we have kind of destroyed it by making it political. Which says something” (in-
terview 020106).
Sometimes the distrust or belief that cooperation would not be fruitful is
mutual. Movement organizations are occasionally seen as not knowing how
to achieve success, because they are rigidly tied to their ideological positions
(interview 010305). A former Green MP in Germany also noted that others in
professional politics perceive movement organizations as willing to formulate
drastic demands in order win donations (interview 010307).
organizations, where those on the “acceptance” side of the attitude-spectrum have some co-
operative interactions with parties, while those on the “anti-party” side have less and more
contentious interactions with parties. In the environmental movement this might also corre-
late with what Dalton (1994) has described as the distinction between a “conservation orienta-
tion” and a more fundamental critique of modern societies based in an “ecological orientation”
(Dalton 1994, pp. 46-47). A representative of an anti-nuclear organization in Germany indi-
cated that this division of labor even exists within organizations. He described that a colleague
worked to maintain contacts with parties, while he himself stressed the importance of “extra-
parliamentary protest” coming to the conclusion: “that there maybe also is something like a
silent, unspoken agreement that it is good that we are different in our opinions and that this is
sometimes complementary” (interview 010402).
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To summarize, beyond the strategic separation movement organizations
pursue to maximize their support and influence, assumptions about and ex-
periences with the vote-seeking behavior of political parties constitute a second
reason why SMOs seek clear organizational separation from any party.
Strategic Benefits of Organizational Separation
Movement platform parties’ organizational separation from the movements
that gave rise to them is further stabilized by movement and party leaders’ per-
ception that the status quo delivers occasional strategic benefits (despite the dis-
satisfaction by party representatives described above). Organizational separa-
tion and the genuine non-partisan approach that comes with it allow movement
organizations for instance, to mediate conflicts between political parties and
build larger, temporary issue-focused coalitions that also include several par-
ties. A representative of the German civil rights organization Humanist Union
recalled that the organization was able to “build bridges” between different par-
ties that wanted to participate in a protest against surveillance, but were con-
cerned that the Pirate Party was over-proportionally profiting from its presence
at the protest, which occurred during an election campaign (interview 010206).
The organization’s engagement thus helped keep this coalition of civil society
groups and political parties together, which was only possible because no one
could suspect the Humanist Union of being partisan (interview 010206).10 Sim-
ilarly, a German Pirate member of a state parliament described how initiatives
10Thus, in this case the movement was not only successful because local movement groups
and activists were coordinated by professional movement organization, as Tarrow (1998) would
expect (Tarrow 1998, p. 124), but additionally because a professional movement organization
was able to coordinate and mediate between several political parties and bring them into the
coalition, at least for one protest.
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for cooperation with civil society actors and other parties fail when initiated by
a partisan political actor (interview 010101) and a member of a state leadership
of the party voiced a preference for non-partisan organizations to take the lead
in coalition-building for the same reason (interview 010106).
Beyond coalition building, party and movement elites sometimes identified
a number of other occasionally occurring strategic benefits of their organiza-
tional separation. First, as a member of the national leadership of the Swedish
Greens acknowledged with respect to the issue of global warming: “If we are
too radical there is always of course a genuine possibility that we will scare
off voters that are not yet as convinced as the core voters how little time we
have to combat the climate issue” (interview 020302). In that context having a
social movement that demands even more radical solutions can have positive
effects for a movement platform party and create a positive radical flank effect
(Haines 1988). That is exactly what these movements do for Miljo¨partiet in the
view of one former party leader:
I usually say that if they [the environmental organizations] are re-
ally radical, it’s good for us, because even if we disagree with them
and they think that we are not as radical as we should be, it’s good
anyway, because then it will seem as if we are reasonable and some-
where in the middle [. . . ] Because if they would be less radical than
us, then we would seem extreme and that would be a problem. (in-
terview 020307)
Third, one environmental movement leader indicated that his organization
occasionally communicated with a few representatives of parties, in particular
Greens who are personally well-known to movement activists, about which role
these politicians and other civil society actors will play in pushing the shared
anti-nuclear agenda (interview 010402). A Pirate politician representing the
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party on a city council also reported occasional contacts with the movement
to ensure that party and movement were not “stealing each other’s issues” so
that the party could highlight one while the movement would focus on another
topic (interview 010109).
Fourth and relatedly, some party leaders see the organizational separation
and distinct roles of the party and movement as helpful in attaining policy suc-
cess. Referring to Greenpeace, a Green Swedish Member of Parliament stated
that:
I think it’s natural that we have different roles. I encourage them in a
way to be more activist. I say yes, do all the campaign stuff that they
do because they are so good at it. Because I cannot do it in my role. I
cannot be that activist. (interview 020303)
A similar opinion was voiced by a former leader of the party, who also en-
dorsed the different roles of party and movement and argued that “[a]s long as
you don’t have a majority, you must make compromises, which is not the style
of the non-parliamentary groups. And they shouldn’t make compromises” (in-
terview 020308).
Finally, SMOs have the ability to make demands that are unpopular or
would be unpopular if they were made by politicians. A digital movement
leader in Germany named legalizing drugs and increasing the financial re-
sources available to parliamentarians for overhead costs as examples of such
demands (interview 010208).
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Organizational Demands and Resources
As the previous discussion demonstrated, formal organizational connections
and regular, informal connections between movement platform parties and
movements are prevented by the latter’s desire to maximize influence, as well
as support, a certain level of distrust between the two actors, and are further sta-
bilized by occasional strategic benefits of organizational separation. The third
criterion of organizational separation, a lack of elite overlap between parties
and movements, is also driven by the organizational demands of political par-
ties and lack of resources among social movement organizations.
Candidate selection for political offices is a prime opportunity for movement
platform parties to include representatives of social movements and civil soci-
ety writ-large in their organization and build links with potential allies. Yet, as
chapter 3 has demonstrated, the elite networks of parties and movements have
become separated and accordingly movement elites who stand as party candi-
dates are a rare occurrence. Party leaders highlighted that a number or organi-
zational demands prevent including outsiders into the party in that way. First,
for small parties it is hard to justify giving one or more of their limited parlia-
mentary seats to an outsider when many party activists have worked hard and
completed important tasks for the party over a long period of time (interview
020308). Second, for parties in which different wings play an important role,
like the German Greens, who are traditionally split into a more fundamentalist
(Fundi) and a more moderate (Realo) camp, candidate selection is an important
mechanism to balance these wings and keep the party together. Accordingly,
these organized wings play a central role in candidate selection (010301), and
there is little room for taking other groups into consideration. Third, move-
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ments and associated organizations are mostly focused on one issue area. While
the movement platform parties’ positions are close to the movements’ demands
on this issue, most movement platform parties broaden their issue agenda over
time. They still stress the core issue and in fact rely on it to engage their core
electorate (see chapter 5), but they require party elites that are on the party line
beyond that central issue (e.g., interview 020308). Green Party elites in Ger-
many recalled past occasions in which outsiders as candidates or MPs had cre-
ated difficulties for the party, because they voiced positions not in line with
the party platform (interview 010305) and “had not learned how to behave in
a party” (interview 010308). Finally, time constraints are another reason why
party and movement elites do not overlap. Significant activity in both the party
and movement is not possible because of the time requirements for each (inter-
views 010103, 010105, 020308) and since vast amounts of available time are a
central prerequisite for political candidates (interview 020104).
While the organizational demands of political parties prevent them from in-
cluding many elites with strong movement backgrounds, moving from parties
into movements is also uncommon. In addition to SMOs’ sensitivity to party
links in general, the lack of the resources available to movement organizations
makes positions in SMOs relatively rare and undesirable for (movement plat-
form) party elites who held positions in parliament or government. A former
Green MP in Germany described this as a “structural problem” in comparison
to, for instance, the (mainstream) parties of the political right, who have a soci-
etal environment consisting of companies, which help to provide career oppor-
tunities for former politicians (interview 010307). In contrast to this, environ-
mental organizations in both Germany and Sweden are not seen as providing
attractive career paths for former party elites due to a lack of resources (inter-
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views 010305, 020301, 020303), including a lack of organizational support for
their elites (interview 010305).
This lack of resources and the resulting need to target the existing ones care-
fully also contributes to the organizational separation between movement plat-
form parties and movements beyond the elite sphere. SMOs concentrate on
lobbying parliamentary groups rather than party organizations themselves (in-
terview 010410), because of limited resources and their general policy-focused
approach. Thus, where they interact with parties they do not interact with those
party actors that are most likely to think about long-term cooperation with civil
society, but with Members of Parliament and their staff, who are usually fo-
cused on the specific policy proposals in front of them. But even if they were
to increasingly engage with the actual party organizations, cooperation would
be problematic since small movement platform parties do not necessarily have
sufficient funding to employ enough staff to organize long-term cooperation
(interviews 010302, 020101, 020102).
Development over Time
The previous discussion mainly focused on highlighting factors that keep move-
ment platform parties and movements organizationally separate and are consis-
tent over time. The findings, for instance, indicate that Pirate parties, as move-
ment platform parties still relatively close to their movement roots in terms of
time, and Green parties, thirty or more years removed from their movement ori-
gins, are both organizationally separate from the movements, because the latter
perceive connections as threatening their influence on other (often more power-
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ful) political parties. The same held true for the Greens, even in their early days,
as one former party leader of Miljo¨partiet recalled:
We talked with them [the “alternative movement”] [. . . ] But you
know these movements, they are basically non-parliamentarian.
They are pressure groups. They want to have contacts with all ex-
isting parties [. . . ] [why would they] risk their position by support-
ing a new party which they wouldn’t know if it will succeed or not.
(interview 020308)
Thus, while some of the most important factors leading to and continuing
to ensure organizational separation are constant over time, time and changing
movement structures and mobilization did have an additional influence on this
separation. With the demobilization of strong grassroots movements, the in-
centives for cooperation have shifted away from direct interactions to the cur-
rent model of clear organizational separation accompanied by programmatic
proximity. First, demobilization led to a lower mobilization potential for so-
cial movements, which accordingly became less attractive partners for move-
ment platform parties (interview 010302). A former Green MP in Germany de-
scribed the current environmental organization as “not very able to conduct
campaigns”11 (interview 010308). The Swedish Pirates are also going through
a process in which the movement demobilized and SMOs ceased to be active,
with activists either being soaked up by the state (through employment) or by
the Pirates themselves, leaving the party without clear attractive partners to
connect with in civil society (interview 020103).
Second, with the institutionalization of movements, some of the reasons for
the original cooperation and organizational connections between movement
platform parties and movements became obsolete. In Germany, for instance,
11“nicht sehr kampagnenfa¨hig” in German.
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where state funding of parties is relatively generous,12 the Green Party had es-
tablished so-called “Eco-Funds,” which it used to channel money into grass-
roots movement projects, like the founding of organic grocery stores (interview
010305). With the institutionalization of the movements, their ability to raise
funds on their own increased. In the case of organic grocery stores, for instance,
gaining access to credits from banks, which was highly problematic in the early
days of the movement, has become easier (interview 010305). Furthermore, the
professionalization of the party itself increased its own financial needs, which
eventually led to an abolition of the “Eco-Funds” in their original form (inter-
view 010305) and a separation of party and movements structures.13
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that the organizational separation of movement
platform parties from movements is driven by movement organizations’ desire
to be genuinely non-partisan in order to increase their support base and influ-
ence over other political parties, as well as skepticism towards parties more
generally. Thus the evidence strongly supports some of the theoretical expec-
tations outlined at the beginning of this chapter.14 By contrast, the expectation
that radical flank effects play in important role in stabilizing organizational sep-
aration receives only very limited support. Party leaders lack the resources to
12State funding is tied to a certain level of electoral support for the parties, though.
13A third reason highlighted by the interviewee was changes in party financing that made
financing external actors less attractive (interview 010305).
14Note, however, that the expectation that movement elites are skeptical of parties is
grounded in the characteristics of New Social Movements. The relevant environmental move-
ments here are/were NSMs and the digital movements show many of their characteristics. How
far these results travel to other movements, like those on the radical right, is an empirical and
open question.
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prevent organizational separation, but very few of them highlighted realizing
positive radical flank effects as a focus of their work.15 The chapter also iden-
tified occasionally occurring strategic benefits, like SMOs’ increased ability to
build cross-party alliances, and a number of organizational demands as well as
the lack of resources to engage in cooperation on both sides as additional factors
that stabilize organizational separation.
Thus, social movement organizations are the driving forces of organizational
separation. This finding stands in contrast to a) the expectations in the litera-
ture based on the evolution of older movement parties, b) some accounts of the
development of contemporary, especially Green, parties with movement roots,
and c) standard theories of organizational change in political parties. The liter-
ature on Social Democratic parties showed that their weakened organizational
links to movements are the result of a long-term development in which parties
first weakened programmatic links in order to attract more voters (Przeworski
& Sprague 1986). The weakening of organizational links, like the end of collec-
tive membership in parties and trade unions, followed later as a result of the
programmatic estrangement. Thus for the Socialists, the parties, and not – as
in the post-1945 cases – the movements, were the actor forcing organizational
separation.
Second, following in the tradition of research on Social Democrats, some
scholarly work, like Hoffmann (2002) regarding the German Greens, has argued
that the organizational separation of newer parties from their movement origins
was driven by the imperatives of “parliamentarisation and professionalisation”
15In light of many SMOs’ preference to be able to work with parties across the political spec-
trum, it is perhaps not surprising that these SMOs cannot play the role of a radical flank to
movement platform parties, as radicalism would inhibit working relationships with many other
parties.
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(Hoffmann 2002, p. 72), as well as parties’ policy and personnel choices (e.g.
Hoffmann (2002, p. 80)). That is, in this view the organizational divergence
was, like that of Social Democrats, driven by party decision-making and pref-
erences. Yet, as the evidence in this chapter has shown, party elites often voice
preferences for closer cooperation and movement elites do not point to specific
party decisions, but rather fundamental concerns about parties and engaging in
party-politics as the reasons for their decision to separate organizationally.
Third, theories of organizational change in parties expect that change to
be driven by dominant coalitions within parties (Harmel & Janda 1994) and
conceptualize environmental change as the result of accidental, periodic, or
election-performance related factors (Appleton & Ward 1997). They do not,
however, consider the influence other actors, like movements, might have on
parties. The relevance of external actors for party evolution, as demonstrated
in this chapter, has also been identified in other cases, though. David Samuels
(2004), for example, has shown that the Brazilian Workers’ Party’s turn towards
more pragmatic positions was among other things possible because its societal
environment, the trade unions in particular, made the same move over time
(Samuels 2004, pp. 1007-1008). Thus, while in the Brazilian case change in ex-
ternal actors allowed party organizational change, for the movement platform
parties in this study the preferences of external movement actors were actively
drove the organizational separation of the party and movement and maintain it
to this day.
A scenario in which SMOs might want to return to closer organizational con-
nections with the party they once spawned is currently hard to imagine. The
labor union movement was often faced with state repression and a hostile envi-
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ronment (e.g. Bartolini (2000, p. 256) leaving it with no other partners than the
Social Democratic parties. A similar situation is unlikely to arise for most social
movements in advanced industrialized democracies. Another factor creating
interest in closer organizational links would be the availability of larger, more
powerful parties with movement roots, which would hold a stronger promise of
influencing policy outcomes for SMOs. The new anti-austerity parties in South-
ern Europe are an interesting case in that respect. I will return to these recent
developments and their implications in the conclusion (see chapter 7). The fol-
lowing chapter will focus on explaining why, in the absence of organizational
links, parties with movement roots after the Second World War did not follow
their Social Democratic predecessors and adopt catch-all platforms.
139
CHAPTER 5
ISSUE VOTERS AND ELITE STRATEGIES: WHY PARTIES RETAIN
PROGRAMMATIC LINKS TO MOVEMENTS
After the previous chapter has illuminated the reasons for the (early) orga-
nizational split between parties and the movements that gave rise to them, this
chapter will focus on the factors that drive the continued programmatic con-
nection. Why have post-1945 movement parties, after separating organization-
ally, not also left their programmatic focus behind and aimed for a transition
to the electoral-professional party model? As laid out in in chapter 2, I argue
that the movement platform party model is attractive to movement parties, be-
cause their original programmatic focus remains central for attracting electoral
support in party systems in which the mainstream parties have successfully oc-
cupied most other political space.
This chapter investigates these theoretical considerations by drawing on sur-
vey data on European voters. It first demonstrates that movement platform
parties indeed gain central parts of their support from those voters who have
deep concerns about the core issues of movement platform parties. In a sec-
ond step, the chapter explores the observable implications for the government
participation of movement platform parties and shows that these parties are
electorally punished if they do not behave in a policy-seeking fashion while
in government. Finally, the chapter uses interview data to establish that social
movement and party elites are well aware of the policy-seeking focus of move-
ment platform parties’ core electorates and strategically react to it. Movement
organizations use the situation to exert pressure on movement platform parties
by holding them publicly accountable, while party leaders carefully craft their
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message around their parties’ core issues.
Movement Platform Parties and Voters: The Impact of Issue Vot-
ing
This section tests the theory, outlined in detail in chapter 2, that movement (plat-
form) parties cannot break with their programmatic origins, because they rely
on programmatically motivated issue voters, who would dessert these parties
if they moved away from their issue focus. The next section introduces the
data from two waves of the European Election Studies (EES) used to investi-
gate whether movement platform parties do indeed continue to rely on voters
demanding a focus on the relevant movement’s core issues. It also discusses
the type of regression analysis used to analyze the data, before another section
presents the results of these regression models.
Methods, Data, and Operationalization
The theory expects movement platform parties to rely on issue voters that, in
many cases even decades after the parties were founded, continue to strongly
value a focus on the core issue of a specific movement and an “associated”
movement platform party. Thus we should observe voters with a programmatic
focus on a movement platform party family’s core issue to be significantly more
likely to vote for a movement platform party in that family.
Hypothesis 1: Voters focused on the core issue of a movement platform party
are significantly more likely to cast a vote for that party.
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Moreover, these parties should have few other programmatic avenues open
to them for the purpose of attracting voters. That is, a focus on other issues
should either not attract voters to the movement platform party at all, or its
contribution to parties’ electoral appeal should be far smaller than that of their
core issue.
Hypothesis 2: The effect of movement platform parties’ core issues to the par-
ties’ electoral appeal outweighs that of any other issue.
In order to test these expectations, I merged data from the 1999 and 2009
waves of the European Election Studies, which contain information both on in-
dividual’s vote choice and programmatic orientations.1
The dependent variable, vote choice, was operationalized as the party a re-
spondent voted for in the last national election. This is preferable to using vote
choice in the European election, which was also polled, because the national
level is the context in which political competition and movement activity re-
main centered. Accordingly, I created dummy variables for voting for one of
the three Western European movement platform party families (Green, region-
alist, and radical right parties).2 A full list of the included movement platform
parties can be found in Table D.1 in the appendix.
The main independent variable – the desire for the provision of concrete
programmatic linkages – is operationalized relying on a question asking the re-
spondents about the three most important issues facing the country.3 Based on
1The 2004 wave of the EES adopted dramatically varying ways of polling and coding data
on programmatic orientations across countries that cannot be meaningfully standardized. Thus
this wave had to be excluded from this study.
2Since only four survey respondents voted for a Pirate Party the analyses were limited to the
remaining three party families.
3The 2009 wave limited answers to three issues, while the 1999 wave allowed more answers.
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the responses to this item, I created variables that identify whether a respondent
mentioned an issue at the heart of a specific movement and movement platform
party family as one of the most important problems.4 In that way three dummy
variables corresponding to the core issues of Green, radical right, and region-
alist parties were created, which take the value of one if the respondent men-
tioned environmental, immigration-related, or regional concerns, respectively.5
As hypothesis 1 expects, if movement platform parties do rely on issue voters,
the results of the analysis should demonstrate that voters with an issue focus
that corresponds to a specific movement platform party should be significantly
more likely to vote for that party. Table 5.1 summarizes this data by presenting
descriptive statistics on the dependent and main independent variables, as well
as included number of parties and countries.
Hypothesis 2 expects that movement platform parties have few issues be-
yond their core issue at their disposal on which they can develop further pro-
grammatic linkages and become less reliant on their original programmatic con-
nection a movement. In order to test this hypothesis I created further dummy
variables summarizing other central issues of partisan competition centering
on the economy, welfare policy, democracy and good governance, law & order
In order to ensure comparability I included only the answers regarding the first three problems
for the 1999 wave.
4The use of scales based on the number of times a respondent identified an issue as among
the most important ones facing the country was prohibited by the limited number of respon-
dents who repeatedly named the same issue. For instance, in the countries included in this
analysis only 54 voters named two issues associated with the environmental movement (and
Green Parties) and only one respondent named three.
5See the appendix for details about the issue concerns that comprise the three issue dummies.
Note that the “regionalist” and “immigration” concern categories overlap by one category of is-
sue concern recorded in the EES waves. “Ethnic minorities” can reasonably refer to either the
status of a distinct domestic ethnic minority, like Swedish-speaking Finns, and thus express a
regionalist concern or to the integration of minorities that have immigrated to the country re-
cently, and thus refer to (anti-)immigrant concerns. Including respondents who mention “ethnic
minorities” in both categories controls for the possibility that respondents were referring to one
or the other concern and thus represents a conservative approach to testing the hypotheses.
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policies, foreign policy, and the European Union.6
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics
Models Greens Radical Right Regionalists
Vote Choice
no 17245 17316 10370
yes 1327 732 537
Programmatic Concerns
no 18343 17610 11896
yes 2513 2643 327
Number of Countries 12 10 6
Number of movement platform parties 15 16 22
The models estimated below control for standard socio-demographic and
political variables that are known to affect vote choice. Specifically, measures of
political ideology along the left/right dimension, education, gender and age are
included (for details regarding the operationalization, see table 5.2). The inclu-
sion of “generalized” political ideology and an item for programmatic concerns
regarding the economy allows testing the assumption that the included move-
ment platform parties mainly compete on a dimension distinct from the main
economic left/right divide (see chapter 7 for a discussion of the economically-
oriented movement parties that have arisen in Southern Europe after the debt
crisis). If the theory laid out above is correct we should observe two results.
First, that movement platform parties do not attract voters through linkages re-
garding economic concerns, potentially to such a degree that economically mo-
tivated voters are discouraged from supporting these parties. That is, the effect
6See the appendix for details about the issue concerns that comprise the these issue dummies
(see appendix E), as well as for descriptive statistics (see table E.4).
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for the economic concern dummy should either be not significant or negative
and significant.
Second, while there is considerable debate over how exactly a second di-
mension of competition is constituted and over the issues that constitute central
cleavages (e.g., Beramendi et al. (2015), Kriesi (2010), Hooghe, Marks, & Wil-
son (2002), Inglehart (1997)) most approaches agree that pro-environmental and
anti-immigrant stances constitute opposing poles and correlate strongly with
other attitudes on that dimension. Thus the additional control for ideology
along the left/right dimension mainly captures a divide about (the role of the
state in) the economy.7 A strong and significant coefficient for the core issues
of movement platform parties on top of the effects of the generalized left/right
control would indicate that the issue space in which movement platform parties
compete in is indeed multi-dimensional and their core voters value the addi-
tional space these parties occupy.
Countries vary in how proportional their electoral systems are and thus in
the likelihood of small parties gaining seats in the legislature. Since most move-
ment platform parties are small, less proportional systems might encourage
strategic voting if voters anticipate that these parties will not be able to gain
representation. The fault line with respect to the translation of votes into seats
does not run strictly between countries with first-past-the-post and those with
proportional representation systems, because the latter vary too in how pro-
portionally they translate votes into seats. To account for this, the models esti-
mated below include the least squares index of disproportionality (Gallagher &
7The inclusion of a dummy variable for programmatic concerns about the economy does not
prevent this, as it only highlights the concern and does not distinguish between positions on
the issue. Expressed concern about the environment and immigration, however, will in their
vast majority express pro-environmental and anti-immigrant stances and thus control for the
“left/libertarian” and “right/authoritarian” poles of this second dimension.
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Mitchell 2005, Gallagher 1991) as an additional control.8
Table 5.2: Independent Variables in Multi-Level Complementary
Log-Log Regression Models
Independent Variable Description
Programmatic concern Dummies for mentioning at least one issue
among the three most important issues facing
the country, 0=not mentioned, 1=mentioned
Political Ideology Self-placement; from 0=left to 9=right
Education In years when full-time education was com-
pleted
Gender 0=male, 1=female
Age In years
Electoral System Least Squares Index; 0-100, with lower values
indicating lower disproportionality
The dependent variable’s distribution is highly skewed towards the zero-
outcome (not having voted for the specific movement platform party family in
question), since all movement platform parties have relatively small electorates
and the overwhelming majority of voters opt to vote for another (mainstream,
catch-all) party. Accordingly, a logistic regression, as the standard method for
the analysis of categorial dependent variables, is not appropriate in this context,
since it is based on the symmetric function. A complementary log-log regres-
sion, however, which is based on a non-symmetric function that approaches 1
more slowly than 0, allows the estimation of models with a skewed dependent
8The index is given by LSq=
√
((
∑
(si − vi)2)/2), where s is a party’s percentage share of seats
and v its percentage share of votes. For this analysis the value is based on the index directly
proceeding the election after which the survey was conducted. This is based on the assumption
that voters, during the course of the campaign, update their impression of how likely it is that
small parties will enter parliament given the electoral rules and the number of parties that have
a realistic chance to overcome the electoral hurdles.
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variable, such as the ones under consideration here (Long 1997, pp. 51-52). Since
the data has a multi-level structure, where respondents are nested in different
countries, I rely on a multi-level complementary log-log model.
To summarize the expectations, we should observe significant and strong
effects of core programmatic concerns (environment, anti-immigration, region-
alism) on the likelihood of casting a vote for a movement platform party, indi-
cating that movement platform parties draw voters mainly through program-
matic linkages on their core issues (hypothesis 1). Furthermore, the effects of
most other issues in general, and the economy in particular, should either be in-
significant or significant and negative, indicating that movement platform par-
ties have few other programmatic links outside of their core issue to attract vot-
ers and need to remain centered on their core issue and its alternative dimension
of competition. Finally, the effects of the (economic) left/right control should be
weaker than those of the programmatic links on the core issue, demonstrating
again the centrality of programmatic linkages on the issue focus of the move-
ment that once gave rise to the movement platform party in question (hypothe-
sis 2).
Results
The results of the regression models presented in Table 5.3 strongly support the
theoretical expectation that movement platform parties rely on voters valuing
programmatic linkages beyond a generalized left/right dimension.
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Table 5.3: Multi-Level Complementary Log-Log Estimates of the
Effects of Programmatic Concerns and Control Variables on the
Likelihood of Voting for Movement Platform Parties
Independent Variable Parties
Greens Radical Right Regionalists
Programmatic concern
Environment .99** (.07) -.87** (.20) -.37 (.31)
Immigration -.16 (.10) .97** (.10) .13 (.17)
Regionalism .24 (.16) .11 (.18) .56* (.26)
Economy -.15* (.07) -.26** (.09) -.18 (.12)
Welfare Policy .14* (.07) .01 (.11) -.09 (.14)
Democracy/Governance .13 (.11) .22 (.14) -.00 (.20)
Law & Order -.01 (.11) .48** (.12) -.14 (.16)
Foreign Policy -.06 (.14) .38* (.15) .34 (.20)
EU -.08 (.16) -.40 (.22) .18 (.29)
Political Ideology -.26** (.01) .14** (.02) -.08** (.02)
Education .03** (.00) -.05** (.01) .01 (.01)
Gender .19** (.06) -.51** (.08) -.08 (.10)
Age -.02** (.00) -.01* (.00) .01 (.00)
Electoral System .06 (.04) -.10* (.04) -.04 (.04)
Wave: 2009 .13 (.07) .21* (.10) -.13 (.15)
Random Intercept Variance 1.82 .52 .21
(.90) (.26) (.14)
Chi2 test of rho = 0 328.79** 186.78** 48.16**
Pseudo-log-likelihood -3403.35 -2136.36 -1569.22
Number of Observations 15941 14775 8394
Cells contain coefficient (standard error); ∗ ∗ p < .01; ∗p < .05 (two-tailed test)
Considering the core issue of a movement platform party family a central
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problem facing the country significantly and strongly raises the likelihood of
casting a vote for that party (cf., the bolded coefficients). Moreover, as expected,
voters whose central concerns focus on the economy are significantly less likely
to cast a vote for either Green or radical right parties. That is, these parties
do not mainly function as a vehicle for protest voters who are disappointed
with the mainstream parties and the economic performance they provide, but
are supported by strong issue-voting. Additionally, all three party families have
few other issues beyond their core issues on which they can successfully engage
voters.
Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 below present the predicted probabilities of voting
for one of those party families depending on a voter’s programmatic focus. In
each case they demonstrate that the size of the effects of programmatic core
concerns are not only statistically, but also substantively significant. Figure 5.1,
for instance, illustrates that caring about the environment more than doubles
a voter’s likelihood of supporting a Green party (from 4.4% to 11%). That is,
movement platform parties increase the likelihood of citizens voting for them by
remaining focused and credible on their core issues, since their core electorates
are composed of voters for whom these issues are central in their vote decision.
Thus, the parties depend on highlighting and competing on another dimension
than mainstream parties, which focus on an economically dominated left/right
antagonism.9
9This also implies that mainstream parties cannot simply integrate new dimensions into their
appeals and close off the issue space for movement platform parties. When the new issue and
a mainstream party’s position on the economic left/right dimension are in conflict, mainstream
parties will usually act in line with their left/right position, making them less credible regarding
the new issue than a movement platform party, which will give preference to the new issue. For
instance when economic growth and environmental protection conflict, a Green party will be
(seen as) more likely to act in favor of environmental protection than a Social Democratic party,
even if the latter has adopted a environmental platform similar to the Greens.
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Figure 5.1: Predicted Probabilities of Voting for a Green Party Depending
on Programmatic Concern and Political Ideology
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Beyond the enormous value of their core issues in terms of mobilizing sup-
port, the figures also illustrate that movement platform parties have few other
options of engaging their electorate. While Green party voters are more likely to
care about issues related to welfare policies, the substantive effect is small. Rad-
ical right parties have a few more issues that can potentially attract voters and
could serve to broaden their appeal, but again the substantive effects of these is-
sues (foreign policy and law & order policies) are far smaller than getting a voter
to consider immigration to be a central issue, as Figure 5.2 illustrates. Moreover,
many responses recorded as foreign policy or law & order might also tie back
into concerns about immigration, like border control or crimes committed by
immigrants. Finally, as Figure 5.3 illustrates, regionalist parties, as a party fam-
ily, are completely reliant on the regionalist issue to mobilize their electorate.
The effects of programmatic core concerns exist independent of and are ex-
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Figure 5.2: Predicted Probabilities of Voting for a Radical Right Party De-
pending on Programmatic Concern and Political Ideology
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tremely strong compared to the effect of a generalized left/right orientation.
Figure 5.1 shows that a voter would need to move about four steps to the left
on a ten-point scale in order to increase his or her likelihood of casting a Green
vote to similar extent as mentioning the environment as a core concern. This dif-
ference in substantive significance is even more pronounced for parties on the
radical right, where moving from the extreme left to the extreme right merely
increases the likelihood for voting for these parties to the same extent as consid-
ering immigration one of the most important problems facing the country.10
The control variables reassuringly reproduce existing knowledge about the
voters of particular party families. Specifically, Green party supporters are more
leftist, female, and have higher levels of education than the supporters of other
10Since regionalist parties show significantly more variation with respect to their position
along the left/right dimension (Massetti 2009), a comparison of the effect of that dimension to
their core issue is not particularly meaningful here.
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Figure 5.3: Predicted Probabilities of Voting for a Regionalist Party De-
pending on Programmatic Concern
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parties, while radical right parties have a more right-wing, male, and less edu-
cated electorate. It is noteworthy that the level of disproportionality in electoral
systems does not affect the likelihood of casting a vote for either green or region-
alist parties, indicating that the parties included in the analysis are established
enough to not fall victim to strategic voting.11 Radical right parties on the other
hand do worse in countries that translate votes into parliamentary seats more
disproportionally.
In sum, this section has found strong support for hypothesis 1 demonstrat-
ing that movement platform parties have to rely on their and the movement’s
core issue when mobilizing for elections. It also found support for hypothesis 2
showing that these parties have few issues beyond their core issue on which to
engage voters successfully.
11See Lublin (2014), though, for a discussion of how electoral systems are decisive factors for
regionalist parties across the globe.
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Movement Platform Parties in Governments: How Delivering
on Core Issues Determines Movement Platform Party Success
The voter base and issue orientation of these voters also have strong implica-
tions for movement platform parties’ electoral success in relation to their behav-
ior in governments. Theoretically we can distinguish between two dimensions
of gains parties on which can deliver (cf. Kitschelt (2006b, pp. 283-284).12 First,
whether they can become part of the executive, i.e. procedural gains. Second,
whether they are able to deliver the policy change they advocate, i.e. substantive
gains. As discussed in chapter 2 and empirically demonstrated in the previous
section of this chapter the issue-oriented core electorates of movement platform
parties should value substantive gains significantly more than procedural gains.
However, while substantive gains are likely to be more important in the eyes
of movement platform party supporters, they are unlikely to operate indepen-
dent of procedural gains, since the latter determine whether substantive gains
are the result of direct action taken by a movement platform party in govern-
ment or of other parties acting on movement demands, while the movement
platform party itself remains in opposition. In this latter case, where the estab-
lishment makes clear concessions to the issues highlighted by the movement
and movement platform party it spawned, we can expect the latter’s appeal to
the electorate to shrink. In the face of policy success a significant number of
issue-voters will not see the necessity for a dedicated party, since their concerns
are addressed (even if that is partially the result of the government acting only to
preempt losing votes to the movement platform party).13 Where, however, the
12With this distinction Kitschelt (2006b) builds on Gamson’s seminal work on social move-
ment success (Gamson 1990).
13See Hug (2001) for a similar reasoning regarding the emergence of new parties. He argues
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demands are not addressed the necessity for a (new) political actor that aims to
provide these changes remains obvious and has electoral appeal.
Thus movement platform parties that make no procedural gains, defined in
terms of government participation, should be more successful if the government
refuses to make policy concessions towards the movement. The most success-
ful type of movement platform party, however, should be a party that makes
inroads both on the procedural and substantial level. A governing movement
platform party that delivers on its policy promises has proven that it is a suc-
cessful vehicle for accomplishing the movement’s programmatic goals. Finally,
a party that cannot deliver on the substantive level, but has achieved govern-
ment participation (i.e. procedural gains) should have the least appeal. Its rep-
resentatives in parliament and government will be perceived as sell-outs who
are willing to give up on the movement’s goals for the purpose of personal gain
in the form of material payoffs and (personal) influence through holding (gov-
ernment) office.
Figure 5.4 below summarizes the expectations generated by the discussion
of substantive and procedural gains above with respect to the success of move-
ment platform parties at the ballot box.
Figure 5.4: Predicted Rank-Order of Success of Movement Platform Par-
ties Depending on Procedural and Substantive Gains
Substantive Gains
Yes No
Procedural Gains
Yes Most Successful (1) Least Successful (4)
No Third Most Successful (3) Second Most Successful (2)
that established parties can prevent new parties from becoming relevant players by accepting
their policy demands (Hug 2001).
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The hypotheses laid out above expect movement platform parties to be
linked to their voters not by clientelist promises or through charismatic leaders
but through the specific policy programs that they advocate (cf. Kitschelt (2000,
pp. 847-851)). Voters will lend and (re)evaluate their support for a movement
platform party in the expectation of policy change on core issues, but are unin-
terested in specific (material) payoffs, e.g. in the form of patronage networks.
As described the following section, I will test these hypotheses using data
on Green party success across Europe. The Green family of movement platform
parties is an ideal candidate for investigating the relationship between party
behavior in government and electoral success, because these parties have been
represented in a number of governments and their existence since the late 1970s
and early 1980s provides a wealth of time-series data.14 Since these parties were
founded at similar times across the European continent, they have also gone
through their evolutionary steps in a similar time-frame and international con-
text, which ensures the comparability across countries.
Moreover, the plentiful research on Green parties has investigated their
emergence (see for instance Kitschelt (1988) and Redding & Viterna (1999)),
the social structure and attitudinal basis for Green party support (e.g., Dolezal
(2010)), and the role of center-left parties and their adaptive strategies (cf.,
Rohrschneider (1993b) and Kitschelt (1994)). Systematic research on the govern-
ment experience of these parties, however, is much more rare and often limited
to (collections of) country-specific studies (see for example the contributions of
14The radical right has had fewer periods of government participation, while the Pirates had
none. A discussion of regionalist parties with respect to procedural and substantive gains is
beyond the scope of this project, since it is greatly complicated by the fact that many of these
parties want to break away from the country in which they might achieve policy success or
participate in governments. See Lublin (2012) for an example of the research agenda on the
relationship between substantive gains in the form of decentralization and the electoral success
of regionalist parties.
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Deschouwer (2008) and Mu¨ller-Rommel & Poguntke (2012)) and a systematic
analysis of the relationship between electoral success, substantive gains, and the
parties’ (policy-seeking) behavior over time is so far lacking. Accordingly this
section makes a contribution to the study of Green parties as well as movement
platform parties more generally.
Data, Operationalization and Method
Data on electoral results are taken from the “Comparative Political Data Set I”
(Armingeon, Gerber, Leimgruber, & Beyeler 2011). Included in the models esti-
mated below are the electoral results of 18 Green Parties in 93 elections across
14 countries (for a total of 107 observations) from 1973 to 2007. A full list of
included parties is available in table D.1 in the appendix. Notably excluded
is Spain, where Green Parties are split into various regional parties and did
not form a significant national party. Notable inclusions are the Socialist Peo-
ple’s Party in Denmark15 and the Socialist Left Party in Norway. Their names
notwithstanding, and despite being founded before most Green parties (the So-
cialist People’s Party in 1959 and the Socialist Left Party in 1975, respectively),
both have included the core demands of Green movements in their platforms. In
both countries no other significant Green Parties exist (Miljøpartiet De Grønne
in Norway has received less than one percent of the votes in all national parlia-
mentary elections covered in the time period of this study), and since 2014 the
Socialist People’s Party has even been a member of the European Green Party,
the umbrella organization of Green Parties on the European level.
In order to test the hypotheses laid out in the previous section, I make use
15On this party, see also the discussion in the section on Green parties in chapter 3.
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of the difference parliamentary systems produce between electoral success in
terms of winnings votes and (procedural) success in terms of becoming part
of the executive. As opposed to other systems like presidentialism, electoral
success and the chance to take responsibility in the executive are not tightly
linked and, it is possible to win a significant percentage of votes over a long
period of time without ever being part of a government. The Danish Socialist
People’s Party, discussed above, is an example of this. Since its founding in 1959
it has received between 3.9 and 14.6 percent of the vote in national elections and
continuously been represented in parliament with at least seven (and up to 27)
seats (out of about 180). Nevertheless, until the electoral victory of the Danish
political left in 2011 and the coalition formed afterwards it had never been part
of the executive.
All included Western European countries, with the exception of France, fol-
low a parliamentary model. However, even France’s semi-presidential system
fulfills the requirements of separating electoral success from procedural gains,
because only the President is directly elected and he or she still has to appoint a
Prime Minister, who needs his or her own majority in parliament. This electoral
success directly translates into government participation only for the presidency
(for which Greens have never been serious contenders), but not for the parlia-
mentary level.
Accordingly the electoral success of Green Parties in parliamentary elections
can serve as the dependent variable in the following analysis and is not syn-
onymous with procedural gains. While the electoral results are the dependent
variable, the regression models include the lagged dependent variable on the
right-hand side. That is, the model analyzes the variation in electoral support
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between electoral cycles within countries and excludes the analysis of varying
base levels of support for Green Parties across countries. This modeling strategy
takes into account that the theoretical expectations focus on how the behavior
of movement platform parties shapes their electoral success, i.e. produces vote
gains or losses, rather than on how structural differences between polities create
variation in base levels of support for Green parties. That is, electoral success
in this section is defined as a positive change in electoral support between two
elections, not the overall level of support.
As defined in the previous section, procedural gains are measured by the
participation of a Green Party in the executive of a country. Since Green par-
ties have exclusively accomplished this in coalition governments, procedural
gains are measured by the percentage of cabinet seats held by a Green Party
before the election in question. Operationalizing government participation this
way has the advantage of measuring the visibility of the Green Party in govern-
ment. The underlying assumption is that the more cabinet posts a party holds
the more its politicians and the party’s participation in government are visible
to the general public (e.g., through press conferences or media coverage of their
ministries’ work).16 The connection voters can make between the visibility of
Green members of the cabinet and the policy gains they deliver (or fail to de-
liver) is enhanced by Green parties’ proclivity to take over cabinet portfolios
close to their core issues, like the environmental ministries.
The operationalization of procedural gains as percentage of cabinet portfo-
lios also allows me to test the assumptions of models that expect office-seeking
behavior (e.g., Aldrich (2011)), discussed in chapter 2. If their assumptions are
16The data was collected from the Political Data Yearbooks of the European Journal of Political
Research.
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correct, the results should show that more cabinet posts alone lead to more elec-
toral success, because a larger share of government jobs should attract aspiring
political entrepreneurs and their voter base to the party.
Measuring substantive gains is less straightforward and presents two re-
lated problems. First, a definition of which implemented policies and passed
laws represent the success of Green parties is required. Second, these measures
of success have to be comparable across countries. This rules out the passing
of many types of laws, because of different institutional settings in different
countries. Some actions might require a law in one country, while the govern-
ment can implement similar actions without consulting the legislature in an-
other country. Counting the passing of a law in the former as a success, but
not being able to identify a similar success in the latter would obviously bias
results. Even focusing on some core demands, independent of the way they
are implemented, can be problematic. For instance, Green Parties are united in
their rejection of nuclear energy. However, some countries in this study have
never relied on nuclear power (e.g. Ireland), some have but decided to phase
out all nuclear plants (e.g. Germany17), some plan to continue to rely on nuclear
energy in the future (e.g. France), and some even fall in middle categories like
Denmark, which had experimental research reactors but shut them down. Thus,
for instance, counting the decision to phase out all nuclear plants in one country
as a substantive gain would not compare to a country without nuclear plants in
which that form of substantive gain was never achievable for the Green party.
This analysis solves these problems by focusing on three core demands that
17The German story is in fact more complex, as its Social Democratic-Green coalition govern-
ment decided to phase out nuclear energy in 2000, which was later reversed by a conservative-
liberal coalition in 2010. However, the same coalition adopted a new phase out policy after the
disaster in Fukushima (and large [movement] protests in Germany) in 2011. See also chapter 6.
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Green Parties have traditionally shared across their specific national contexts.
The first is simply the recognition of environmental problems as a topic that
deserves serious political attention and resources. This is operationalized as
whether a government has set up a ministry of the environment that is specif-
ically dedicated to these problems. A dummy variable indicates whether such
a ministry was created during the legislative period before the election or not.
This dummy returns to zero after one electoral cycle. This is based on the ex-
pectation that the public will perceive the creation of the ministry in the short
term as the government of the day addressing environmental problems (and a
success of the Green party if it is in government at the time) and the government
will campaign on it, but it will not be a relevant topic after the next legislative
period.18
The second demand relates to energy policy. Green Parties have tradition-
ally been supporters of renewable energy sources for at least two reasons. First,
because renewable energy allows countries to reduce energy production from
nuclear sources and coal and thus their various emissions and harmful effects to
the environment. A second reason for supporting the expansion of renewable
energy production that has become increasingly important is concern regarding
climate change and carbon dioxide emissions. Accordingly the second variable
18The data for this was collected from various sources, but predominantly from the websites
of the respective ministries and the Political Data Yearbooks of the European Journal of Political
Research. Two alternative operationalizations of this variable are conceivable. First, the gain
from creating the ministry could exist in the long term, i.e. the dummy should take the value of 1
when a ministry exists in a country and never revert to zero. Second, the existence of a ministry
could matter in the long term but only when it was created during the existence of a Green
Party (that could continuously point to the act of creation as a sign of the party’s relevance) and
accordingly the dummy should take the value of 1 only if the ministry was created during a time
period in which a Green party competed electorally. Models with both alternative formulations
of this variable have been tested and they lead to the same substantive conclusions as the model
presented below, although in the latter formulation the interaction term for substantive gains
misses conventional levels of significance narrowly (p=.076) with a two-tailed test (which is an
extremely conservative test considering the clearly directional hypotheses).
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that is used to operationalize the substantive gains of Green Parties is the con-
tribution of renewables to the energy supply19 of a country as a percentage of
total primary energy supply, as reported by the Organization of Economic De-
veloped Countries (OECD) (OECD 2010b). The variable is operationalized as
a trend variable taking a value of -1 if the contribution of renewables has de-
creased compared to the last election year, 0 if it has remained constant, and 1 if
it has increased.
The third and final indicator focuses directly on the issue of climate change
and measures substantive gains in the progress made with respect to reducing
carbon dioxide emissions. The raw data is again available through the OECD
(OECD 2010a) and has also been transformed into a trend variable. This variable
is coded as 0 in case emissions in the election year are at the same level as in the
previous election year, as -1 in case they have increased, and as 1 in case they
have decreased.
Substantive gains measured using these three variables are included in the
regression models presented below in the form of a “Substantive Gains Scale.”
All variables are thought of as equally relevant for determining Green Party
success and thus they are all standardized on a range from -1 to 1.20 The scale
measuring the substantive gains of Green Parties is constructed by adding these
three variables to create an indicator that could theoretically vary from -3 (for
a country in which a ministry of the environment has been abolished, the con-
tribution of renewable energy sources has decreased, and the level of carbon
dioxide emissions has risen over the last legislative period) to 3 (describing a
19For a definition of primary energy supply see the appendix. See Seeberg (forthcoming, p.
8) for a similar approach drawing on oil consumption to measure the real-world developments
regarding the environment in a study of issue ownership.
20The ministry variable could theoretically assume the value of -1 if the ministry was abol-
ished, however, empirically this does not occur.
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country that has established a ministry of the environment during the last leg-
islative period, has increased the contribution of renewables to its energy mix,
and has reduced its carbon dioxide emissions).
Additionally the models include an interaction term between the percentage
of cabinet seats held by a Green Party and the Substantive Gains Scale. The as-
sumption here is that the share of credit for substantive gains assigned to a coali-
tion partner increases with the visibility of government participation by that
party measured in terms of cabinet seats. That is, the more cabinet seats Green
parties hold in a coalition government, the more they will profit electorally from
the substantive gains that this government has delivers. With these three vari-
ables all four possible combinations of procedural and substantive gains are
covered. The coefficient for procedural gains measures the effect of cabinet rep-
resentation on electoral success for a Green Party that is in government but does
not deliver substantive gains. The coefficient for the Substantive Gains Scale in-
dicates the effect of a government without Green party participation delivering
environmental polices and the interaction term measures the effect of delivering
substantive gains for a Green party in government. The baseline category for all
these effects is a Green party without substantive and procedural gains (i.e. a
Green party in opposition to a government that does not deliver environmental
policies).
The model furthermore includes a control for economic growth. This inves-
tigates the possibility that the Green Party vote rises in good economic times,
when issues of material welfare are less salient and the policies at the core of the
Green agenda receive a higher priority. This reasoning is in line with Inglehart’s
(1997) arguments about shifting value orientations from materialist to postma-
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terialist priorities.21 Furthermore, it is conceivable that Green parties are treated
differently depending on whether they are seen as responsible for the economic
development of the time, i.e. whether they are in government or not. Accord-
ingly the models include GDP growth and an interaction with the government
participation (i.e. procedural gains) variable.22 All independent variables de-
scribed above are summarized in table 5.4 below.
The assumptions for the standard approach to estimating regression models,
Ordinary-Least Squares (OLS) regression, are likely to be violated with cross-
sectional time series data. One of the main problems is that time series data
can include serial-correlation. In the presence of serial correlation OLS estima-
tors remain consistent and unbiased, but since incorrect standard errors will be
computed the regular t- and F-tests are not applicable (cf. Gujarati & Porter
(2009, p. 452) and Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, & Stephens (2003, p. 214)).
This problem is unlikely to be significant in this particular case, because the
time-series is very short, ranging from one to a maximum of fourteen observa-
tions for one party. Nevertheless, precautions should be taken. One option is to
apply Generalized Least Squares estimation. However, this method has come
under criticism for producing “dramatically inaccurate standard errors when
used for the type of data commonly analyzed by students of comparative poli-
tics” (Beck & Katz 1995, p. 634). The alternative solution suggested by Beck &
21I have also run models controlling more directly for the effects of potentially shifting value
orientations by including a measure of postmaterialism using Inglehart’s 4-item index. The data
was taken from several waves of the World Value Survey. It is, however, not available for all
election years in all countries. For those elections the data has been calculated by assuming
that the percentage of postmaterialists linearly increased (or declined) between the closest years
available in the WVS before and after the election in question. Elections before the first and
after the last year for which data from WVS is available were dropped from the analysis. This
drastically reduces the number of cases from 107 to 62 and the coefficient for postmatrialist
values is far from reaching significance.
22The data source for GDP growth is the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
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Katz (1995) is the use of OLS-regression with panel-corrected standard errors
(Beck & Katz 1995, pp. 640-642). This strategy, however, is not feasible here
since it requires observations at common points in time for all panels, which
with elections taking place at different times across countries, is not the case for
the data analyzed in this section. In order to solve this problem I employ OLS
regression using a robust-cluster estimator for the standard errors (cf., Bradley
et al. (2003, pp. 213-215)). This estimation technique provides valid standard er-
rors even in the presence of within-unit correlation of errors. Thus, the possible
presence of autocorrelation between the different observations will not skew the
estimated standard errors.
Table 5.4: Independent Variables in the OLS model
Independent Variable Description
Procedural gains:
Government participation Measured in percentage of cabinet seats held by
a Green Party
Substantive Gain Scale from -3 to 3
composed of:
Ministry of the environment 1 for the first election after the ministry of the
environment has been set up; 0 if no ministry
was created, -1 if the ministry was abolished
Renewable energy Trend variable: -1=decrease in renewables; 0=no
change in renewables; 1=increase in renewables
Carbon dioxide emissions Trend variable: -1=increase in emissions; 0=no
change in emissions; 1=reduction in emissions
Economic growth GDP growth in percent
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Results
The results of the model including the variables described in the previous sec-
tion are presented in table 5.5 below.23 The specific hypotheses outlined above
are mostly supported by the results of the regression analysis. The coefficient
for Green parties in government shows that in cases where these parties do not
at the same time deliver on substantive demands, they are considerably pun-
ished. Specifically, for each percent of cabinet seats held, they lose .25 percent
of electoral support. The effect for the substantive gains scale is insignificant,
demonstrating that what a government does regarding environmental policies
likely matters very little for future Green party success when the Greens remain
in opposition. The positive and significant interaction term between procedu-
ral and substantive gains provides clear support for the hypothesis that those
Green parties that are part of the government and are able to implement their
polices are the most successful type.
With respect to the control variables the coefficients for GDP growth and
its interaction with government participation are far from being significant at
conventional levels, i.e. economic growth does not influence the electoral suc-
cess of Green parties. The coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is, as
expected, significant and indicates that for every percentage of the vote won
23Two further models to check the robustness of these results have also been estimated. The
first is a model that excludes the two “socialist-green” parties from Norway and Denmark based
on the possibility that these older parties differ from the newer Green parties. Second, a model
that adds a measure of electoral thresholds to control for the possibility that, even when only
analyzing vote change between electoral cycles and not variation between countries, strategic
voting might play a role and, for instance, voters might be more reluctant to vote for a Green
party in less proportional systems (i.e. Green parties potential for increasing their vote share
could be circumscribed in less proportional countries). These models are presented in tables E.5
and E.6 in the appendix and lead to the same substantial conclusions as the model presented in
this section. The control variable for the electoral threshold is far from reaching conventional
levels of significance (p=.31).
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in the past the party will win almost .7 percentage points at the next election.
Thus Green parties have been successful in building a core electorate that votes
for these parties on consistent basis. As the results summarized above demon-
strate, however, this core electorate shows a tendency to abandon the parties if
they do not deliver movement policies when in government.
Table 5.5: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Government Participa-
tion, Substantive Gains, Economic Growth on Electoral Success of
Green Parties
Independent Variable Coefficient
(standard error)
Government Participation -.25* (.10)
Substantive Gain Scale -.04 (.12)
Government Participation*Substantive Gain Scale .13* (.05)
Economic Growth -.03 (.08)
Economic Growth *Government Participation -.01 (.04)
Lagged electoral success .69* (.07)
Intercept 2.55* (.57)
R2 .55
Mean Squared Error 2.17
Number of Observations 107
*p <.05 (two-tailed test); standard errors are robust-cluster standard errors
Finally, the coefficient of determination indicates that the independent vari-
ables explain about 55% of the variance in electoral success of Green parties.
Considering that the regressions are based on macro-level data and include the
lagged dependent variable, an indication that other factors, besides those in-
cluded in this model, are relevant in explaining Green party success.
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In sum, the main hypotheses find support. On the one hand, Green par-
ties are heavily punished by their issue-orientated core electorates if they enter
governments without delivering substantive gains in their and the movements’
key policy area. They are, on the other hand, rewarded if they are able to pro-
vide these substantive gains when in government. This clearly identifies Green
parties as movement platform parties that are linked to their potential support-
ers through their policy platforms based on social movement demands. That
is, their potential supporters reward policy-seeking behavior and punish pure
vote- or office-seeking behavior. This runs counter to the assumptions of models
that anticipate government participation alone to have positive effects, because
they expect government office to attract additional political entrepreneurs and
their voters to the party.
One revision with respect to the hypotheses has to be made: the expecta-
tion that governments can preempt Green party success by delivering on the
environmental movement’s policy demands finds no support. Thus, there is
no strategic trade-off for Green strategists between pushing their policy agenda
and gaining votes. Accordingly, the results indicate that the electoral success
of Green parties in opposition is not affected by the government’s policy activ-
ity. Thus, in figure 5.4 these two types of movement parties should share an
intermediate level of success instead of being rank-ordered. This result makes
sense in light of the previously discussed considerations about the core elec-
torates of movement platform parties. They are unlikely to desert the party that
is programmatically closest to their issue demands just because another party
also acted (once) on these demands. They do, however, punish the movement
platform party heavily when it fails to deliver movement policies in a situation
where it has the power to do so. This result points to an interesting difference
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between factors that influence the likelihood of a new party emerging, which in-
creases when established parties ignore (new) policy demands (see Hug (2001)),
and the (continued) electoral success after the emergence, which these results
suggest is not influenced by the policies adopted by established (governing)
parties.
In sum, this exploration of the influence of government participation and
delivering policy gains on the electoral success of movement platform parties
has demonstrated that they not only rely on issue-driven voters more generally,
but on a discerning core electorate that rewards policy success, when it can be
reasonably achieved (i.e. when a movement platform party is in government).
This creates further incentives for movement (platform) parties to retain strong
programmatic links with the social movement that gave rise to them and to
deliver on those demands when in government. That is, electoral success for
these parties comes with a clear policy mandate and voters hold the parties
accountable for that mandate. I will show in chapter 6 that social movement
organizations play a central role in providing movement platform parties’ core
electorates with the necessary information to distinguish parties that violated
their policy mandate from those who stayed true to the movement platform.
The following section will draw on interview data to illuminate how move-
ment elites strategically use the situation movement platform parties find them-
selves in to exert pressure on these parties and how movement platform party
elites react to this pressure and the composition of their voter base.
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Movement Platform Parties and Social Movements: How Elites
Engage Issue Voters
The previous sections demonstrated that the core electorate of movement plat-
form parties consists of issue-orientated voters who reward policy success. In
the following section this chapter explores how this situation shapes the behav-
ior and strategies of movement platform party elites and organizations rooted
in the movement that gave rise to these parties. Drawing on the interview
data from Sweden and Germany described in chapter 3, this section shows that
movement platform party elites are acutely sensitive to their core electorates
and to movement organizations’ strategies of highlighting their parties’ per-
formance on core issues to those electorates. This interplay of the core elec-
torate, movement organizations’ efforts to hold movement parties accountable,
and movement platform party leaders strategically reacting to this situation ex-
plains why these parties have not loosened their programmatic connections to
the movements.
Party Elites and Electoral Strategy
The analysis of voter data above demonstrated that movement platform par-
ties rely on a core electorate of issue voters who give preference to dimensions
other than the economically dominated left/right divide. The elites of these
parties are fully aware of the importance of these voters and adjust how they
position the party accordingly. A former member of the national leadership of
the German Green Party stated that when the party is working on its platform
169
those responsible for environmental policy in the party “make sure that [the]
environment is the number one issue,” because surveys demonstrate that vot-
ers “ascribe high competence to us and then there is nothing [no other issue] for
a long time” (interview 010303).24 Thus party elites strategically identify the is-
sues that will electorally benefit their party, and movement platform parties are
usually incentivized to almost exclusively stress the issue that originally gave
rise to them, in this particular case even more than 30 years after the party was
founded. In times of easy access to survey results on issue competence per-
ceptions and voter preferences, party leaders in both the Swedish and German
Green Party indicated that these surveys are used to help decide which issues
to stress during (electoral) platform formulation processes (interviews 010303;
020303).
This is not to say that movement platform party elites do not want to ex-
pand their electorate and address a broader set of voters. Indeed, one former
German Green Member of Parliament argued that those organized in environ-
mental movement organizations are not the focus in electoral campaigns, since
they are already likely to vote Green (interview 010308). During the 2013 elec-
toral campaign, for instance, the party stood on a platform that emphasized a
left-wing profile with respect to tax policy (Ru¨dig 2014, pp. 160, 163). The elec-
tion result of 8.4% was a drop of more than two percentage points compared
to the previous election in 2009 and especially disappointing for the party in
light of polls that had shown the Greens consistently well above ten percent
just months before the election (Ru¨dig 2014, p. 159). Within the party, this out-
come was widely interpreted as the result of a campaign strategy that focused
on a broader set of issues in an effort to attract non-core voters, while neglect-
24That is, this interviewee described a party “owning” a particular issue in the eyes of the
public (Petrocik 1996). See also chapter 6.
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ing to campaign on environmental issues and failing to successfully promote
green issues on the agenda (interviews 010302, 010305). One observer within
the Green party saw a “close, close connection” between the relative absence
of contact to the social movements and the electoral failure. Specifically, he
stated that if the party had foreseen the problems it would have in the 2013 cam-
paign, “one would have had to care about having a core electorate” (interview
010302). Therefore the inability to expand the party base by employing broader
programmatic appeals led to a refocusing on core issues and a reinforcement of
the movement platform party model.25
In sum, party elites consistently argued that a focus on their core issue and
their ability to set the agenda in a way that highlights this issue is central to
their party’s electoral success. This situation has led movement platform party
leaders to consciously adopt (issue) niche strategies. As one former member
of the national Pirate Party leadership in Sweden put it: “essentially it boils
down to how you become loved by five percent so much that they will actually
vote for you. And then it doesn’t matter what the other 95% thinks” (interview
020107). Thus, these movement platform parties are caught in the same ten-
sion between broadening their base and losing core support by deemphasizing
original programmatic linkages that their Social Democratic predecessors once
faced (Przeworski & Sprague 1986). But while Social Democrats were able to
make a breakthrough to mainstream party status because they faced different
electoral competition and a relatively less empowered movement base (see the
discussion of movement organizations in the next subsection), movement plat-
form parties are often best advised to stick to their party model, which ensures
25Within the Swedish Pirate Party, which first entered the European Parliament after the 2009
elections, but lost its representation in the 2014 elections, similar perceptions with respect to the
origin of their electoral woes exist. I will discuss the Pirate’s failure to establish themselves in
the long term in detail in the following chapter.
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electoral survival.
Social Movements’ Role in Stabilizing and Reinforcing the
Movement Platform Party Model
The interviews also revealed the central role movement organizations play in
keeping movement platform parties tied to their core issues. Party elites indi-
cated consistently that they are aware that movement organizations keep close
tabs on what the movement platform parties do and that these organizations
have the means to inform those interested in the party’s core issue about the
potential failure of the party to deliver on its promises. A key staffer of the
German Greens, for instance, stated that criticism is the norm in case movement
organizations’ issues do not receive ample time during party conventions (inter-
view 010305). Furthermore, conflicts with the movement are not only costly in
the moment, but have long-term consequences for the relationship with move-
ment activists, i.e. a significant part of the core electorate of movement platform
parties. Decisions regarding nuclear policy made by the German Green party
when in government in the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, continue
to have palpable consequences as the party is still being “reproached with the
nuclear compromise” and “[anti-nuclear] action-groups believe we [the Green
party] could have achieved more or should have made it a coalition question”26
(interview 010303).
Movement organizations are highly aware of this vulnerability of movement
platform parties and strategically make use of it to further their policy goals.
26That is, a question on which the party decided whether to stay or break the coalition gov-
ernment with the Social Democrats in which the Greens participated in at the time.
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These organizations develop strategies that remind parties of their core elec-
torate’s priorities and the organizations’ abilities to publicize any party action
that would compromise on these policy goals. With respect to the already men-
tioned debate about nuclear energy in Germany, for instance, one movement
leader stated: “the Greens, who very much also publicly cultivate this image
that they are the only anti-nuclear party [. . . ], we of course grab them by that
image” (interview 010412). Accordingly, the organization devised a strategy be-
fore the 2013 election to pressure the Green Party into adopting a faster nuclear
phase-out as one of their key demands for a potential participation in govern-
ment. This organization commissioned a poll showing that Green Party voters
overwhelmingly favored a faster phase-out of nuclear energy, and published
it in a full page advertisement in the taz (interview 010412), a major national
newspaper that originated in the same movement contexts that gave rise to the
Green party and accordingly is read by many of the parties’ core voters. Besides
specific campaigns like these, movement organizations have also routinized the
ways in which they put pressure on movement platform parties, for instance,
through reports summarizing their evaluations of parties’ commitments to the
movements’ core issues published during electoral campaigns (see chapter 6 for
a detailed discussion).
In short, the leaders of movement platform parties know that their electoral
success depends considerably on highlighting their core issues and that move-
ment organizations have the means to inform their core electorate about any
failure to remain focused on these specific programmatic linkages. Accordingly
the party elites never diverge too far from focusing their party’s efforts on their
core issue commitments. In the end it is hardly surprising how acutely aware of
movement organizations’ strategic choices movement platform party elites are,
173
considering that these strategies are the exact same ones they decided to apply
when they founded their parties. One former member of the national leader-
ship of the Swedish Pirate Party summarized his reasoning for why the party
was founded as follows: “as long as they [the movement] weren’t a threat to
politicians’ jobs, they could be safely ignored” (interview 020107). These sen-
timents are echoed by a former leader of the Swedish Greens when discussing
the early days of the party and stating that for policy progress those in power
“must feel a threat to lose something from a competitive Green Party” (inter-
view 020308). In their early days movement parties threatened the jobs of main-
stream party politicians if the latter did not take action on a new issue dimen-
sion. Today movement organizations threaten the jobs of elites in movement
turned movement platform parties in case these elites try to shift to a party type
programmatically decoupled from the movement. These organizations have
the means to achieve this because, as demonstrated above, the voters of move-
ment platform parties are highly issue-focused. This dynamic, driven by SMOs,
reinforces the movement platform party model.
Conclusions
Transitioning to a movement platform party model is the logical choice for con-
temporary movement parties. As the first two sections of this chapter demon-
strated movement platform parties’ core electorates strongly value program-
matic linkages on the parties’ core issues and the parties remain reliant on pro-
viding these linkages to mobilize support at election time and retain it after
periods of government participation. That is even after decades of partisan
dealignment in advanced industrialized countries (Dalton 2008, pp. 180-183)
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movement platform parties’ potential to win support beyond their core voters
remains severely limited.
The previous section, moreover, demonstrated that party and movement
elites are highly aware of this situation and react accordingly. Party elites posi-
tion their parties close to movement positions and SMOs take note of any diver-
gence parties might attempt from their core issues and publicize them among
the parties’ core supporters with potentially devastating electoral consequences.
Thus movement platform party leaders’ room for maneuver is strongly circum-
scribed by movement organizations on the one hand and by mainstream parties,
that occupy the other issue dimensions, on the other hand.
At the same time, as chapter 4 has demonstrated, movement platform party
elites have little choice than to accept the organizational separation, which is
driven by SMO elites’ desire to maximize their influence on the full set of rele-
vant actors in party politics and civil society. Accordingly, these different incen-
tive structures explain why movement parties in the pre- and post-World War II
era evolved differently. An open question that remains is how movement plat-
form parties stay programmatically close to social movements in the absence
of any tight organizational links. How do these parties and their elites ensure
that fundamental conflict with movement organizations and the loss of their
core electorate is avoided? The following chapter will address this question
by identifying four distinct mechanisms that lead to a process of programmatic
alignment between movement platform parties and the movements from which
they originated, even in the absence of organizational connections.
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CHAPTER 6
MECHANISMS OF PROGRAMMATIC ALIGNMENT: HOW PARTY
PLATFORMS REMAIN TIED TO MOVEMENT DEMANDS
The previous chapter has illustrated that electoral success for movement
platform parties depends on these parties’ abilities to provide programmatic
linkages regarding the core issues of their movement origins. Yet the previ-
ous analysis has also demonstrated that movement parties follow the incentives
set by their environment and largely decouple organizationally from the move-
ments that gave rise to them. That is, there is almost no routinized coordination
or overlap between party and movement elites. This absence of overt coordina-
tion raises the question of how the movement platform parties ensure that they
remain programmatically aligned with the movement. This chapter draws on
interview, survey, and participant observation data from the fieldwork for this
project, as well as secondary sources to analyze how the programmatic connec-
tion between social movements and the movement platform parties to which
they gave rise is maintained.
The chapter demonstrates that programmatic alignment is secured through
four distinct mechanisms.1 First, movement organizations have developed suc-
cessful ways of exerting pressure on movement platform parties during elec-
toral campaigns by keeping the parties’ core electorates informed about the
parties’ performance. Second, a limited subset of grassroots activists with roots
in both the movement and the party, but without leadership positions in ei-
ther, contribute to the continued programmatic alignment. Third, movement
1I follow McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly (2001) in defining mechanisms as “a delimited class of
events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways
over a variety of situations” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001, p. 24).
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platform party leaders consciously seek to position their parties close to the
movement by soliciting advice from movement organizations on a case-by-case
basis and by adopting movement demands on their own initiative. Finally,
think tanks and political foundations provide brokerage (McAdam, Tarrow, &
Tilly 2001, Vasi 2011) through a “non-politicized” environment in which differ-
ent groups of movement and party elites interact and exchange ideas in irregu-
lar intervals.
These mechanisms are initiated by different actors, as summarized in fig-
ure 6.1. The “electoral pressure” movement organizations exert during election
campaigns center on keeping voters informed. The “grassroots linkage” be-
tween movement platform parties and movements occurs on the activist level.
Finally, party elites initiate programmatic alignment by seeking movement or-
ganizations’ advice, independently seeking to remain close to movement posi-
tions, and interacting with movement elites through think tanks and political
foundations.
Movement 
(Organizations’)
Policy Positions
Party
Platforms
Party Activists
(grassroots linkage)
Party Elites
(orientation, 
foundations)
Voters
(electoral pressure)
Figure 6.1: Mechanisms of Programmatic Alignment
The strong programmatic orientation on one specific issue area and align-
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ment with movement demands that these movement platform parties show
contrasts with mainstream, catch-all parties’ approaches to platform formula-
tions. As highlighted in chapter 2, since catch-all parties aim at winning sup-
port from the broadest possible set of sectors in society, they can neither afford
concentrating on one issue area, nor adopting the precise demands of one move-
ment or another for fear of alienating voters (what Kirchheimer (1966) described
as “limited integration” between the catch-all party, interest groups, and voters
(Kirchheimer 1966, pp. 192-195)). Thus, while movements might try to influence
mainstream parties during electoral campaigns in similar ways as movement
platform parties, the effect of their efforts will be smaller. The other mecha-
nisms, working through a grassroots linkage, independent orientation of party
elites, and think tanks, should be much weaker in connecting civil society to
mainstream parties or not exist at all, particularly with regard to party elites
adopting specific (movement) demands on their own. Empirical studies have
shown this to be the case. Rasmussen & Lindeboom (2013), for instance, in
a study of interest group-party relations across three West European countries
find these interactions to be only weakly institutionalized.2 In terms of party
politics, once Social Democratic parties sought allies beyond the working class,
they were forced to deemphasize their original focus on demands of the work-
ing class and union movement (Przeworski & Sprague 1986, pp. 40-52). More
recently, Brazil’s Workers’ Party has undergone a similar process with respect to
its platform, as elites tried to transform it into a serious contender for the presi-
dency (Hunter 2010, pp. 106-145). The Catholic laymen’s movement driving the
establishment of Christian Democratic parties (Kalyvas 1996) has even ceased
to exist as a relevant political force and is accordingly not able to exert pressure
2Joint policy committees only existed with 3.32% of the 1225 organizations surveyed by Ras-
mussen & Lindeboom (2013, p. 273).
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or serve as a point of reference for programmatic alignment for these parties.
Thus, mainstream parties’ incentives for programmatic alignment have
shifted away from the movements that once gave rise to them. However, facing
an incentive structure that rewards alignment with a movement, as movement
platform parties do, is not a guarantee that alignment occurs successfully. Not
all parties with contemporary movement roots are successful in drawing on the
mechanisms, identified in this chapter, to ensure that their platforms remain
close enough to the movements’ in order to mobilize their core electorates. Af-
ter introducing all four mechanisms, this chapter illustrates alignment failure
through case studies of the electoral decline of both the Swedish and German
Pirate Parties and the role the (absence of) alignment mechanisms played in that
development.
Electoral Pressure
As described in chapter 3, the distance between (movement platform) parties
and movements grows even larger during electoral campaigns when movement
organizations are especially sensitive to being perceived as partisan. Accord-
ingly, many direct interactions come to a temporary halt, which prompted a
former leader of the Swedish Greens to describe electoral campaigns as “the
time when they [the movement organizations] are most avoiding contact with
us” (interview 020307). But since electoral campaigns are a prime opportunity
to advocate for issues, elicit politicians’ public commitments to policy goals, and
get the movements’ messages heard by a public that is more attentive to poli-
tics than usual, social movement organizations have developed a standardized
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repertoire of activities for electoral campaigns. Specifically, across the coun-
tries and movements studied in this project, movement organizations publish
reports summarizing their evaluations of parties’ commitments to the move-
ments’ core issues. They also participate in podium discussions with politicians,
and organize protests shortly before national elections. Thus, these movements
are engaged in what McAdam & Tarrow (2010) describe as “proactive electoral
mobilization” (McAdam & Tarrow 2010, p. 533). Movement organizations ei-
ther see the electoral campaign as an opportunity or a threat to their goals and
target voters by providing information. This puts indirect pressure on parties
to position themselves in such a way that they do not become the target of a
negative report or protest during election campaigns. For politicians leading
movement platform parties the pressure is especially strong for two reasons.
First, elections are often more threat than opportunity for these parties, because
many of them are small and thus have to fear the loss of parliamentary repre-
sentation. Second, since these parties rely on issue focused core electorates their
(potential) voters are likely among those particularly tuned into the information
provided by movement organizations.
Many movement organizations publish evaluations regarding the perfor-
mance of political parties on the movements’ core issues during electoral cam-
paigns. About a quarter of the interviewed representatives of movement orga-
nizations (25.7%) indicated that these reports are part of their organizations’
election campaign activities. These reports are most often based on the an-
swers parties or individual candidates give to surveys sent out by the move-
ment organizations, though the analysis of party platforms occurs, too. Some
organizations, like the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, go even fur-
ther and include a comparison with the past track record of parties as part of
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their reports. These publications allow movement organizations to inform vot-
ers about which party is most in line with movement demands without having
to issue an explicit endorsement. One movement leader summarized the ap-
proach as follows: “One example of what we have done, we send out “election
touchstones”3. For us that is a very elegant option to participate in the political
discourse without having to position ourselves” (interview 010201).
The importance of these reports is recognized by elites in movement plat-
form parties. About 31% of interviewed party leaders independently referenced
them when discussing their interactions with movements during electoral cam-
paigns. A former leader of the Swedish Greens stressed the advantages these
reports have for the parties and movements:
So they never came out really [and] say: “Go and vote for the
Greens,” but [. . . ] before almost every election [. . . ] they have
checked the behavior of the parliamentary parties and also checked
their programs. And then they make lists and most often the Greens
come on top of these lists from their point of view. And I mean then
they don’t have to add: “Go and vote for the Greens.” I mean the
message is pretty clear [. . . ] So that’s the way it works now and has
worked for a couple of decades. (interview 020308)
The Swedish Greens did in fact receive the best evaluations in the Society
for Nature Conservation’s reports regarding the European election in 2014 and
the national elections in the same year (Junker 2014, Naturskyddsfo¨reningen
2014). Miljo¨partiet was the only party to receive a 100% ranking from the SNF
regarding the national elections, a result which the organization prominently
displayed in a bar chart at the top of its website that reported the organization’s
evaluations (Naturskyddsfo¨reningen 2014).4
3The German term for a set of questions directed at a political party before an election is
“Wahlpru¨fsteine.”
4The SNF also took great care, however, not to strike a partisan tone in its reports. While the
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The parties do, however, know that they need to respond to movement pres-
sure to get and retain these results in movement organizations’ reports. One of
Miljo¨partiet’s Members of Parliament summarized the situation during election
campaigns as follows:
So now for example they are sending us surveys [. . . ] asking us what
will the Green Party do in these different topics and what we answer
is publicly presented. So they put quite a lot of pressure on us in
performing what we are promising [. . . ] and more or less form [. . . ]
what we would focus on. (interview 020303)
A second prominent way in which movements seek to put their issues on
the agenda and exert pressure on parties are protests SMOs organize during
election campaigns. For the movements represented in this study, protests were
most prominently used by the digital movement, which has organized a yearly
protest against surveillance in Berlin under the title “Freedom not fear”5 since
2006 (Bartels 2009, p. 128). In both election years since 2006 (2009 and 2013), the
protest took place about two weeks before the elections. Similarly, the Pirate
Bay Trial, as well as the Swedish Parliament’s (affirmative) vote on the Euro-
pean directive to enforce intellectual property (IPRED), led to a massive phase
of movement mobilization and activists gathering in Stockholm in early 2009
(interview 020203). Thus, this mobilization occurred right before the European
Elections in June of the same year in which the Swedish Pirates achieved their
electoral breakthrough.
Protests during an electoral campaign seem to have been employed less by
the more institutionalized environmental movements in Germany and Sweden,
Green Party’s candidates on average scored the highest results regarding the EU election, the
single top candidate was a member of Centerpartiet (the Centre Party is a liberal, center-right
party, which originated as a famers’ party).
5“Freiheit statt Angst” in German.
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though there is some protest activity by these movements as well. For instance,
during Almedalensveckan, a yearly Swedish event in which each party repre-
sented in the national parliament hosts a day of programming on the island of
Gotland, the anti-nuclear movement was present with flags during the Green
leaders’ speech. In that way the activists were visible not only to party elites
and supporters, who were present, but also to a national TV audience.6 In
general, however, it seems that protest during electoral campaigns is a strategy
pursued by younger, less institutionalized grassroots-orientated organizations
and movements. More established organizations might avoid protest because
it frequently causes conflicts between the movement and parties about the role
parties will play in the protest and how prominent they can present themselves
during the protest (see chapter 4). Furthermore, parties are prone to quarrel
amongst themselves about these questions and movements risk getting caught
up in these disputes. This makes protest a less attractive option for movement
organizations with strong lobbying activities, because they might risk damag-
ing their relationships with a political party and its legislators over a (perceived)
mistreatment during the protest. Thus, investing in an institutional role creates
incentives for SMOs not to engage in extra-institutional protest activities that
might jeopardize their relationships with institutional actors and sets limits to
how much one organization can combine contentious with institutional activi-
ties.
Public podium discussions represent another way in which movement or-
6It is notable that the central anti-nuclear organization in Sweden, Folkkampanjen mot
Ka¨rnkraft-Ka¨rnvapen (People’s Campaign against Nuclear Power-Nuclear Weapons), is fre-
quently described as remaining more oriented towards the original means of movement ac-
tivism, rather than, for example, directly engaging with political parties (e.g. interviews 020303,
020308). That is, it is the part of the Swedish environmental movement that is least institu-
tionalized. This might indicate an implicit division of labor among movement organizations,
with some SMOs focusing on direct lobbying activities, while other continue to engage in more
contentious forms of exerting pressure on political parties.
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ganizations exert pressure on parties during electoral campaigns. Sometimes
these events are hosted by movement organizations themselves. The SNF, for
instance, presented the above described report about candidate positions on en-
vironmental issues before the European Election at an event to which they also
had invited a representative from each evaluated party. These representatives
were then given the chance to argue for and defend their party’s record and po-
sitions (interview 020401). In other cases, third parties such as the media host
these events. The German Nature And Biodiversity Conservation Union, for
example, co-hosted an event with German public television at which represen-
tatives from all parties with seats in the national parliament discussed environ-
mental issues (interview 010406). The inclusion of all relevant parties at both of
these events reflects a conscious strategic choice by the SMOs to maintain a non-
partisan approach and image (cf. chapter 4). In an interview with the Humanist
Union, a German civil rights organization, these public discussion events were
directly linked to the non-partisan approach of sending questionnaires to all
parties discussed above: “We have done this [hosted a public discussion event]
during the last electoral campaign, but then with representatives of all parties
and composed on a basis of parity, [. . . ] according to the model of ‘election
touchstones’ ” (interview 010206).
In sum, during electoral campaigns movement organizations use a variety of
means to exert influence on political parties in general and movement platform
parties in particular. These mechanisms do work through making information
available (reports, podium discussions) and through demonstrating public sup-
port for an issue by mobilizing for protests. Thus, these activities aim at raising
the salience of an issue and to increase parties’ stakes of ignoring the issue.
During those efforts the SMOs take increased care not to be perceived as parti-
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san. Movement organizations achieve this by engaging with all parties in the
same way: evaluating all parties on the basis of the same issues or questions,
restricting the role parties play in supporting protests, and inviting all relevant
or at least several parties to public discussion events. The effect of their activi-
ties, however, will on average be larger for movement platform parties, because
these parties’ core electorates will be tuned into the movement organizations’
advice. This is because these core electorates make their vote decisions based
on the movements’ central issues, as opposed to average voters, who are likely
to focus on a broader range of issues.
Outside of campaign seasons, however, more direct interactions between
movement platform parties and the movements that gave rise to them are more
frequent and different in nature than the movements’ interactions with main-
stream parties. That is, the relationship between movements and movement
platform parties varies systematically with the electoral calendar. The follow-
ing sections illuminate how the programmatic linkage is maintained when no
election is scheduled in the near future.
Grassroots Linkage: Movement Activists as Party Activists
Party elites indicated that an overlap between party members and movement
activists shapes the platforms of movement platform parties. About 38% of the
interviewed party leaders observed that party members who are also move-
ment activists bring ideas, frames, and policy goals from the movement into
the process through which the parties formulate their platforms. The results
of the party member survey support this conclusion with about 38% of mem-
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bers (and 44.3% of members who had also been active in the environmental or
anti-nuclear movement) stating that their work within Milo¨partiet had been in-
fluenced by their movement activity. Respondents, for instance, indicated that
they had drawn ideas for the party platform from their movement activities.
Similarly, a German Green Member of Parliament described how anti-fracking
initiatives had influenced the party platform “partially not directly, but through
Green members who made specific proposals here at the party convention” (in-
terview 010304).
Most party elites see this mechanism as working mostly at the grassroots
(10 of the 12 interviewees who made reference to this mechanism and indi-
cated the level at which it works). On the level of elites these kinds of inter-
actions seem to be precluded by the time commitments and intense focus on
intra-organizational politics leadership positions within a party or movement
require, which prompted one German former Green MP to describe this sep-
aration of elite spheres as being their “own worlds of life”7. She furthermore
highlighted the amount of energy spent on intra-movement or party-politics:
The competition among the environmental associations and what
happens within the environmental associations absorbs probably
more energy than they are actually are in communication with poli-
tics. And that applies vice versa. Politics and what happens within
the parliamentary group and within the party and in parliament is
significantly more important for many members of parliament than
what is somehow trying to influence politics from the outside. (in-
terview 010308)
In order for the remaining overlap on the grassroots to be influential, ac-
tivists need channels of influence in the party. Thus, the more participatory
7“[E]igene Lebenswelten” in German.
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nature of these movement platform parties compared to their mainstream catch-
all and cartel party competition comes into play. Through these structures party
members, who are also movement activists, continue to have a comparatively
strong say in developing party and electoral platforms. When asked about the
influence of external groups on the party platform, a former member of the
national leadership of the German Pirate Party highlighted that there was no
“influence of groups as such,” but that “where personal overlaps exist texts are
certainly being adopted.” He continued: “Our electoral law proposal originates
with Mehr Demokratie e.V. [More Democracy; a SMO pushing for more direct
democratic elements in electoral law]. But I have already said that there are also
Pirates who are members of Mehr Demokratie e.V. and that [the Pirates adopt-
ing the proposal] is actually because Pirates like the proposal of an NGO and
introduce it. But it is not the case that the NGOs or the lobbying organizations
approaches us and says: here is our proposal” (interview 010102).
The youth organizations of movement platform parties seem to play a par-
ticularly relevant role in bringing movement ideas to parties on the grass-
roots level.8 Politicians in the German and Swedish Greens (interviews 010302,
010304, 010306, 020305, 020307), as well as Swedish Pirates (020101, 020105)
highlighted the role of their parties’ youth organizations in shaping platforms,
with one German observer stressing that: “The Green Youth is strongly repre-
sented in those movements. And for them the Green Youth is in effect one of
those points of connection between a party that one is giving impulses and the
network from which they [the movements] originate” (interview 010302). Youth
organizations are also perceived to be more contentious and radical than the
8In addition to the Green and Pirate parties studied here, Caiani, della Porta, & Wagemann
(2012), in a study of online networks, have also identified youth organizations as fulfilling the
same linking function between radical right parties in Germany and groups outside of the par-
ties (Caiani, della Porta, & Wagemann 2012, pp. 69-70).
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parties themselves. One member of the German Green Party’s staff described
the role of the youth organization in writing electoral platforms as follows:
“And then we have the Green Youth [. . . ], which contributes a lot, gives a lot of
impulses. Sometimes it also likes to provoke. And then we have to resolve that
through voting, but that is of course part of a democracy” (interview 010306).
As the quote indicates those provocations have to a certain extent become rou-
tine and a former member of the German Green Party’s federal leadership ob-
served that: “there is virtually no party convention where not some group uses
the party convention to protest for or against something that the Greens are
planning” (interview 010303). That is, just as movements are not unitary actors
and some movement organizations work in more contentious ways than others,
movement platform parties have internal divisions and groups that are closer
or further away from the movements’ positions. One way of dealing with this
constant simmering conflict are organizational structures and cultures that are
tolerant of contention. The German Green’s conventions, for instance, consis-
tently provide examples of the routinized way in which the party deals with
contention. At Die Gru¨nen’s federal convention in February 2014, for example,
the proceedings were interrupted by a group of young persons, some of them
carrying signs of movement organizations (e.g. BUND and attac), who were
protesting against surveillance and the planned transatlantic free trade agree-
ment between the United States and the European Union. Despite interrupting
the convention, the protesters were offered the stage by the conference chair
(they declined) and received warm applause from the delegates. After a few
minutes the convention debate continued and both the conference chair and the
following debate speaker thanked the protesters for their contribution.
Thus, having young party and movement activists connecting movement
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platform parties to the movements that gave rise to the parties might be an un-
intended consequence of setting up party youth wings. The creation of these
organizations is not necessarily driven by a desire to link to the movement sec-
tor, but can be rooted in more short-term and concrete motives. One digital
movement activist with insights into how Ung Pirat, the Swedish Pirate Party’s
youth wing, was set up, for instance, saw the desire to attain the financial sup-
port the Swedish state makes available for youth organizations as the central
reason for Ung Pirat’s founding (interview 020203). Nonetheless, this organiza-
tion now is the part of the party that retains personal contacts to the movement
(interviews 020103, 020203).
Movement organizations, however, do not coordinate or actively encourage
influencing parties through an overlap of activists at the grassroots level. In
fact, only a single interviewed movement organization leader referred to influ-
encing party platforms in this way. The person representing the German wing
of the Free Software Foundation Europe recalled that a part of the Pirate Party’s
electoral platform followed his organization’s demands because “it had been
proposed in this way by one of our members [. . . ] Because of that [the proposal]
follows our wording rather exactly” (interview 010205).
The overlapping grassroots again highlight the importance of core con-
stituencies for movement platform parties, since not only their voter, but also
the movement activist base are recruited from these constituencies. This link-
age, however, seems to play a larger role in younger parties, as it was mainly
discussed by Pirate Party elites.9 Beyond those movement activists that were
founding members of the parties, the Pirates quickly growing success also
attracted additional activists from the digital and other (movement) organi-
911 out of 15 references to this mechanism were made by Pirate Party leaders.
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zations, who, as described by one member of the national leadership of the
German Pirates, joined the party to “actively promote their issues” (interview
010105).
Movement Organizations as Points of Orientation for Party
Elites: Direct and Indirect Influence
The most common mechanism of programmatic alignment movement platform
party elites highlighted was their active efforts to ensure that the party platform
matched movement demands. This occurs in two ways. First, leaders within
the parties seek the advice of movement organizations on a case-by-case basis
(i.e. in a non-institutionalized fashion). Second, movement platform party elites
adopt movement demands into party and electoral platforms by taking publicly
available information about movement positions into account without active
input by the movements themselves. This mechanism is distinct from “electoral
pressure,” described above, because it operates outside of campaign season and
works through party and movement elites rather than informing voters.
Direct influence through advice
Movement platform parties rely on the advice and expertise of movement or-
ganizations on a regular basis. The majority of party elites in all four parties
referenced eliciting advice and feedback from civil society (64.1%), and repre-
sentatives of movement organizations mentioned providing such advice to po-
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litical parties with a similar frequency (68.6%10). This direct contact between the
parties and social movements mainly takes place on two occasions. First, during
the legislative process when members of parliament reach out to organizations
for input in order to form a position on government proposals or develop their
own motions. Second, movement platform parties consciously offer movements
and their organizations opportunities for influence during the parties’ platform
formulation processes.
Members of Parliament contact movement-affiliated NGOs for advice and
expertise, as well as to make sure that they do not move too far from move-
ments’ programmatic demands (77.8% of interviewed party representatives
who are or were once members of a parliament made reference to this kind
of contact). In these exchanges politicians draw on the knowledge of (scientific)
experts in the NGOs to help them formulate positions regarding issues currently
before parliament and to develop their own proposals or questions for the gov-
ernment.11 Usually these kinds of consultations occur through non-public, di-
rect contact between staff at SMOs and members of parliament, but occasionally
the consultations are conducted in public ways. At Almedalensveckan 2014, for
instance, the Swedish Society of Nature Conservation hosted a panel on wa-
terpower at which representatives of environmental movement organizations,
10This number jumps to 74.3% when including organizations that referred to providing ad-
vice and input in formal government consultations. That some variation exists with respect to
whether movement organizations highlight that they provide advice to political actors points
again to different priorities of organizations. While some organizations might focus on insti-
tutionalized forms of interactions, including advice, others in the movement might continue to
focus on more contentious action. Thus, as with respect to the parties, its is analytically ben-
eficial to treat movements not as unitary actors, but to recognize the diversity of approaches
within them.
11While younger or more grassroots-orientated movements might find themselves unable to
draw on this mechanism, it is notable that among the four movements studied for this project
three, including the relatively young German digital movement, had developed the necessary
professional expertise and offered clear points of contact. Only the Swedish digital movement
was so weakly institutionalized that identifying and contacting the experts within the move-
ment would often have posed problems for politicians.
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including the SNF itself and the WWF, answered the questions of politicians
from several parties, including the Green Party’s environmental spokesperson
in the Swedish parliament.
Movement platform parties use these interactions to remain close to the
movements. One Green Member of Parliament in Sweden summarized his mo-
tivations for getting in touch with movement organizations as follows: “I want
to check the course, the direction of my work. Am I right? [. . . ] I pick up the
phone. I always know who to call” (interview 020305). A representative of the
SMO that this MP stressed as a central point of contact in his work confirmed
that the organization occasionally provides advice to politicians, for instance
with respect to framing and fact-checking. The representative, however, also
stated that personal attributes rather than party-affiliation determine whether
politicians seek out the organization’s advice (interview 020403). This answer is
typical of the attitude with which NGOs approach their direct interactions with
politicians. These organizations are usually happy to provide that advice and
advance their agenda through these interactions, but they consistently stress
that their expertise is equally available to all political parties. In this way the
organizations preserve a genuinely non-partisan approach.
However, the use of these contacts and their impact on political parties is not
distributed equally across the political spectrum. Movement platform parties
have a strong incentive to seek the expertise of the movement that gave rise
to them because their issue focus aligns. Accordingly, one representative of
the German Environment Aid Association replied to a question about whether
some parties are more attentive to the organization’s demands:
Well, that is definitely the Greens, because they of course need the
expertise of environmental associations for their issues, which they
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have chosen themselves. That expertise is also needed by other par-
ties, but not as strongly, because they simply do not have these green
issues in their platform and also, one has to say, listen more to busi-
ness associations than the Greens do. (interview 010407)
Movement platform parties seem to seek advice and input from move-
ment organizations especially when they have to make difficult political de-
cisions that could potentially cause conflict with the movement. The German
Greens found themselves in that position when, after the 2011 nuclear disaster
in Fukushima and massive anti-nuclear protests in Germany,12 the government
decided to initiate a nuclear phase-out. This government, composed of the tra-
ditionally pro-nuclear Christian Democratic and Free Democratic parties,13 pub-
lished a proposal that envisaged a faster phase-out than the Green Party had
been able to negotiate with nuclear power providers when the party was part of
a coalition government between 1998 and 2005.14 The Green Party now had to
decide whether to vote in favor of the government’s plan, which lagged behind
the demands of some movement organizations, or to oppose that plan, which
was more progressive than what the party itself had achieved in the past. In
that situation the party leadership sought close contacts with movement orga-
nization elites (interviews 010406, 010411, 010412, 010413), as one anti-nuclear
activist recalled: “And then it was suddenly very, very important to the Greens,
to talk with us a lot, so to say. Then there was a special party convention, [and]
then two guest speakers from the anti-nuclear movement were invited” (inter-
view 010412). The leadership also held meetings with several organizations to
discuss the party’s position (interviews 010406, 010412).
12The Green Party supported these protests.
13The German Free Democratic Party is a center-right, “classical liberal” party.
14The phase-out plan had been cancelled by the same Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition
that proposed the phase-out after the Fukushima disaster.
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The organizations interpreted this behavior as driven by the party’s strategic
concern to avoid conflict:
the party leadership and those who were afraid that the Greens
would be torn apart internally had an interest in receiving support
for their position from important environmental associations. At this
point in time they did not seriously believe anymore that they could
influence the bill. It was about the question, do they vote in favor or
not in the end and will they receive criticism from the environmental
associations or not. (interview 010406)
The Green Party leadership eventually settled on supporting the govern-
ment’s proposal and held a special party convention at which it asked party
delegates to support the leadership’s position. Some movement organizations
remained highly critical of this process and the government proposal, like .aus-
gestrahlt, a prominent anti-nuclear initiative (interview 1010412), while others,
like Greenpeace, were supportive of the proposal (interview 010411). The Green
leadership used the different positions in the movement to strategically avoid
a fundamental clash with the anti-nuclear and environmental movements by
highlighting movement positions that were in line with the party leadership’s
position. One representative of NABU, one of the largest environmental organi-
zations in Germany, for instance, saw the Green Party leadership as employing
NABU’s position to bolster the party leadership’s own standing at the conven-
tion (interview 010406).
In the end the party convention endorsed the leadership’s position. One
Green summarized the reaction of those in the movement who disagreed with
the proposal and the Green Party’s decision to support it as follows: “They said:
‘We do see this differently, but, okay, you [the Greens] have done it this way
and we have seen that you have genuinely grappled with this. You have done
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a whole party convention on this, which no other party has done, and you have
exchanged reasonable arguments and nothing remained [swept] under the car-
pet’ ” (interview 010303). In this way the party avoided a clash with and strong
criticism from the movement and aligned itself with many of the movement’s
most prominent organizations at a time when the agenda on the party’s and
movement’s core issue changed rapidly with uncertain consequences.
But while contacts between party and movement elites can lessen the likeli-
hood of conflict between them, they can also be the cause of friction. In some
situations the movements become the temporary ally of one wing or group
within a party that is in conflict with others within the same party (again
highlighting that parties are not unitary actors). One member of the German
Greens, for instance, reported lobbying successfully for a party convention
guest speaking spot for a movement leader, who shared the criticism she and
others had of the party leadership’s position on a central environmental issue
(interview 010301). Similarly, a representative of the German Bundesverband
Bu¨rgerinitiativen Umweltschutz, an umbrella organization for local environ-
mental groups that once played the central role in movement,15 indicated that
the group actively “accompanied” a conflict between a Green local association
that broke with its party over the state leadership’s policy regarding a local nu-
clear plant (interview 010405). Thus, the advice sought from movements can be
a resource in intra-party conflicts and the cause for a more general mechanism
that links parties and movements, which McAdam & Tarrow (2010) have de-
scribed as “movement-induced party polarization” (McAdam & Tarrow 2013,
pp. 332-334).
Besides contacting movements when the party is formulating its position on
15See Markham (2005) for a history of the rise and decline of the organization.
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proposals in parliament, movement platform parties also seek the input of civil
society–in particular those organizations affiliated with the movement that gave
rise to the party–when formulating the party platform. The Swedish Green and
Pirate parties, for instance, have both adopted platform formulation processes
in which the interested public can contribute ideas and proposals online (inter-
views 020101, 020304). For all parties, movement demands also found their way
into discussions of platforms through existing personal contacts with activists in
movements and movement organizations. One member of a German state par-
liament representing the Pirates, for example, described how the party’s plat-
form working groups seeks input: “In most cases, [. . . ] the NGOs are asked
to answer questions. That is in particular [the case] when new areas are being
worked on. But more often [. . . ] there are indeed direct contacts, that members
of the NGOs are also members of the Pirate Party or have good contacts with
each other and are directly being included in the discussion” (interview 010114).
The more established parties, operating in a more institutionalized move-
ment environment, i.e. the two Green parties, go even further in directly seeking
the input of civil society when they write their (election) platforms. A represen-
tative of the party platform group of the Swedish Greens recalled their approach
as follows: “So it is some sort of more private seminar, where you have the party
program group gathered and then you invite three or four, maybe five, orga-
nizations and they have ten to fifteen minutes to present something and then
we have a discussion for two hours” (interview 020304).16 The German Greens
also conducted meetings with movement groups when working on their plat-
forms (010303) and have sent drafts of platforms to civil society groups to seek
16The representative, however, also notes that while environmental organizations were repre-
sented in these seminars, there was less contact with more “activist” groups, speculating “that
we kind of think that we already have them represented in our party.”
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their input (interview 010306). In this process the party pays special attention
to proposals from environmental groups: “Who, for that matter, is influential
regarding the content of the platform are the environmental associations. They
also write long things [about] what they think should be in it [the platform] and
rather many of those things are then being included” (interview 010305).
The environmental organizations are aware that their influence on the
Greens is stronger than on other parties: “with the Greens we have of course a
bit more contact. So that one has contacts on the staff level and can maybe exert
influence on one or another statement or formulation in the electoral program”
(interview 010404). The influence of the central environmental movement or-
ganizations on the German Greens is so strong that they in effect have a veto
over proposals, because the party leadership anticipates that it could never pass
a platform at their convention that the organizations oppose. A former mem-
ber of the party’s federal leadership summarized this as follows: “classically it
is the environmental associations who have a strong weight with us. I believe
the Greens would not pass a motion at a party convention where BUND and
NABU would say: ‘Here, you can’t do this.’ That would certainly have hardly
a chance with us” (interview 010303). Thus, the movement organizations can
exercise a form of agenda control that allows them to limit the parties’ room
of programmatic maneuver. This may either occur directly by signaling where
the red lines are, but also takes a more indirect form where the movement has
created an atmosphere in which party elites keep issues off the agenda if they
anticipate fundamental conflict with the movement (what Bachrach & Baratz
(1958) identified as the second face of power; cf. also Lukes (1974)).
Through the direct input from movement organizations on their platforms,
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movement platform parties ensure that they are positioned close to the move-
ments. The Green parties furthermore occasionally conduct informal exchanges
with movement organizations about the topics and issues they expect to be on
the agenda in the future or that they plan to place there themselves: “We coop-
erate sometimes in harmonizing our campaigns. Not formally but we meet up
every once in a while and discuss: which topics are you going to focus on and
so on” (interview 020303).
For these more established parties the costs of establishing and maintaining
direct connections are reduced in two ways. First, party and movement elites
often know each other from past interactions and sometimes a shared activist
past. One member of the German Green Party’s staff summarized this in the fol-
lowing way: “it’s partially persons who we already know for many years. Then
you do not need a formal email, but one simply meets with them or one meets
anyhow at events. Thus, a good network already exists” (interview 010306).
This also goes along with a shared social and cultural environment, as a repre-
sentative of the German chapter of Friends of the Earth remarked: “Well, there
is no cultural difference. That is in itself important for the general contact. In
part one also knows each other from the same protest, and, what I have said be-
fore, there is always this natural understanding that nature and environmental
protection are important and we, as representatives of this concern, therefore
are too” (interview 010410). These comments were echoed by a former leader
of the Swedish Greens: “I mean if you are in this alternative, green movement
[. . . ], even if you don’t know each other personally, you know that you have
something in common, which you don’t have if you meet a person from a big
business or something like that. I mean it’s so clear that you have [. . . ] a gen-
eral outlook at least that is similar. Which it wouldn’t be, not even with a trade
198
unionist. It wouldn’t be the same” (interview 020308).
Second, while the elites of parties and movements are separated, some orga-
nizations have staff members who used to work for a movement platform party
or vice versa (e.g. interview 020307). Accordingly, these staffers bring their per-
sonal networks into the new job and make informal, direct exchanges easier to
initiate. However, since many organizations try to limit their visible linkage to
parties, and some movement organizations, like Greenpeace, even insist that
those working in their political operations are not members of political parties
(interview 010411), these connections are relatively rare. They are also harder to
maintain for the younger movements and movement platform parties and some
accordingly struggle to do so. A representative of the Free Software Foundation
Europe in Germany, for instance, reported that valuable contacts with the fed-
eral parliament were lost and not replaced when members of parliament, with
whom contacts existed, were not reelected (interview 010205).
While there might be a difference in the extent to which newer and more es-
tablished movement platform parties can draw on direct contacts and the advice
of movement organizations, and the interplay is more institutionalized in the
Green than the Pirate party cases,17 both equally rely on the frames, ideas, and
demands movement organizations make publicly available. Movement plat-
form party elites consciously use these as points of orientation for their own
work. The next subsection discusses this mechanism.
17See the case study below on how this mechanism of providing advice failed to fully develop
for the German and especially Swedish Pirate parties.
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Indirect influence and orientation
Party elites consciously choosing to adopt movement positions and policies in
order to avoid conflicts with the movements is an additional way in which par-
ties and movements remain programmatically aligned. Almost half of the in-
terviewed party elites (46.2%) made reference to having independently sought
out information about movement demands and followed that position in their
work within their respective parties. One Swedish member of parliament for
Miljo¨partiet described this process as follows:
To give you one example, we, both the Green Party and Greenpeace,
were discussing we need to set a goal for energy policy in Sweden.
[. . . ] And they [Greenpeace] set a date to 2030 and it was not a co-
incidence that we also decided on 2030 as the same goal. Otherwise
maybe we would have said 2035 or so, but out of the idea that we
want to have the same goal as them, we set the same date for when
we want nuclear to be phased out in Sweden. (interview 020303)
This kind of independent orientation ranges from adopting specific policy
goals, as described above, to parties directly including movement demands
in their platforms. A former member of the German Pirate’s federal leader-
ship recalled how the party’s platform and behavior were shaped by movement
NGOs concerned with increasing democratic participation and transparency:
“demands that Mehr Demokratie e.V. made were for instance adopted into the
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg state election platform. Or the Pirate Party has looked at
the list of demands of Transparency International and has adopted it as require-
ments for its own work” (interview 010114).
Beyond influencing policy-making and platforms, party elites mentioned
that the work of movement organizations sets the agenda for issues that move-
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ment platform parties pick up. A former party leader of the Swedish Greens
described how environmental organizations influence party behavior:
If they [the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation] or Greenpeace
or someone would have a initiative and trying to raise a certain issue,
it would be quite probable that one or two of the Green parliamen-
tarians would take that up and do something about it politically, like
put [a] question to [the] minister [. . . ] Not as an official coopera-
tion, but because when they have their campaigns it affects us and
we see that and we realize that this issue is actually something that
we should do something about. And then we will take the initiative
from them and forward it to the parliament in some way. (interview
020307)
The survey of Miljo¨partiet’s members further highlights the importance of
publicly available information from movement organizations. Table 6.1 sum-
marizes the extent to which different subsets of survey respondents relied on
NGOs for their political information. That is, to what extent these respondents
are aware of and can draw on the policy positions of civil society organizations
when formulating policies.
Table 6.1: NGOs as Source for Political Information in %
Party Members Office Holders Party Elites
often 29.53 31.65 45.45
sometimes 46.98 49.37 42.42
rarely 18.79 15.19 12.12
never 4.70 3.80 0
N 149 79 33
Office Holders are the subset of Party Members holding any public or party office,
while Party Elites are defined as those members holding office above the local level,
i.e. are a subset of Office Holders.
201
The data shows that the vast majority of party members are tuned in to the
messages of NGOs, as 76.5% often or sometimes rely on these organizations
for their political information. Among survey respondents NGOs rivaled TV in
importance, which 71.7% of respondents named as an information source they
relied on often or sometimes.18
Movement organizations are well aware that they exert pressure on move-
ment platform parties simply by making their positions publicly known, which
leaves the party the option of adopting the position or creating a (public) con-
flict with the movement. For the movement organizations this has the added
advantage of allowing them to exert this influence without interacting with a
party directly and taking on the accompanying risk of being perceived as par-
tisan. A representative of the German Nature And Biodiversity Conservation
Union summarized this as follows: “we don’t say, we advise the Greens to do
this or that, but we say the NABU demands this or that or the NABU supports
the government’s proposal for this or that. And by making our position public,
journalists will look at whether that is congruent with what the Greens say or
whether there is a discrepancy” (interview 010406). Similarly movement organi-
zations consciously exert their influence on agenda setting: “we don’t have the
resources to massively conduct lobbying [. . . ], but simply because we continu-
ously report [on internet policy], we do engage in some form of agenda setting”
(interview 010210).
Again, the movement organizations’ work is non-partisan, but since the
movement platform parties remain focused on their original core issues, the
influence of these publicly available policy positions and agenda setting efforts
1827.6% indicated they relied on TV for political information sometimes and 44.1% did so
often.
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is largest on the movement platform parties, as already described regarding di-
rect advice above. Occasionally the independent efforts of party elites to stay
close to the movements lead to programmatic alignment that is so close that
movement organizations consider lobbying movement platform parties a very
low priority, since these parties are seen by movement elites as “already on our
side” (interview 020401).
In sum, by publicizing their positions movement organizations strongly
influence movement platform parties, whose elites have clear incentives to
adopt movement policy demands and frames independently. In this way the
movements transfer innovations like new frames into the party political arena
(c.f. McAdam & Tarrow (2010) on transferable innovations). A member of
Miljo¨partiet’s national leadership, for instance, described observing develop-
ments in civil society to decide how to position the party. The interviewee in-
dicated that the emergence of parent and grandparent organizations concerned
with global warming, which framed the fight against climate change as a gen-
erational issue, was instructive for their work (interview 020302).
The two types of orientation mechanisms described in this section seem to
be more important for more established movement platform parties, as they
can rely less on activists that are solidly rooted in both the party and the move-
ment to remain aligned with the movement (see above). Thus, it seems possible
that the grassroots linkage is over time and with the transition to the movement
platform party model, replaced by the orientation mechanism. That is, while
early in their development parties arising from a social movement continue to
connect to the movement through shared activists, the connection later shifts
towards the elite level, where party leaders seek the movement’s advice and
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independently position the party close to movement demands. This interpre-
tation is in line with the survey data from the Swedish Green Party member
survey. While, as mentioned above, a large minority of respondents indicate
that their work in Miljo¨partiet is influenced by movement activity, the vast ma-
jority of respondents also indicate that their focus lies with the political party.
As discussed in chapter 3, more than three quarters of the surveyed members
(76.2%) reported that they spent more time working for the party than for the
movement. Only 14.3% of respondents spent equal time on their party and
movement activities and thus could be characterized as truly having roots in
both the party and movement. Moreover, those in the latter group spent less
than half the time (about 20 hours a month) on party activities than those fo-
cused on working within the party, who on average invested about 42 hours a
month. This development from connecting on the grassroots level to connect-
ing through party and movement elites could also already be observed within
the Pirate Parties in 2013 and 2014 (both parties existed for seven years at the
time the interviews were conducted). One German Pirate with movement back-
ground, for instance, indicated that the contacts to external groups that were
relevant to his work as a member of a state parliament were largely established
after he was elected (interview 010101).
Think Tanks and Political Foundations: “Neutral” Agents of
Platform Alignment
A final way in which movement platform parties align their platforms with so-
cial movement demands works indirectly through foundations or think tanks
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affiliated with the movement platform parties. Many parties have created these
auxiliary institutions that conduct research, provide policy papers, offer a vari-
ety of scholarship, and (in the German cases) engage in the promotion of democ-
racy abroad. The structure of these institutions varies by their national context.
They are, for example, relatively well-endowed and large in Germany, where ex-
tensive state funding for political foundations is available to parties represented
in the federal parliament (Rudzio 2003, pp. 129-135). But in all cases these foun-
dations and think tanks elicit input from outside the party and in that way link
movement organizations back to the party and open a channel for movement
influence. Thus, the foundations engage in brokerage as defined by McAdam,
Tarrow, & Tilly (2001): “the linking of two or more previously unconnected so-
cial sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with
yet other sites” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001, p. 26).19
The Pirate parties, as very young political parties, largely lack developed
think tanks or foundations. While activists in Germany were actively pursuing
the establishment of foundations in a number of working groups in 2013/14 (in-
terviews 010101, 010102, 010103, 010104), the lack of political representation in
the federal parliament meant that the party was without access to the necessary
financial resources to establish a significant foundation (interview 010107). A
nascent foundation, however, exists in the Berlin based “Peira-Gesellschaft fu¨r
politisches Wagnis” (Peira-Society for Political Audacity) (interviews 010101,
19This brokerage takes place on the elite level where it enables previously unconnected elites
to interact. Specifically, this is a form of what Vasi (2011) identifies as “itinerant brokerage”
in which “the broker belongs to a different group from the actors who need to exchange
information”(Vasi 2011, p. 14). In this case the relationship between the broker/think tank and
one of the actors, the sponsoring movement platform party, is characterized by extremely high
miscibility, because they are strongly connected through elite networks and a shared ideology,
while the relationship between the broker and the other actor, the movement, is characterized
by medium miscibility, with some personal networks and ideological commonalities (cf. Vasi &
Strang (2009)).
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010102) in the legal form of a registered society.
The more established Green parties, on the other hand, both created signifi-
cant foundations or think tanks. The German Greens, represented in the federal
parliament since 1983, merged a number of state-based foundations20 into one
federal foundation, named after literature Nobel Prize winner Heinrich Bo¨ll, in
1997 (Heinrich Bo¨ll Foundation 2015). The Swedish Greens established their
own think tank, Cogito, in 2005 with a former party leader, who also served as
a Member of Parliament and Member of the European Parliament at different
times, as its first president (interview 020306).
These foundations engage with social movement organizations mainly
through events hosted by the foundations. One official at wikimedia Germany
described the interactions of his organization with party politics as follows: “We
don’t do joint events with parties at this time, but we move in the same spaces.
That is, one point of contact are events of party-affiliated political foundations.
Bo¨ll, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, sporadically Konrad Adenauer Foundation,
too.21 We are invited to that. Often as participants, occasionally on the podium
too and then also partially with active parliamentarians at the same event” (in-
terview 010201).
As this description implies, movement organizations often link up with the
whole spectrum of political parties through their affiliated foundations. In fact,
about 26% of interviewed movement organizations indicated that they interact
with political parties through the party’s think tanks and foundations. Consid-
ering the often policy-orientated nature of the foundations and think tanks, it
20These state foundations had been loosely associated through a federal society previously.
21The Friedrich Ebert Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Foundations are associated with the
Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties respectively.
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seems likely that this mechanism is especially important with respect to con-
necting with movements and movement organizations that have developed sci-
entific expertise. The presence of the German Institute for Applied Ecology,
whose mission is to conduct research with respect to sustainability, among those
highlighting foundations as a link to political parties, supports this inference
(interview 010403). It is furthermore noteworthy that all movement organi-
zations that mentioned working with political foundations are located in Ger-
many, where, as described above, foundations are extremely well-resourced.
But while movement organizations engage with many parties in that way,
interview partners in the Green parties, of which about 35% described contacts
to movements through foundations or think tanks, indicated that their founda-
tions highlight the core issue of their “associated” movements. Accordingly,
a member of the staff at Cogito in Sweden reported that the think tank has
“been working with most NGOs in Sweden that work on environmental or cli-
mate change or the same questions and issues” (interview 020306). Similarly,
a member of one of the German Green party’s topic-centered working groups
indicated that events of the Heinrich Bo¨ll Foundation often serve to connect
the party with the movement (interview 010301). But while in Sweden Cog-
ito has “no formal connections to them [the environmental and climate change
movements]” and contacts occur mostly when the think tank has “a seminar
or book launch or a report” (interview 020306), the role of the German Green
Party’s foundation is occasionally more direct. It, for instance, hosts regular
meetings between those working on energy policy in the Green parliamentary
group, Green state ministers responsible for energy policy, and the representa-
tives of environmental groups (interview 010308).
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Movement organizations are more willing to cooperate with political foun-
dations or think tanks than with the parties themselves. BUND - Friends of the
Earth Germany, for instance, cooperated with the Heinrich Bo¨ll Foundation on
a publication regarding meat consumption, something they “would never do
with the Greens” directly (interview 010410). Working with think tanks and
foundations as parties’ auxiliary organizations significantly limits the SMOs’
risk of being criticized as partisan, but allows them valuable means of influ-
encing the parties. As described above, representatives of movement organiza-
tions have an opportunity to directly interact with party elites at events hosted
by party-affiliated think tanks or political foundations and present their pol-
icy demands in these forums. Parties also profit from these interactions by ac-
quiring expertise and movement platform parties in particular can use these
interactions to align their platforms with movement demands. A member of
Miljo¨partiet’s platform commission, which was responsible for developing the
party’s new platform, for example indicated that Cogito was an important point
of orientation for the group when working on the platform (interview 020304).
Furthermore, the foundations and think tanks are seen within the parties as
providing the space for programmatic debate (interview 010302).
But even though foundations and think tanks are somewhat removed from
the political parties they are affiliated with, movement organizations still are ex-
tremely careful not to expose themselves to charges of partisan bias. They do so
by two means. First, as already described above, they do not only engage with
a think tank or foundation of the movement platform party closest to them, but
with a broad range of party affiliated auxiliary institutions and thus maintain
their non-partisan approach. Second, even when cooperating they take great
care to maintain some distance. While those familiar with the set-up phase of
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Cogito reported that working with movements through the think tank was eas-
ier than trying to do same as a party politician (interview 020308), efforts to
bring the most prominent national environmental organizations into the think
tank failed, as discussed in chapter 4, because of the organizations’ concerns of
being connected to the party (interview 020306).
Case Studies: Pirate Parties and Linkage Failure
The previous discussion of programmatic alignment has demonstrated that so-
cial movements and the movement platform parties they gave rise to remain
connected through several mechanisms that ensure close programmatic align-
ment between them. The Pirate parties, however, also represent instructive case
studies for a situation in which these mechanisms do not work well or to the
necessary extent. The Swedish Pirate Party found itself in an environment in
which the movement demobilized quickly after 2009/10 and thus few opportu-
nities existed to link up with movement actors. That is, (contentious) grassroots
movement activity dropped off significantly without being replaced by organi-
zational actors. In Germany, the movement institutionalized more successfully,
but problems internal to the Pirate Party prevented it from successfully aligning
with that movement. This section will discuss how and why the mechanisms
of programmatic alignment identified in this chapter failed to function for the
Pirate parties and how this contributed to the parties’ electoral decline. It thus
demonstrates that alignment, even though it is often in the interest of both party
and movement, is not an automatically occurring process and in the absence of
the necessary conditions fails to materialize.
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Sweden: A Demobilizing Movement
The Swedish digital movement experienced an apex of activity in 2009 with
file-sharing issues receiving a lot of public attention. As one movement activists
recalled: “The IPRED directive is being implemented in Sweden, which causes a
lot of debate. And you have the trial on the Pirate Bay taking place in early 2009
[. . . ] Which gathers a lot of people” (interview 020203). At the same time, the
young Pirate Party could rely on activists from the movement in their electoral
campaign for the European Parliament: “I mean in 2009 I was even helping out
with posting flyers [. . . ] You know on the walls: ‘Vote for the Pirate Party’ [. . . ]
And the people, the local Pirates here were very engaged” (interview 020203). It
was in this campaign that the party experienced its electoral breakthrough and
won 7.1% of the vote, enough for one seat in the European Parliament.22
After this period of massive activity, however, the movement in Sweden be-
gan to demobilize. The Pirate Bureau, the central nucleus of movement activists
from which the Pirate Party had taken its name (and frames), closed down in
2010 (Miegel & Olsson 2012), after its founders felt that they had accomplished
many of their goals and one of the co-founders passed away (Van Der Sar 2010)
(interview 020203). This demobilization went along with many young activists
turning their attention to issues outside of Sweden, like the activities another
SMO, Telecomix, organized to support the Arab Spring (interview 020205), as
well as turning to work through established institutions: “There was a lot of
those kind of movement organizations about the internet, digital rights, and
freedoms and recently they have declined. But I think what happened is that
22Because the distribution of seats in the European Parliament between member countries
was adjusted later during that legislative session Sweden gained seats. One of these was as-
signed to the Pirates, whose representation accordingly increased to two seats.
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a lot of people who were active in those kind of movements, the leadership,
they get [. . . ] [absorbed] into the establishment. So now they all [. . . ] work at
universities, and work for the government [. . . ]” (interview 020103). This was
particularly true for prominent movement leaders:23
A lot of the people that were Swedish and leading in that crop [of
activists in Telecomix and the Pirate Bureau], they were absorbed by
the government or are finalizing doctoral theses. Sweden is a very
small country. So normally when somebody who is somewhat tal-
ented reveals themselves, the government machinery will work very
hard to absorb them. Especially if they have some kind of socially
amicable cause. (interview 020104)
This left Piratpartiet in a situation in which there were few places to turn
to for advice or to use as points of orientation, as one of their Members of the
European Parliament summarized: “Sweden doesn’t have a civil society in this
sphere. So it’s not possible to have contact with a civil society that doesn’t exist”
(interview 020104).
Other mechanisms of programmatic alignment also could not work or
worked only to a limited extent. The absence of an established think tank con-
nected to the party prevented interactions on that level. Moreover, the particular
history of the party, being founded not from the core of the movement, but by
a political entrepreneur (see chapter 3), combined with the demobilized move-
ment, led to a limited linkage on the activist level. Even the party’s youth wing,
which should be expected to have a high overlap, had few members active in
the movement, which led a representative of Ung Pirat to observe: “I haven’t
23This is another difference between newer parties with movement origins and the older, So-
cial Democratic parties. Because many of the newer parties are driven by the middle class, their
members and leaders often have individual channels and opportunities for social mobility. This
stands in contrast to parties originating in the workers’ movement, where those opportunities
were scarce for their supporters, who were mostly recruited from the lower classes.
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seen this new generation [of activists] coming up.” He furthermore described
his organization’s overlap with the movement as increasingly small: “I know
there is a generation of people that have not been active in those kind of so-
cial movements” (interview 020103). This perception is shared regarding the
party more generally by a central movement activist, who had been working
in Piratbyra˚n: “the generation of party activists today maybe don’t really have
the insights or the knowledge of the actual [. . . ] history of the Piracy Bureau”
(interview 020205).
Furthermore where contacts between party and the remaining activists exist,
they are often not seen as productive and the party is not perceived as an effec-
tive vehicle for policy change. Asked whether friends in political parties take
up the movement’s position to lobby for them in their parties, a movement ac-
tivist replied: “not that often I think. I think one of the reasons is that the Pirate
Party in Sweden doesn’t really have that much power as a party. So trying to
establish political change is often easier when you don’t do it through the usual
parliamentary system” (interview 020206). Due to the party’s limited electoral
success and lack of representation in the national parliament, it is also not an
attractive target for lobbying by the movement, which has to carefully focus its
limited resources. One activist explained Telecomix’s approach to influencing
political parties as follows: “So very pragmatic in that sense. Where your idea
gets the most traction, this is were you will try to frame it. And that’s never in
the Pirate Party” (interview 020203).
In the absence of a movement from which Piratpartiet could draw frames,
ideas, and advice, the party was not able to repeat its 2009 success in the 2010
national elections, where it could not mobilize movement activists to support
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its campaign and only gained .65% of the vote. A party activist argued that
the a reason for the 2009 success “was because all these different movement
organizations, they were working together and helping out the party and in
2010 all those people who were part of the leadership outside of the party for
these different movement organizations were not wanting to help out for dif-
ferent reasons, which made the movement weaker” (interview 020103; similar
020203). The party furthermore went through a process to broaden its platform,
losing its clear focus on internet issues in the process, because the positions on
other issues were not logically derived from and connected back to the party
and movement’s core issues in the view of one of the party’s MEPs: “And so ac-
tually it would be more useful for us to look at the implications of our policies
and what they logically conclude in other fields, so that we could build some
kind of coherent policy framework for ourselves. But it is very difficult for us to
do so, I think” (interview 020104). The same MEP further described the prob-
lems with respect to the European Election in 2014, which resulted from a lack
of programmatic focus:
now in the election campaigns for the European elections, it is very
painfully obvious that we lack people [. . . ] who can and want to do
stuff to advance the party’s positions. A lot of the leading figures of
the party also, including the party leader, spend a lot of time talking
about LGBT rights, which is nice and I don’t mind it, but I don’t see
where that makes us different from any other party. [. . . ] So it is un-
strategic populist mobilization around non-core issues, which delegitimizes
the existence of the party to begin with, because if we were not the inter-
net party, the people who know these power relations and the creative forces
best, then why are we here? Why? (interview 020104)
This was clearly a problem for a party whose electoral success in 2009 was
based on the programmatic linkages it provided with regard to its core issues
(Erlingsson & Persson 2011). The party went on to achieve merely 2.2% of the
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vote and lost both of its seats in the European Parliament. Its leadership re-
signed collectively in December 2014 (Sveriges Radio 2014, Piratpartiet 2014)
and was not replaced throughout 2015.24
Germany: (Contentious) Intra-Party Politics
Contrary to the Swedish situation, in Germany the movement did success-
fully set up a wide variety of organizations, ranging from the working groups
against data retention and censorship to the Open Knowledge Foundation,
which joined existing organizations like the Chaos Computer Club. The Pi-
rate Party, however, was not able to successfully and consistently link up with
these organizations due to internal problems, which resulted in a lack of suit-
able structures to connect to SMOs. Furthermore, because of a strong influx
of activists from far-left movements into the new party, the Piratenpartei ex-
perienced massive internal conflicts over its programmatic orientation. As a
consequence it lost its clear focus on internet issues and accordingly parts of its
electoral appeal.
The German Pirates grew quickly after their first electoral success and their
membership skyrocketed from less than a thousand members at the beginning
of 2009 to more than 12000 in 2010 (Zolleis, Prokopf, & Strauch 2010, p. 20). The
rapidly growing membership figures combined with the party’s commitment
to direct participation of all members in its decision-making processes led to a
situation in which the party focused on internal institution and platform build-
ing. It did not, however, develop a clear strategy of linking up to the movement
24The party was run by the party board in the interim (Piratpartiet 2015).
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from which it originated.25 While the party has created tools for online decision
making, German party law is ambiguous about whether virtual party conven-
tions are legal26 and the Pirates continue to host physical conventions. These are
member rather than delegate conferences and thus all members are eligible to
participate and vote. With many new members these conventions often proved
to be inefficient vehicles for decision making (interview 010102) and the chair at
the party’s November/December 2013 convention, for instance, had to spend
time stopping a member from flying a small drone in the hall and with a motion
questioning the decision to ban drones from the hall before the meeting could
continue.
The party developed the concept of “topic representatives,” inter alia re-
sponsible for contact with movement organizations, to provide a link to exter-
nal actors (interview 010102). However, even party elites conceded to not be-
ing completely aware of what these representatives were supposed to achieve:
“Then, on the federal level, there is this concept of topic representatives. But
if I am completely honest I have never properly understood what that is sup-
posed to entail” (interview 010101). A member of the party’s federal leadership
summarized the cooperation with movement organizations as follows:
in my impression it is not an organized, steady communication. But
one is of course close and talks to each other. But I also think we
have to work on making that a bit more structured maybe. I believe
that former federal leaderships have acted a bit lax in not seeking,
not maintaining this contact specifically. [So] That in effect we need
to engage in a little reconstruction work. (interview 010105)
25A member of the party’s national leadership indicated that while there was the desire within
the the leadership to build more connections to NGOs, it was an open question whether the
party would be able to accomplish this considering the number of other “construction sites” for
the party (interview 010105).
26The Pirates have, for instance, been advised by the office of the privacy protection officer of
the State of Berlin that a online voting tool that the party employed could not ensure the legally
required anonymity of voters in secret ballots (Holzapfel 2012).
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This confusion about the correct point of contact is shared by the movement.
A representative of Digitale Gesellschaft (Digital Society), a movement organi-
zation focused on the protection of consumers and basic rights with respect to
internet issues, indicated that interactions with the Pirates have been limited in
scope and stated: “it is somehow a bit diffuse to figure out with whom you can
cooperate there [in the Pirate Party] at present” (interview 010207). Moreover,
SMOs described some reservations about the Pirate Party’s competence when it
came to their core issues. With respect to the issue of censorship, a representa-
tive of the Working Group against Internet Blocks and Censorship asserted that
“Individual persons, who are also active in the Pirates, were indeed with us,
but the Pirates were rather invisible and have also missed the issue in general, I
have to say” (interview 010204). Similarly, an activist with the Working Group
on Data Retention indicated that in his opinion the Pirate Party should have
made use of the Working Group’s expertise:
The Pirates should have done this [seeking out the group’s exper-
tise], but they did not. It is not a secret that much went wrong inter-
nally [in the Pirate Party] in the last one and a half years with respect
to internal organization and structures. Also with respect to the im-
pression left externally and at least regarding the [policy] issues we
could maybe have provided assistance at one point or another. (in-
terview 010202)
Similar to the Swedish case, the German Pirate Party’s limited parliamen-
tary representation (it had parliamentary groups in four state parliaments in
2013/14) set few incentives for the movement to focus its efforts on the party.
Describing the issues on which the movement engaged with parties, and dis-
cussing concerns regarding free trade agreements and transparency in how they
are negotiated in particular, one activist stated: “The Pirates, in my opinion,
are completely irrelevant. Simply because they have no influence in the Euro-
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pean Parliament, in the EU Commission, in the Council of Ministers” (interview
010203).
Thus, direct contacts with the movement were relatively rare and not overly
productive in terms of programmatic alignment, because the Pirates were fo-
cused on internal affairs and the movement did not perceive the party as an ef-
fective or competent actor in pushing its agenda. This situation is also mirrored
in the party’s attempts to set up a political foundation that could have served
as a focal point for connections to civil society. A former member of the fed-
eral leadership argued that the many parallel efforts to create foundations were
“an expression of the fragmentation of the party” and driven by actors trying
the secure the resources that come with a foundation for themselves (interview
010102).
But beyond its structural problem in achieving a successful working rela-
tionship with the movement on the elite level, the German Pirate party was
also hampered in its alignment with the digital movement because the young
party’s success had attracted activists from other social movements, who joined
the Piratenpartei to turn it into their party-political vehicle. These were mostly
activists from anti-fascist, anti-racist, and generally far-left backgrounds. This
caused tension in a party that over time had clearly positioned itself left of the
political center in general (Zolleis, Prokopf, & Strauch 2010, p. 31), and in Berlin
in particular (Odenbach 2012, p. 94), but contained members with ideological
positions ranging from socially-liberal, center-left to far-left. This tension ex-
pressed itself in a variety of ways. At their party conferences in late 2013 and
early 2014, for instance, a banner of the anti-fascist movement was affixed in the
hall and on both occasions this led to contention and demands for the banner to
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be taken down (it remained in place in both instances).
This tension and focus on internal conflicts led to a loss of the party’s focus
on their core issues. One activist in the digital movement described this as fol-
lows: “And at the same time one has to say too, that the Pirates have lost sight of
the issue of data protection, or of the issue internet policy generally” (interview
010207). This analysis is shared within the party itself. Exactly as the Swedish
MEP in relation to Piratpartiet, one of the German Pirates’ topic representa-
tives, saw his party’s decline of electoral appeal connected to not highlighting
the party’s core issues and failing to draw on these issues to develop positions
in other areas:
That [the connection between movement and party] has unfortu-
nately split a bit, especially regarding the 2013 election, which also
was, I believe, one of the reasons that our intrinsic peer group did
not necessarily vote for us anymore. That was a problem, that we
did leave our core issues a bit aside, especially topics like copyright
law, internet policies, but instead [practiced] broadening [of the plat-
form]. Which is also right and important, i.e. unconditional basic
income, asylum policies, family policies, gender policies. But it was
unfortunately not derived from our core issues [. . . ], but rather iso-
lated and alone. And it was, I believe, the largest problem, that we
weren’t able to develop a narrative (interview 010108)
After a disappointing result of 2.2% in the federal election of 201327 these
tensions led to an open struggle over the direction of the party starting in early
2014 and lasting (at least) until the election of new leadership team in June of the
same year. On February 13 2014, Anne Helm, a member of a local parliament
in Berlin and the Pirate Party’s fifth candidate on their list for the European
Elections in May 2014,28 was photographed topless in Dresden with the mes-
27As laid out in chapter 3, German electoral law requires a party to win 5% or electoral dis-
tricts directly to enter the federal parliament. The Pirate Party fell short of either of these ways.
28Considering the number of seats assigned to Germany and the country’s electoral law, Anne
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sage “Thanks Bomber Harris,” as well as the sign of the feminist activist group
Femen, painted on the upper part of her body (Heiser 2014). In Dresden, neo-
nazi groups have regularly used February 13, the day on which in 1945 Allied
aircrafts heavily bombarded the city, to try to recast Germans as the victims in
World War II. Thanking Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris, the head of the British air
force bombing command, who advocated aerial bombings as a strategy, sets the
radical counterpoint to the extreme-right’s reframing efforts.29 This led to a con-
tentious debate in the party about how far left the parties should be positioned.
Different state leadership took different positions in the debate, some support-
ing Helm, some criticizing her (Heiser 2014). In March, the three members of
the federal leadership associated with a more center-left, socially liberal profile
resigned from the leadership team (Reinbold 2014). When a new leadership
was elected at a special party convention in June no one from the old leadership
team, associated with a (far) left position was reelected and the new leadership
solidly represented the socially liberal wing of the party (Spiegel Online 2014).
This result prompted the founding of the “Progressive Platform,” an organi-
zation of those on the (far) left formally independent of the party (Beikler &
Christmann 2014), many of whom subsequently left the Pirates.30 This phase
was dominated by coverage of a split party and fighting (inter alia) about its
ideological position on the left/right dimension, while the party’s core, internet
issues receded into the background (e.g. Denkler (2014)). The Pirates won 1.4%
in the May 2014 European election, barely .2% more than the Animal Protection
Helm’s position on the list would have required the Pirates to gain about 5% of the vote, for her
to be elected as an MEP.
29Helm wore a head scarf during the protest, but later confirmed that she was the person in
the pictures (Beier 2014).
30Several prominent former members of the party, including Anne Helm, announced in early
2016 that they would from now on support The Left, Germany’s most left-wing party repre-
sented in the national parliament (Delius 2016, taz 2016). Helm was elected to the state parlia-
ment of Berlin for The Left in September of 2016 (Spiegel Online 2016).
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Party, and in 2017 lost their representation in all four state parliaments they had
entered earlier in the decade.
In sum, both the Swedish and German Pirate parties managed to carve out
an electoral niche based on their issue profile during their breakout elections.
However, they struggled to keep their issues salient and to remain seen as com-
petent electoral owners of these issues (cf. Meguid (2008) on the importance of
salience and issue ownership for niche parties). In both countries the parties
embarked on processes to broaden their platforms, partially driven by external
pressure to develop positions on policy issues beyond the parties’ core issues.31
But instead of linking the new positions clearly back to the issue core of Pi-
rate parties, the parties diluted their appeals by highlighting seemingly uncon-
nected issues like, e.g. LGBT rights in Sweden or asylum policies in Germany.
In Germany in particular this created a profile that made the party harder to
distinguish from the other three parties of the left. Thus, the Pirates did not
give voters a clear reason to vote for them instead of other, more established
parties, which were also often more likely to represent these broader (new) left
concerns in a government role. In neither country could the parties rely on the
movement to connect them back to their issue core, because only limited links
existed between the two actors. In Sweden, the Pirates’ position was further-
more complicated after 2010 by the absence of a mobilized movement raising
the digital agenda and thus the party was left to defend its electoral issue-space
on its own.
31One member of a state party leadership in Germany, for instance, indicated that media
description of the Pirates a “one-issue party” drove the desire to formulate policies on other
issues (interview 010104).
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Conclusion
This chapter has identified four mechanisms by which movement platform par-
ties remain aligned with the policies and frames of the movements that gave rise
to them, even in the absence of organizational connections. Movements keep
voters informed, especially during electoral campaigns, about parties’ perfor-
mance on the movement’s core issues and thus set strong incentives for move-
ment platform parties to (continue to) focus on these issues. Another source of
programmatic alignment is a grassroots linkage in which movement activists
who are also party members bring ideas and policies into the platform writing
processes of these parties. Finally, party elites play a large role in aligning their
parties with the movement by seeking movement organizations’ advice, inde-
pendently working to remain close to movement positions, and interacting with
movement elites through think tanks and political foundations. Through these
mechanisms movement platform parties gain an ally in keeping their core issue
salient and increase the likelihood of remaining the legitimate owner of their
issue in voters’, and particular, in their core electorates’ minds. The movement
profits from a party that pushes for its policies in the electoral and legislative
arena. Moreover, since all mechanisms allow SMOs to act in genuinely non-
partisan ways, they do not damage the organizations’ ability to influence other
political parties or to attract supporters from across the political spectrum.
Figure 6.2 illuminates the relative frequency with which relevant intervie-
wees highlighted the mechanism in question, separated by party and movement
actors.32 Since the grassroots linkage and independent elite orientation are al-
32Percentages of interviews provide a sense of how many interview partners highlighted the
mechanism and do not represent observations that are representative of an underlying popula-
tion.
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most exclusively observable to party actors, only percentages for party actors
are provided for those mechanisms. Moreover, because SMOs’ reports about
the performance of parties represent the central basis for informing voters dur-
ing electoral campaigns, they stand in as a proxy for electoral pressure more
generally here. Note that the two Pirate parties, as discussed above, did not
establish foundations and the prominence of the respective linkage on the party
side would jump from about 15% to about 35% percent, if only interviewees
from parties with existing foundations were considered.
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Figure 6.2: Mechanisms as Highlighted by % of Interviewees
Taking this data and the descriptions of these activities by movement organi-
zation and party leaders into account, table 6.2 presents an overview of the rel-
ative prominence of the four mechanisms. The findings suggest that the impor-
tance of the mechanisms varies by the age of the movement platform party. The
grassroots linkage is more common among younger movement platform par-
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ties. These parties, (the Pirate parties, as well as early Green parties (Kitschelt
& Hellemans 1990)) are likely to have a larger subset of party members who are
also active in movement contexts than their more institutionalized counterparts.
By contrast, they are less likely to have established think tanks or foundations
that organize significant exchanges with movement elites. While think tanks
and foundations play a larger role for the established Green parties and are
present with medium frequency, they were consistently assigned a less central
role than direct elite contacts in the interviews conducted for this project. The
direct (and indirect) elite orientation efforts are highly common independent
of party age. Finally, electoral pressure plays a similarly consistent role across
the developmental stages of party development, but is inherently limited to the
months before an election.
Table 6.2: Frequency of Programmatic Alignment Mechanisms
Mechanism Green Parties Pirate Parties
Electoral Pressure medium medium
Grassroots Linkage increasingly rare medium
Orientation common common
Foundations medium rare
Identifying the mechanisms underlined that neither the movements nor the
movement platform parties are unitary actors. Thus, these mechanism do not
connect parties and movements, but rather actors within them. Thus, for in-
stance, groups with preferences close to the movement might reference move-
ment advice to strengthen their position in intra-party conflicts. Movements,
too, are composed of activists and organizations with different agendas and
preferences regarding strategies. Some of the SMOs work directly with gov-
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ernmental and party actors, while other remain more focused on contentious,
outsider strategies. While the former are during some phases hard to distin-
guish from more conventional interest groups,33 the movement writ-large will
still have the opportunity to draw on more contentious tactics.34
The case study of the two Pirate parties highlighted that parties with roots
in contemporary movements face a dilemma with respect to their issue profile
for which no obvious solution exists.35 They achieved their breakthrough by
articulating a new set of issues as a niche party (cf. Meguid (2005) on niche par-
ties and Hug (2001) on new parties). After this breakthrough they were faced
with two options. On the one hand, if they were to stick to their issue pro-
file they could be destined to remain a minor party and their electoral niche is
potentially so small that it would not allow for long-term survival. This inabil-
ity to maintain the electoral space necessary for survival becomes more likely
when parties do not successfully connect to movements, because, as this chap-
ter has highlighted and the literature on niche parties and issue ownership has
so far overlooked, social movements are central actors in raising the salience of
issues and assigning issue ownership. If, on the other hand, the party would
try to broaden its programmatic profile, it would risk losing core voters and di-
minishing the salience of its central issues in electoral competition. This was a
viable way to electoral success (though not the preservation of original frames
and goals (Przeworski & Sprague 1986, pp. 50-52)) for the Social Democrats, but
in today’s party systems this strategy is less achievable due a significant number
33This is also partially the result of interest groups moving to “movement behavior,” as social
movements moved into “the realm of conventional politics” (Meyer & Tarrow 1998a, p. 4) and
thus tactical repertoires that were considered particularly contentious and limited to movement
actors became increasingly acceptable for interest groups.
34Movement organizations in general, and those in the four movement studied here in par-
ticular, are also likely to have fewer financial resources than many interest groups.
35Contributing to a situation in which European party systems have, at least at their cores,
remained frozen (Lipset & Rokkan 1967).
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of mainstream parties already covering broad issue profiles.
In sum, movement platform parties have developed a number of mech-
anisms that keep them programmatically aligned with the movements from
which they originate. These mechanisms allow the parties to continue to at-
tract their core electorate and ensure electoral success. In the absence of these
mechanisms, as the case of the Pirate Parties demonstrates, movement platform
parties struggle to retain their programmatic focus and electoral appeal.
Up to this point the project has considered the reasons for movement
platform parties’ organizational separation from, but continued programmatic
alignment with movements. This chapter has illuminated the mechanisms driv-
ing the latter in this chapter. The following and final chapter will discuss the
implications of this project, as well as the open questions that remain.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This dissertation began with a look at the diverging evolution of two
Swedish parties with movement roots. As the previous chapters have demon-
strated, differences in incentive structures in distinct historical environments
explain why movement parties in the pre- and post-World War II eras in gen-
eral, and the Swedish Social Democrats and Greens in particular, have pursued
those different paths. Social Democratic leaders loosened their programmatic
(and later organizational) connections to the labor movement in order to appeal
to a broader, multi-class voter base. They were able to accomplish this because
in the absence of (other) catch-all parties during the first half of the 20th cen-
tury, electoral space remained to be captured. Green Party elites, however, had
to grapple with an environment in which limited electoral space narrowed their
popular appeal and empowered the environmental movement, which could re-
alize its preferred outcome of loosening organizational ties but retaining a pro-
grammatic ally in parliament.
Both the Swedish Social Democrats and the Swedish Greens have strug-
gled since taking over government responsibility. Since 2014 they have had
to cope with, among other developments, a refugee crisis that led the govern-
ment to close the borders for asylum seekers, violence from the extreme right
against shelters for asylum seekers, and a terrorist attack. Support for the So-
cial Democrats in the polls has dropped from their 2014 electoral result of 31.1%
into the mid- to high-20s, though following IPSO polls the Social Democrats
never lost their status as the strongest party in Sweden (Ahlin 2017).1 That is,
1Other pollsters have occasionally shown either the center-right Moderaterna or the radical
right Sverigedemokraterna challenging the SAP for that status; see e.g. Gylling (2016).
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they retain their broad appeal beyond the sympathizers of one particular social
movement. For the Swedish Greens government participation has come with an
existential crisis. In an interview a member of Miljo¨partiet’s national leadership
anticipated that a government role might strain relationships with civil soci-
ety organizations (interview 020302), and government participation has led to
a sharp drop in the party’s popularity, leaving it below the 4% hurdle required
for representation in the Swedish parliament in many polls (Duxbury 2017).
The Green Party, as the results of this project would lead us to expect, has
reacted by turning to its core issue of environmental protection and actively
highlighted significant increases in the government’s environmental budget
(Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na 2016). Leading members also indicated a renewed fo-
cus on the environment and climate change before the next elections are held in
2018 (Duxbury 2017). Moreover, after the resignation of one of the party’s co-
leaders, the Greens elected a well-known environmental writer who had only
become active in the party in 2009 to run for the European Parliament as her
replacement. Whether this attempt to return to green issues can stabilize the
party’s trajectory before the 2018 national elections, after other issues like the
refugee crisis dominated the agenda, remains to be seen. As this project has
shown, however, the party is left with few alternative options.
In the following section I will provide a more detailed summary of the dis-
sertation’s findings before focusing on their theoretical and normative impli-
cations in a second section. A third and final section concludes by discussing
limitations of the project and pointing out avenues for future research.
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Summary of Findings
The previous chapters have demonstrated that transitioning to a movement
platform party model is the logical choice for contemporary movement parties.
These parties, including Green, Pirate, and many radical right and regionalist
parties, were tightly connected to a social movement at their inception through
organizational as well programmatic links. Over the first decades of their exis-
tence the organizational links withered away, but to this day the parties retain
a strong programmatic connection to the movement in which they originated.
This development stands in stark contrast to the evolution of Social and Chris-
tian Democratic parties from their movement roots to catch-all parties without
organizational or programmatic connections to social movements. Figure 7.1
below summarizes the relationship of Social Democrats and the labour move-
ment over time, as well as the factors that led to change in that relationship.
Figure 7.1: Party-Movement Linkages: Social Democrats and the Labour
Movement
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Social Democrats and the labour movement started with strong program-
matic and organizational links to each other, i.e. as ideal-typical movement
parties. These parties and movements encountered a political environment in
which enfranchisement created open voter markets leaving many voters up for
grabs. This led Social Democrats, in the first phase of their evolution, to broaden
their platforms and to delink programmatically from the labour movement in
order to appeal to those voters. Trade unions, however, could find few other
party-political allies beyond Social Democrats and thus had no incentives to
loosen their organizational links, despite the parties’ programmatic drift. As a
result Social Democrats adopted a club party model (cf. figure 2.1 in chapter 2)
with strong organizational, but weak programmatic links to the labour move-
ment.
The political environment changed significantly in the latter half of the 20th
century leading to the second phase in Social Democratic parties’ evolution.
The transformation of most parties towards catch-all strategies opened the pos-
sibility for cooperation across the party-political spectrum and saturated voter
markets. The former development allowed unions to engage with parties be-
yond Social Democrats and thus organizational links were increasingly loos-
ened. This loosening was likely also helped along by the friction the lack of a
strong programmatic connection between parties and movements caused. The
saturated voter markets moreover created incentives for Social Democrats to
keep their programmatic linkages to the labour movement loose, as a tightening
would have left many of their voters to be scooped up by other catch-all parties.
The outcome of this process was the creation of the electoral-professional model
that became the new “standard” for political parties across Europe.
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The development of Social Democrats has been well-established in the litera-
ture and has set the expectations for movement party evolution more generally.
As this project has demonstrated, however, Social Democrats’ evolution was
highly contingent on the historical context into which they were born. Figure
7.2 highlights this contingency by summarizing the experience of newer move-
ment parties.
Figure 7.2: Party-Movement Linkages: Post-WWII Movement Parties and
Movements
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Post-WWII movement parties were founded during the time at which So-
cial Democrats went through the second phase of their evolution. That is, in-
stead of the open voter markets, but closed party-society relationships that So-
cial Democrats encountered when they were founded, these newer movement
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parties were confronted with the opposite scenario: closed voter markets and
open party-society linkages. The fact that the catch-all parties, which satu-
rated the electoral markets, were willing to engage with a wide variety of civil
society actors set strong incentives for social movements to regain and retain
their organizational independence. As demonstrated in chapter 4, that inde-
pendence helps SMOs to maximize their support from citizens with different
party-political preferences, as well as their influence on governments of differ-
ent party-political compositions. A deep skepticism about political parties as
a means of achieving policy change and an over-time separation of the elite
sphere due to organizational pressures are additional reasons for the organiza-
tional separation of movements and parties.
In the saturated voter markets in which electoral space was limited to new
dimensions, and, in times of crisis the new movement parties had few resources
to change SMOs’ minds. Instead, as shown in chapter 5, they concentrate on
retaining core electorates that strongly value programmatic linkages on the par-
ties’ core issue. That is, they adopted the movement platform model, in which
these parties continue to provide clear programmatic linkages on their core
issue to retain their voter base even after organizational separation from the
movements. They (have to) do this by highlighting the relevant issues both in
the way they communicate with voters in elections and in the policies they de-
liver when in government.
Movements that spawned parties after the Second World War have been sig-
nificantly empowered by their political environment when compared with their
trade union predecessors. Not only are they the driving force for organizational
separation, but they also play the central role in keeping movement platform
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parties programmatically aligned with the movement, as chapter 6 has demon-
strated. Social movement organizations have developed strategies to observe
any divergence of parties from the movements’ programmatic demands and
publicize them, especially among movement platform parties’ core supporters,
with potentially devastating electoral consequences for those parties. In particu-
lar, SMOs use electoral campaigns to highlight their policy proposals and exert
pressure on movement platform parties. But even beyond campaign season,
SMOs can rely on a shared activist base with parties, party elites’ own efforts
not to diverge from the movement programmatically, and connections through
party-sponsored foundations and think-tanks to place their policies in the plat-
forms of parties with movement roots. In these ways social movements severely
limit parties’ room for maneuver and turn them into movement platform par-
ties.
In sum, many assumptions about the development of movement parties
are grounded in the historically contingent experience of Social Democrats that
empowered these parties vis-a`-vis the labour movement and allowed them to
become mainstream, electoral-professional parties. Newer movement parties,
born into a different political environment after WWII, found themselves con-
fronted with saturated markets and empowered social movement organizations
which forced those parties’ transition into the movement platform party model.
Implications: “Bringing Civil Society Back In”
The findings summarized above have a number of implications for how we
study and conceptualize political parties, questions of political participation
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and representation, and social movements. I will turn to each of these areas
of inquiry in a distinct subsection below.
Political Parties
One of the central take-aways from this project is that we often cannot under-
stand the development of institutionalized politics without considering extra-
institutional politics and civil society actors. That is, we should “bring civil
society back in” (cf. Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol (1985)) when studying in-
stitutionalized politics in general and political parties in particular. As demon-
strated above, because the current literature on political parties underestimates
the power of social movement organizations and parties’ roots in civil society, it
fails to grasp the stability of the movement platform party model.
This project has identified further and more specific ways in which so-
cial movements shape political parties. While existing scholarship has illu-
minated how political parties and their interactions among each other as-
sign and change the perceptions of issue ownership (Walgrave, Lefevere, &
Nuytemans 2009, Meguid 2008), civil society actors have so far been overlooked.
The mechanisms of programmatic influence highlighted in chapter 6 show that
SMOs are central actors in assigning issue ownership to political parties. Fu-
ture research should further illuminate the roles NGOs and movement mobi-
lization play in changing citizens’ perceptions of issue ownership. Considering
that movements and NGOs enjoy much higher levels of trust in many countries
than political parties (cf. also chapter 4), a reasonable initial expectation would
be that their influence is stronger than that of political parties.
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Connected to the importance of cues provided by SMOs to the electorate,
work on niche parties should begin to systematically distinguish between those
niche parties that exist in mobilized movement environments and those that
have no noteworthy representatives of their niche issue in civil society. The for-
mer type of niche party should be expected to have a much smaller room for
maneuver in terms of broadening their programmatic appeals than the latter,
because SMOs can credibly threaten their issue-ownership if they do not re-
main focused on their core issue. Among other things, this implies that even in
the face of disappointing electoral results, niche parties surrounded by a social
movement should not be expected to transform into a different party model (cf.
Meyer & Wagner (2013)).
Similar to findings about niche parties (Adams et al. 2006), this study also
demonstrated that movement platform parties do not have the mobility Down-
sian median voter models assume and that they cannot abandon their specific
programmatic electoral space without potentially high electoral costs. Accord-
ingly the office- or vote-seeking strategies assumed by many models in the
Downsian tradition are not appropriate for analyzing these parties, which will
increase their electoral success through policy-seeking behavior. Short of being
able to make their issue the central issue of electoral competition and supplant-
ing the economic left/right dimension, this also implies that there is a relatively
low electoral ceiling for movement platform parties. These parties’ best chances
of increasing the importance of their core issues might again lie with a success-
ful social movement transforming societal perceptions of the central political
challenges.
This project also has further clarified the dilemma inherent in the movement
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party model and why it has been so far, independent of historical circumstances,
a highly unstable party model (cf. Kitschelt (2006b, p. 288)). While the results
presented above demonstrate that, contrary to assumptions in the literature,
leaving the movement party model does not automatically imply a transforma-
tion towards an electoral-professional model, even in the saturated European
party systems of the second of half the 20th century, retaining the movement
party model was not a viable strategy. Notably the organizational links have
consistently been the dimension on which the connection could not be kept.
Movement parties with origins before the Second World War faced incentives to
broaden programmatically that made the organizational link to the movement
not retainable in the long-term. For contemporary movement parties the orga-
nizational links with the movements became unsustainable in the short-term,
because social movement organizations have a strong interest in party-political
neutrality. For the foreseeable future it is hard to imagine that civil society could
give rise to a social movement whose policy demands are only accepted by one
political party.2 As the experience of the digital movement shows, even move-
ments that represent what many at first glance took to be exotic demands and
at the same time have the potential to upend political competition by introduc-
ing a new “knowledge-based cleavage” (Demker 2014, p. 203), found access to
(mainstream) political parties beyond the Pirate parties they had spawned over
the course of just a few years (e.g. interview 010201).3 Moreover, some of the
anti-austerity parties in the European South, like Syriza, might be tempted to
follow the example of older Social Democratic parties and leave the movement
2Even in the European countries in which partisan competition centers around only two
parties, i.e. France and the United Kingdom, movements have usually been able to engage both
main parties. The situation in the United States, where some SMOs endorse candidates, and
polarization closes access to one or the other political party, however, seems to be different and
warrants further research.
3In countries in which a cordon sanitaire against radical right movements still holds, these
movements might be the exception.
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behind. In the aftermath of the European debt crisis, which weakened the tra-
ditional center-left and created an unusually volatile electorate, these parties
have the ability to compete on economic issues, which allows them a path to the
mainstream, electoral-professional party model (see below for a more detailed
discussion of the recent developments regarding party-movement relationships
in Southern Europe).
While there are few reasons to assume that movement-spawned parties will
find a way to maintain the original movement party model, some electoral-
professional parties have recently made efforts to move back into the direction
of the movement party ideal type by strengthening and reestablishing links
with civil society. Most notably, the British Labour party under the leader-
ship of Jeremey Corbyn has sought a close relationship to trade unions in gen-
eral and Unite, the largest union in the U.K., in particular (Grice 2017). More-
over, Corbyn’s leadership is also strongly supported in intra-party conflicts by
Momentum, a grass-roots organization set up in the wake of his leadership
campaign that aims to officially affiliate with the Labour Party in the future
(Cowburn 2017). These links with organized civil society serve to strengthen
one wing of the party in internal conflicts and to re-energize the “party-in-the-
electorate” (Key 1964) with organizational resources and programmatic preci-
sion.
In an effort to engage voters more broadly, other electoral-professional par-
ties have created the preconditions for significant influence from civil society, in-
cluding social movements, on their programmatic stances by granting possibil-
ities of participation to non-party members (Scarrow 2015). The Italian center-
left Democratic Party, for instance, opened its candidate selection for the prime
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ministership to non-party members (Corbetta & Vignati 2013). While this deci-
sion is different from directly establishing ties with civil society organizations,
it potentially allows SMOs (and interest groups) to mobilize their supporters in
favor of one or the other candidate in intra-party elections. The circumstances
under which mainstream parties turn to reestablishing these links with orga-
nized and unorganized cvil society and their effects deserve further scrutiny.
In terms of methodological implications, this study has highlighted that for
correct inferences it is important to interrogate the motivation of party (and
movement) elites directly. A current strain of the literature based on the analysis
of party manifesto data, expert surveys, and party documents concludes that in-
ternally more democratic parties will have narrower and more party supporter-
focused than median voter-focused platforms (Lehrer 2012, van Heck forth-
coming). That is, parties with movement roots and more activist participation
are expected to have more movement-aligned platforms. These studies explic-
itly build on the assumption that party elites pursue vote- and office-seeking
strategies (e.g. van Heck (forthcoming, p. 1)). The results presented in chap-
ter 6, however, demonstrate that some of the programmatic alignment between
movement platform parties and movements is the result of party elites’ inde-
pendent efforts. This calls into question the assumptions of the previously sum-
marized studies for movement platform parties and suggests that party elites
play an important role in ensuring their parties’ alignment with supporters’
views. However, without elite interviews (or other means of understanding
elite behavior, like a party leader survey) and a careful tracing of the connec-
tion between movements and elections following McAdam and Tarrow’s call
(McAdam & Tarrow 2010), the narrow definition of the office-seeking assump-
tion would have gone unchallenged.
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Political Participation and Representation
With respect to political participation and behavior, this project has demon-
strated that it is critical to recognize the existence of different types of voters,
rather than simply formulate theories based on aggregate or median tendencies.
Voters content with the types of vague and broad issue linkages of catch-all par-
ties co-exist with those interested in more specific linkages on narrower issues,
like the environment or societal changes in response to information and commu-
nication technology. Whether movement platform parties’ appeal is exclusively
due to competing on different issues (or issue dimensions) than mainstream
parties or whether the movement-enforced precision of their policy positions,
and thus the breaking with the vagueness of the catch-all model, is appealing in
and of itself is worth further investigation.
The findings of this project also contribute to our understanding of contem-
porary shifts in patterns of participation. Even in times of decreasing party
membership and direct engagement with political parties, movement platform
parties remain strongly tied to civil society and citizens retain enormous influ-
ence through their increased level of issue-focused activism (cf., Dalton (2008)).
This development, moreover has strong normative implications for the nature
of representation in advanced industrial democracies. Movement platform par-
ties, together with the movement that spawned them, but without cooperat-
ing directly, manage to (re)integrate politically active citizens in contemporary
democracies and give them a “party-political home.” Accordingly, politically
engaged citizens have a variety of mutually reinforcing options for participat-
ing at their disposal, which can to some degree counteract the development of
mainstream parties towards catch-all or cartel party models. Movements and
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movement platform parties together are a strong force for policy change and
since they increasingly exist as separate organizational spheres with distinct cir-
cles of potential supporters and donors there is little conflict over resources,
making this a mutually beneficial arrangement (see Ramiro & Morales (2014)
for further evidence that movements and parties do not compete for the same
pool of potential activists).
This efficacy for policy change and opening of possibilities for participation
is, however, limited to the issue concerns around which movements have mobi-
lized. Basic economic concerns about increasing inequality have, until the anti-
austerity movements of the early 2010s, played only a peripheral role in these
movements and the parties they spawned. This development will reinforce the
already significant gap in political activism between different societal groups
and increasingly exclude citizens who do not belong to the elite or do not have
a social movement to act on their behalf. Thus, with movement platform parties
not focused on economic issues and Social Democrats facing strong incentives
to be programmatically vague and to act as insider parties, representing those
in secure jobs, rather than those in insecure employment or outside the job mar-
ket (Rueda 2005), the economically most vulnerable citizens are left behind. To
what extent small parties left of Social Democracy and the new anti-austerity
parties in the European South can counteract this development is an open ques-
tion.
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Social Movements
Mirroring the conclusions with respect to political parties, this study has also
shown that investigating social movements’ connections to institutionalized
politics is a fruitful endeavor. Sociology, more than political science and in
particular over the last decade, has developed a research program on these
questions (Amenta et al. 2010), but political parties have played only a small
role in that program.4 This project sheds additional light on movement strate-
gies. The mechanisms identified in chapter 3 constitute a successful approach by
which movements can interact with party political actors without trading their
access for policy compromises, avoiding “co-optation” (Gamson 1990). Thus,
beyond movements’ influence on party politics, the findings in this project with
respect to SMOs shaping party platforms also enhance our knowledge about
the circumstances under which movements are influential (cf. Burstein & Lin-
ton (2002)) by illuminating one of the avenues through which SMOs can achieve
policy success, especially when a movement platform party is in government.
In this project the focus was on the impact of social movements on political
parties and I demonstrated that a mix of tactics with different levels of con-
tention, ranging from protest to lobbying, was effective at influencing the pol-
icy demands of movement platform parties. But it seems likely that engaging
in this tactical mix, as well as with political parties, also changed social move-
ment organizations. While, as mentioned above, they have not been co-opted,
the role contacts with political parties play in incentivizing different forms of
institutionalization and tactical behavior, and potentially a separation of labor
between different SMOs, deserves further attention. Moreover, the potential in-
4Notable exceptions are McAdam & Tarrow (2013) and McAdam & Kloos (2014).
240
teractive influences between parties and movements in terms of ideology and
policy demands promise to be an important avenue for future research. As
chapter 3 highlighted, the Swedish environmental movement and Green party,
for example, have co-evolved to see economic growth as compatible with envi-
ronmental protection. Is this the result of external factors pushing both actors
in the same direction or do their interactions play a role in that ideological evo-
lution?
This project has also mainly centered on social movement organizations and
elites rather than grassroots activists. Yet, especially in increasingly contentious
times, the political participation of citizens and how and when they switch be-
tween or combine activism in the institutional and extra-institutional arenas
are extremely important. This dissertation has provided additional knowledge
about the institutional environment these activists will encounter, but research
on the micro-level, like the project currently conducted under the direction of
Bert Klandermans (2016) aiming to compare citizen engagement in movement
and party politics on the activist level, will provide important insights.
In terms of movement tactics, existing research has investigated the rela-
tionship between protest and the success of programmatically aligned par-
ties. With respect to the (radical) right, studies have shown an inverse re-
lationship in which more protest is associated with less electoral success
(Hutter 2014, Minkenberg 2003, Koopmans 1996), while on the left the relation-
ship is reinforcing (Hutter 2014). The results of this study highlight that move-
ment activity that affects party success is not limited to protest. Moreover, these
activities are not only geared to affect the success of programmatically-aligned
parties, but also to keep those parties aligned in terms of policy. Accordingly fu-
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ture work should investigate the entire tactical repertoire of social movements
(cf. Taylor & Van Dyke (2007)) in terms of influencing parties, as well as protests’
effects on setting the programmatic agenda of (movement platform) parties.
Limitations of Findings and Open Questions
After discussing the implications of the dissertation’s findings, this final sec-
tion will highlight the limitations of these findings, as well as the questions
that could not be addressed with the collected data and the questions that have
arisen based on the results presented here. I will first discuss the two movement
platform families not analyzed with detailed case studies (regionalists and the
radical right), before turning to the recent anti-austerity movements in Southern
Europe, and party-movement interactions beyond the European context. A final
subsection will highlight open questions not tied to specific parties, movements,
or geographical contexts.
Regionalist and Radical Right Parties and Movements
This project studied four parties that co-existed with organizationally separated
movements mobilizing on the same core issue. That is, these parties closely
comply to the movement platform party ideal type. As highlighted in chap-
ter 3, regionalist parties display more variation regarding their organizational
relationship to independence movements, with some parties having consistent
informal relationships with the movements around them and other regionalist
parties, beyond the scope of this study, having no movement to speak of with
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which to interact. This raises questions about small parties with and without
mobilized movement environments. Are regionalist parties with movements
around them more likely to survive and electorally thrive because SMOs help
them to keep their issues on the agenda and connect with core voters? Or does
the increased programmatic flexibility that comes with an absence of movement
pressure make up for the absence of programmatic allies in civil society?
The radical right provides additional instructive examples of the complexity
of organizational connections between movements and parties. As described
in chapter 3, across-country variation in whether nationalist subcultures pro-
vide organizational support for these parties exists (cf. Art (2011)). Addition-
ally, strong disruptive anti-immigrant movements and protests have occurred,
in particular during and after the recent refugee crisis in Europe. Some of these
movements have docked onto and/or invigorated radical right parties. The
PEGIDA movement in Germany, for instance, has built ties to the Alternative
for Germany party (Wieland 2016). Thus, on the radical right we observe a
similar variance in the existence of organizational ties to movements as in re-
gionalist parties. These ties are, however, additionally complicated by the often
highly contentious demands as well as tactics, including violence, that radical
right activists employ (regarding the recent waves of attacks on asylum seekers
in Germany, see e.g. Ja¨ckle & Ko¨nig (2017)). This sets high incentives to demon-
strate organizational separation for movement-spawned parties in order to re-
alize positive radical flank effects. Whether these parties, however, informally
continue to build ties to radical activists and their organizations is accordingly
harder to observe and a research program, akin to the detailed sociological stud-
ies of the roles different actors play in U.S. racist movements (e.g. Blee (2002)),
would help our understanding of these dynamics.
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In sum, the empirically existing variation in organizational ties between
movements and the parties they spawned, in particular on the radical right,
deserve further attention.
Anti-Austerity and Anti-Establishment Movement Parties in
Southern Europe: the Dimensionality of Movement Party Com-
petition
This project has focused on those programmatic parties that arose from move-
ments until 2010. Recently, in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis in Eu-
rope, social movements have given rise to new parties, like Podemos in Spain,
and reinvigorated others, like Syriza in Greece (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou 2013),
that compete for a mainstream party position. Note that this is not an ex-
clusively Southern European phenomenon, as the Icelandic Pirate Party has
bucked the trend of the declining fortunes that affected the other parties in that
party family. Despite performing below some early expectations (Dickie 2016),
the Icelandic Pirates established themselves as the third party in the country
with 14.5% of the vote in the 2016 national elections (Henley 2016). Some of
these parties, like Podemos (cf. Go´mez-Reino & Llamazares (2015) and chapter
2), have already loosened their organizational connections to movements and
thus adopted a movement platform party model. Future research should illumi-
nate how specifically these parties in countries particularly affected by the Eu-
ropean debt crisis have drawn on the resulting electoral volatility (Herna´ndez
& Kriesi 2016) and broken through the electoral limits of the movement plat-
form party model, allowing them a path to mainstream party status. Early re-
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search has highlighted the importance of shared frames between parties and
movements as well as organizational innovation stemming from the move-
ments (della Porta et al. 2017).
The parties in Southern Europe, moreover, have achieved their success by
engaging voters on the economic left/right dimension, which raises implica-
tions and questions regarding how the dimensionality of political competition
interacts with openings for movement-spawned parties. First, the crisis in-
creased electoral volatility and made (former) mainstream party voters avail-
able to other parties. The inability of older movement platform parties, like
the Greens, to accomplish an electoral breakthrough in that situation suggests
that, even in times of high electoral volatility, movement platform parties re-
main locked into their issue niche (due to SMO pressure).
Second, and relatedly, what are the implications of being locked into an issue
dimension by social movements for mobility on other dimensions of compe-
tition? Can regionalist movement platform parties, for instance, change their
position on the economic left/right dimension without punishment by their
electorate? The Scottish National Party’s evolution from a liberal-centrist to a
center-left position on economic matters (Lynch 2006), which provided the pre-
conditions for their electoral breakthrough and their ability to replace Labour
as the central party in Scotland, provides some initial evidence for flexibility
on secondary dimensions for these parties. But more research about whether
SMOs and movement platform parties’ core electorates develop priorities on
non-primary dimensions and whether this differs across party families is re-
quired. That is, what are the opportunities for issue bundling that could allow
movement platform parties to attract new voters without alienating their core
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electorate?
Third, what is the role of social movements in reinvigorating the importance
of old issue dimension, like economic inequality, or in establishing new dimen-
sions of political competition? Making new issues relevant in the “frozen” party
systems of Western Europe (Lipset & Rokkan 1967) is a daunting task and it
seems implausible that, for instance, small Green parties on their own achieved
this feat. Thus, it seems plausible that movements, drawing on protest and
activism, are important first-movers in establishing new political cleavages and
changing the nature of partisan competition. How these movements affect voter
priorities and party positions, however, remains under-explored. Research in
this vein could help to answer questions like which strategies and organiza-
tional forms successfully place new issue dimensions in the political space and
what the role of societal counter-mobilization is in filling both poles of a new
dimension (as occurred when the radical right mobilized after the New Social
Movements had spawned Green parties). Regarding the movements studied in
this project, work on the part civil society activism plays in establishing new
issue dimensions would contribute to explaining why the Pirates and digital
movements, despite the potential for new cleavages centering on their core con-
cerns (Demker 2014), have fallen short in establishing that dimension in their
respective societies and party systems.
Fourth, the anti-austerity movements bring the often more loosely connected
and less institutionalized organizational forms, usually associated with New So-
cial Movements and issues of the New Left, to activism focused on the economy
and economic inequality. How this departure from the institutionalized, union-
based activism of the Old Left shapes the parties spawned by these movements
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and their development is an important and open question. Now that these par-
ties compete on economic issues where many (moderate) voters are potentially
available, are they bound to repeat the Social Democrats’ evolution to catch-all
parties? Or are contemporary and differently organized SMOs more powerful
and better equipped than their union predecessors when it comes to holding for-
mer movement parties programmatically accountable? Moreover, what are the
implications of the new forms of movement activity for the party models that
movement-spawned parties can adopt? Which forms of organizational connec-
tions between movements and parties are possible considering looser and new
electronic forms of organization on the movement side?
Party-Movement Interactions Beyond the European Context
Parties with movement roots have not only played a central part in the polit-
ical history of Europe in the 20th century and more recently after the Euro-
pean debt crisis, but shaped the fortunes of many other continents and coun-
tries. This includes the developments of the Arab Spring and, for instance,
the Muslim Brotherhood’s (short-lived) rise to power in its aftermath (Milton-
Edwards 2016), (left-wing) ethnic movements’ rise in Latin American countries
and sweeping to power in Bolivia (Madrid 2012), and the role of the Tea Party
movement in shaping U.S. party politics (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin 2011).
Comparing the results of this project with insights about party-movement
interactions in other regions highlights several implications and initial hypothe-
ses for future research. In Latin America a number of movement-spawned
parties seem to have followed the evolutionary trajectory of European Social
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Democrats. Since its inception in 1980, the Brazilian Workers’ Party, for instance,
has first adopted a catch-all strategy that led it to success in four consecutive
presidential elections, and later also loosened organizational connections to the
union movement (Hunter 2010, Keck 1992). Similarly, Madrid (2012) has shown
that successful parties from the more recent wave of ethnic movement parties
achieved their electoral success by drawing on inclusive, catch-all appeals that
bridged ethnic identities.
But the continent also retains parties whose movement origins more power-
fully shape their present, and here clear differences with the European move-
ment platform parties emerge. Research on the Bolivian MAS shows that the
party, which originated in the indigenous and peasant union movements of
the country, continues to draw on the movements for candidate selection and
builds intensively integrated coalitions with its partners in civil society (Anria
& Cyr forthcoming, Anria 2016). This stands in clear contrast to the organiza-
tional separation, in particular of elite spheres, between European movements
and movement platform parties. Moreover, the three models that order party-
movement relationships on the Latin American Left (Roberts 1998), discussed in
chapter 2, do not travel to the contemporary European context. European move-
ment platform parties neither dominate the movements nor organically blur
their distinction with them. While they, as in Roberts’ electoralist model, respect
movement autonomy, contrary to that model movement platform parties’ lack
of organizational connections to the movement is not “in part because their po-
litical project is less contingent on the support of collective actors” (Roberts 1998,
p. 75). On the contrary, it is the result of powerful SMO preferences for that
separation, as these parties remain highly dependent on core voters and SMO
behavior for their electoral success.
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The European developments also strongly contrast with party-movement
relationships in the United States. In that context, Schlozman (2015) has dis-
covered that New Social Movements were not able to anchor political parties
for significant time periods, either because they eschewed alliances with parties
in the first place, like the environmental movement, or because they failed to
bring about more fundamental change, like the anti-(Vietnam) war movement
(Schlozman 2015, pp. 39, 11). In contrast, the results presented above show that
in Europe the same NSMs were successful in locking the parties they spawned
into policy platforms over several decades. Moreover, U.S. parties tend to be
focal points in loose organizational networks of ideologically-aligned organiza-
tions (Koger, Masket, & Noel 2009) in a way that movement platform parties,
due to their organizational separation from civil society actors, are not.
Taken together these differences with U.S. and Latin American movement
party developments point to a fruitful research agenda that investigates how en-
vironmental and institutional factors determine the nature of party-movement
relationships and their organizational connections. Looking only at the U.S., an
obvious initial hypothesis is to suggest that First-Past-The-Post electoral rules
and the related two-party system lead movements to work through (main-
stream) parties and result in lower barriers regarding organizational connec-
tions than proportional representation and multi-party systems in Europe. Yet,
at least for presidential elections and half of the lower chamber, Bolivia also em-
ploys a majoritarian electoral system, but has a prominent movement-spawned
party that retains programmatic, as well as organizational connections to the
movement. Accordingly, much remains to be learned about environmental and
institutional factors shaping the nature of party-movement relationships.
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Open Questions
There are a number of broader questions that have been raised by this study
or, for reasons of feasibility, had to remain beyond the scope of it. The first
question pertains to the life cycles of social movements and the role institution-
alization plays in shaping party-movement relationships: how does the evo-
lution of many movements from contentious mobilization to established SMOs
influence the level of success they have in shaping parties and government poli-
cies? While this study has focused on parties in national contexts with at least
partially institutionalized movements, it might not be necessary for movement
activity to take these forms in order to, for instance, influence perceptions of
issue ownership and party platforms. As discussed above, some radical right
parties, for example, are surrounded by movement activities that take less in-
stitutionalized and more violent forms. These contentious activities are by their
nature newsworthy and keep the related issues on the agenda and could help
programmatically-associated parties bring their core issues to the forefront dur-
ing electoral campaigns. Especially in the presence of digital echo chambers in
which sympathizers can hear activists’ messages, these movements might also
be able to assign the status of a credible issue owner to a political party.
A second set of questions is particularly relevant given populism’s recent
rise across the world (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012b). Several movement platform
parties, including many in the radical right party family, as well as the new
anti-establishment parties in Southern Europe, have combined their program-
matic commitments with populist appeals and elements of charismatic leader-
ship (see for instance Arter (2016) for the case of the radical right True Finns
party). Some parties, like the 5 Star Movement in Italy, have gone so far in their
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populist appeals as to make it hard to place these parties on traditional dimen-
sions of political competition (Tronconi 2016). An investigation of how these
parties combine populism, which claims to act on behalf of a “true people,” and
thus is a specific version of stressing civil society roots, with programmatic ap-
peals promises worthwhile insights. Specific questions include how the ability
to draw on populist appeals changes over the lifetime of these parties (Green
parties, for instance, seem to have largely ceased the use of populist appeals,
while the radical right retains them) and what kinds of programmatic appeals
are compatible with populist strategies.
A third set of questions centers on the order of party-movement association.
This project has focused on cases in which pre-existing movements spawned
political parties. But it also highlighted that the German Pirates, for instance,
experienced another movement from the far-left “docking” onto their party.
Other examples of movement links occurring post-party foundation exist. Also
in Germany, the Alternative for Germany party built connections to far-right
movements, after originally having been founded by elite actors critical of Euro-
pean bailouts. In Great Britain, the Green Party’s predecessor party, the People
(later renamed Ecology) party, was founded comparatively early in 1973 and
did not originate from the environmental movement (Ru¨dig 1990, p. 327),5 but
later found itself surrounded by a mobilized environmental movement. This
raises question about differences between parties originating from a movement
core and those that established connections to a movement later. Moreover, re-
garding the German Pirates, this study has also illustrated how an activist influx
from a (in this case far-left) movement that does not share a movement platform
party’s issue focus can have destabilizing effects. But much about how move-
5Though see Dalton (1994, p. 220) regarding the role of Friends of the Earth in setting up the
Green Party in Britain.
251
ments “dock onto” existing parties, the consequences, and the conditions under
which they are successful in “capturing” that party remains to be learned.
A fourth set of questions on which much room for research remains is how
the role and influence of movement actors might differ depending on external
factors. For instance, do external shocks that place a movement platform party’s
core issue high on the agenda and create support for it beyond its core electorate
lessen the influence of SMOs on the party, since the party is less dependent on
the movement’s implicit endorsements? The case of the Greens in the German
state of Baden-Wu¨rtemberg provides some illustrative support for that hypoth-
esis. The party managed to replace the Social Democrats as the state’s second
party in the the 2011 state elections, which took place less than three weeks after
the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Subsequently the Greens have also been able to
build on that success and even capture the most votes in the 2016 state election,
cementing their mainstream party position. Thus, the factors external to party
and movement behavior that lessen (or strengthen) movement influence and
accordingly increase (or further limit) party elites’ room for maneuver deserve
further attention.
Beyond questions centering on social movements and the parties they
spawn, many questions remain to be answered regarding the relationship of
mainstream parties to social movements. For instance, under which conditions
are mainstream parties receptive to movement demands? Can mainstream par-
ties use their interactions with social movements to foreclose the space for a
movement party?
Finally, two contemporary and related developments and their effects on
party-movement relationships have so far received little attention. Technologi-
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cal change and connected processes of denationalization (Castells 2012, Castells
2010) have allowed new forms of transnational activism and the Pirate parties,
as discussed in chapter 3, have also formed strong transnational connections
among each other. The role of this transnational activism in spawning and dif-
fusing a political program and party model beyond national borders is so far
under-explored. Moreover, does this electronic and transnational network im-
ply new flexibility that allows activists to oscillate between party and movement
forms and place their efforts in the countries and arenas in which the opportu-
nity structure is particularly open to them?
Even in the absence of a transnational dimension, internet-driven activism
regarding the founding and running of parties has already had significant im-
pacts. Not only the largely electorally failed Pirate parties, but also the Italian
5 Star Movement, now the country’s second largest party, originated in internet
activism (Turner 2013). Questions about what factors determine a successful
transition from web-based activism to the electoral arena thus remain to be an-
swered.
In sum, this study demonstrates the importance of party-movement interac-
tions for determining, among other outcomes, political competition, party mod-
els, and the quality of representation. Illuminating the role of participation in
civil society in general, and social movements in particular, in shaping political
parties promises to hold many insights about how and how well our political
systems perform, especially in uncertain and contentious times.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX: FIELDWORK DATA
This section summarizes the data collected during fieldwork in Germany
and Sweden from 2013-2104, including interview data, material collected dur-
ing participant observation, and a survey of Swedish Green party members.
Interview Data
For this project I conducted 74 semi-structured interviews with party elites in
the Pirate and Green parties in Germany and Sweden, as well as with elites
in the digital and environmental movements in those two countries. The in-
terviews took place between December 2013 and June 2014. Table A.1 below
provides an overview of how these interviews were distributed between the
two countries and four party-movement dyads, as well as the rates at which
interview requests led to an interview.
With respect to social movements, I identified all environmental and digi-
tal movement organizations active at the national level relying on secondary
literature on these movements, as well as media coverage and snowball sam-
pling. I then sent an interview request by mail or email asking the organization
for an interview with the person most familiar with the organization’s interac-
tions with political parties. Within political parties I aimed at identifying per-
sons who were experts on their party’s interactions with movements because of
their position within the party. I identified those persons who were in charge of
running national campaigns, during which movements might seek to influence
parties and the movements’ mobilization resources become especially valuable.
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Furthermore, I contacted party elites influential in terms of platform formula-
tion, i.e. with direct influence on the parties’ policies, and finally politicians who
were potentially part of a personal network connecting movement and party
because they came into the party with a movement background. I also asked re-
spondents for further contacts they considered particularly knowledgable about
party-movement interactions and followed up on those suggestions. In case I
did not receive a reply to my interview request I followed up (often several
times) via phone or email.
Table A.1: Interviews: Overview and Response Rates
Country Party/Movement Response
Rate in %
Number of
Interviews
Total number of
Interviews
(Response Rate)
Germany
Pirate Party 75.0 15
47 (56.6)
Digital Movement 61.1 11
Green Party 29.6 8
Environmental Movement 72.2 13
Sweden
Pirate Party 70.0 7
27 (56.3)
Digital Movement 63.6 7
Green Party 52.9 9
Environmental Movement 25.0 4
The interviews were guided by 10 prepared questions starting with a general
question on movement-party interactions and then focusing on the same three
arenas of potential interactions that guided the case selection (campaigns, plat-
form formulation, elite overlap and networks; see below for the complete ques-
tionnaire). While the questionnaire standardized the interviews to some degree,
their semi-structured nature allowed me to follow up and inquire about aspects
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of party-movement interactions not foreseen when constructing the question-
naire.
Interviews were conducted in German and English and lasted about 38 min-
utes on average, with the shortest interview being 13 and the longest about 92
minutes long. A full list of interviews can be found in table A.2 below. Partic-
ipants were assured that they would remain anonymous, but agreed that the
interviews and quotes from them could be attributed to the respondents as rep-
resentatives of their organizations (on the movement side) or a general descrip-
tion of their role within the party.
Table A.2: Conducted Interviews
Code Date Interview Partner Mode
010101 12/17/13 Member of a State Parliament, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010102 12/17/13 Former Member Federal Leadership, Piraten-
partei
face-to-face
010103 12/18/13 Member of a State Parliament, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010104 01/04/14 Member of a State Leadership, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010105 01/04/14 Member Federal Leadership, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010106 01/04/14 Member of a State Leadership, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010107 01/04/14 Member of a State Parliament, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010108 01/04/14 Topic Representative, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010109 01/04/14 Member of a Town Council, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010110 01/15/14 Issue Working Group, Piratenpartei Skype
010111 01/22/14 Member of a State Parliament, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010112 02/11/14 Topic Representative, Piratenpartei face-to-face
010113 02/27/14 Member of a State Parliament, Piratenpartei phone
010114 02/27/14 Former Member Federal Leadership, Piraten-
partei
phone
010115 03/17/14 Member of a State Parliament, Piratenpartei phone
010201 12/17/13 Wikimedia Deutschland e.V. face-to-face
010202 12/19/13 Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung
(Working Group on Data Retention)
face-to-face
010203 01/03/14 Arbeitskreis gegen Internetsperren und Zen-
sur (Working Group against Internet Blocks
and Censorship)
face-to-face
010204 01/10/14 Arbeitskreis gegen Internetsperren und Zen-
sur (Working Group against Internet Blocks
and Censorship)
phone
010205 01/21/14 Free Software Foundation Europe face-to-face
010206 01/23/14 Humanistische Union (Humanist Union) face-to-face
010207 01/27/14 Digitale Gesellschaft (Digital Society) face-to-face
010208 02/03/14 Digitalcourage face-to-face
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010209 02/12/14 Open Knowledge Foundation Deutschland face-to-face
010210 02/13/14 Netzpolitik.org face-to-face
010211 02/24/14 Deutsche Vereinigung fu¨r Datenschutz (Ger-
man Association for the Protection of Data
Privacy)
face-to-face
010301 01/23/14 Federal Working Group, Bu¨ndnis 90/Die
Gru¨nen
face-to-face
010302 01/24/14 Stiftung Gru¨nes Geda¨chtnis (Green Memory
Archive)
face-to-face
010303 01/30/14 Former Member Federal Leadership,
Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen
face-to-face
010304 02/08/14 Member of Parliament, Bu¨ndnis 90/Die
Gru¨nen
face-to-face
010305 02/12/14 Staffer, Federal Level, Bu¨ndnis 90/Die
Gru¨nen
face-to-face
010306 02/13/14 Staffer, Federal Level, Bu¨ndnis 90/Die
Gru¨nen
face-to-face
010307 02/25/14 Former Member of Parliament, Bu¨ndnis
90/Die Gru¨nen
phone
010308 03/04/14 Former Member of Parliament, Bu¨ndnis
90/Die Gru¨nen
face-to-face
010401 12/18/13 Deutscher Naturschutzring (German League
for Nature, Animal Protection and Environ-
ment)
face-to-face
010402 01/08/14 Local Anti-Nuclear Group face-to-face
010403 01/13/14 O¨ko-Institut (Institute for Applied Ecology) face-to-face
010404 01/21/14 Gu¨ne Liga (Green League) face-to-face
010405 01/22/14 Bundesverband Bu¨rgerinitiativen
Umweltschutz e.V. (Federal Alliance of
Citizens’ Initiatives for Environmental
Protection)
phone
010406 01/23/14 Naturschutzbund Deutschland (Nature And
Biodiversity Conservation Union)
face-to-face
010407 01/27/14 Deutsche Umwelthilfe (German Environ-
ment Aid Association)
face-to-face
010408 01/28/14 Forum O¨kologisch-Soziale Marktwirtschaft
(Green Budget Germany)
face-to-face
010409 01/29/14 Schutzgemeinschaft Deutscher Wald (Protec-
tion of German Forests)
phone
010410 02/11/14 Bund fu¨r Umwelt und Naturschutz (Friends
of the Earth Germany)
face-to-face
010411 02/12/14 Greenpeace face-to-face
010412 02/17/14 .ausgestrahlt (-together against nuclear en-
ergy)
face-to-face
010413 02/20/14 campact face-to-face
020101 04/04/14 Member of Party Board, Piratpartiet face-to-face
020102 04/15/14 Member Party Leadership, Piratpartiet face-to-face
020103 04/16/14 Ung Pirat (Youth Organization of Piratpar-
tiet)
face-to-face
020104 05/03/14 Member of European Parliament, Piratpartiet face-to-face
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020105 05/05/14 Member of the Board, Piratpartiet Skype
020106 05/29/14 Former Member of Valberedningen (Nomi-
nating Committee), Piratpartiet
face-to-face
020107 06/23/14 Former Member National Leadership, Pirat-
partiet
face-to-face
020201 04/16/14 Fo¨reningen fo¨r Digitala Fri- och Ra¨ttigheter
(Society for Digital Freedoms and Rights)
face-to-face
020202 04/17/14 Open Knowledge Foundation Sweden face-to-face
020203 04/22/14 Online Activist face-to-face
020204 04/24/14 Transparency International Sweden face-to-face
020205 04/28/14 Online Activist face-to-face
020206 05/05/14 Online Activist face-to-face
020207 06/11/14 Wikimedia Sverige face-to-face
020301 04/23/14 Member of a County Parliament, Miljo¨partiet face-to-face
020302 04/28/14 Member National Leadership, Miljo¨partiet face-to-face
020303 04/30/14 Member of Parliament, Miljo¨partiet face-to-face
020304 05/06/14 Member of Party Platform Commission,
Miljo¨partiet
face-to-face
020305 05/07/14 Member of Parliament, Miljo¨partiet face-to-face
020306 05/14/14 Cogito, Green Think Tank face-to-face
020307 05/22/14 Former Party Leader, Miljo¨partiet face-to-face
020308 05/23/14 Former Party Leader, Miljo¨partiet face-to-face
020309 06/10/14 Member of Parliament, Miljo¨partiet face-to-face
020401 05/06/14 Naturskyddsfo¨reningen (Swedish Society for
Nature Conservation)
face-to-face
020402 05/08/14 Co-founder of KRAV face-to-face
020403 06/13/14 Ekologiska Lantbrukarna (Organic Farmers’
Association)
phone
020404 06/26/14 Va¨rldsnaturfonden WWF face-to-face
The codes consist of three sets of two digits of which the first identifies the
country (01=Germany; 02=Sweden), the second indicates the party or move-
ment (01=Pirate Party, 02=Digital Movement, 03=Green Party, 04=Environmen-
tal Movement), and the third is a running count of interviews among that subset
of actors.
All interviews were recorded and then transcribed. I used the software pro-
gram Atlas.ti to code and analyze the interviews. I employed a combination of
compatible coding methods (specifically structural, hypothesis, and causation
coding), usually described as eclectic coding (Salda˜na 2013, pp. 188ff.). Struc-
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tural codes identify the passages in interviews that deal with theoretically rele-
vant concepts, while hypothesis codes are derived from the theory and its hy-
potheses, coding the presence (or absence) of theoretical expected outcomes, be-
havior etc. (Salda˜na 2013, pp. 84, 148). Causation codes code statements about
causal beliefs of the respondents (Salda˜na 2013, p. 163) and in this context an-
alyze the causal beliefs of respondents regarding why their own organization
or party, or others they were cooperating with, behave in one way or another.
While some codes, including those based on hypotheses, were developed de-
ductively I also remained attentive to unexpected observations and processes
and coded these inductively.
Other Qualitative Data
For this project I spent 12 months (August 2013-July 2014) in Germany and
Sweden to collect data on the Green and Pirate parties, as well as environ-
mental and digital movements in those countries. Besides the interviews dis-
cussed above and the Green Party member survey in Sweden (see below), I
collected a wide variety of documents on the activities of and interactions be-
tween these parties and movements. These documents range from movement
organization publications to email newsletters of parties and NGOs and inform
the observations and descriptions in this dissertation. Furthermore, I attended
about 72 hours of party and movement organization events. Specifically, I ob-
served four party conventions: two federal party conventions of the German
Pirate Party in Bremen (11/30/2013-12/01/2013) and Bochum (01/04/2014-
01/05/2014), one federal party convention of the German Green Party in Dres-
den (02/08/2014-02/09/2014), and one national-level party convention of the
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Swedish Green Party in Gothenburg (04/30/2014). During the party conven-
tions I observed debates, political speeches, events around the party conven-
tions, collected materials, and had informal chats with delegates and other vis-
itors. At two party conventions (at the German Pirate’s convention in Bochum
and German Green’s convention in Dresden) I also conducted formal interviews
(see table A.2 above).
Beyond the party conventions I also attended Almedalensveckan in Visby
(07/01/2014-07/04/2014). Almedalensveckan is a yearly, week-long event at
which NGOs and political parties converge in Visby on the Swedish island of
Gotland. Every party represented in the Swedish national parliament hosts one
day of events during the week, which culminate in the party leader’s speech at
the end of the day. Besides the parties, many NGOs and movement organiza-
tions also hold their own events during that week. At Almedalen I attended a
variety of events including lectures and panel discussions hosted by environ-
mental movement organizations, as well as several events of the Green Party
and A˚sa Romson’s (one of Miljo¨partiet’s two co-leaders at the time) speech. Fur-
thermore I had informal conversations with party and movement activists.
Swedish Green Party Member Survey
The survey was fielded through the Swedish Green Party via their national ac-
tivist email list. The first email about the survey was sent on 06/23/2014 and
the survey was open for two month, with the last response being completed
on 08/07/2014. Over the course of that time the party sent two reminders
regarding the survey. The Green Parties email list requires members to sign
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up so that the email was sent to only 1570 of the about 14000 party members
(Svenska Dagbladet 2014b). The survey resulted in 198 responses (a response
rate of 12.6%) of which 146 are complete sets of responses to all questions on the
survey (9.3%).
The survey started with questions on respondents’ membership in
Miljo¨partiet and continued with items regarding potential movement activism.
After these two blocs the questionnaire posed a number of questions regarding
potential interactions between the respondents’ party and movement activism
(e.g. whether movement activism has led the respondent to become active in
the party or vice versa), before a final block of questions on political ideology
and socio-demographics concluded the survey. For the questionnaire, see ap-
pendix C below. Many questions in the survey, in particular with respect to
party activities, were adapted from the first wave of the European Green Parties
Membership Survey (European Green Parties Membership Survey 2017).
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX: ELITE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
1. In which contexts do you cooperate with (political parties/movement or-
ganizations)?
2. Thinking back to the last electoral campaign, what were the (political par-
ties/movement organizations) that you were in regular contact with?
(a) Which of these (organizations/parties) would you say you cooper-
ated most closely with during that campaign?
(b) How did you cooperate with these (parties/organizations)?
3. Beyond the last electoral campaign, are there any routinized interactions
(e.g. regular meetings) with (parties/organizations)?
(a) Which (parties/organizations) and of what kind are these interac-
tions?
For party leaders only:
4. Which external groups are especially influential in shaping the agenda set-
ting for topics covered at party conventions?
(a) How do these groups communicate their preferences to the party?
5. Which groups within the party take an especially active role in shaping
the party’s platform?
6. Where do you recruit candidates for political office?
7. What are the career options for your party members beyond the party
itself?
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8. When you would like to know how activists in the (name of the move-
ment, e.g., environmental movement) feel about an issue, whom do you
contact?
For movement organization leaders only:
9. Are there political parties you lobby especially hard regarding their policy
platform and priorities?
10. How would you organize your lobbying efforts? What would you do?
11. How do you hire new employees for your organization? To which kinds
of persons do you reach out?
12. Did you have any former employees of your organization who ran for
office for a political party or went on to be employed by one?
(a) For/By which?
13. When you would like to acquire information about a specific proposal that
is in the legislative process, whom do you contact?
For both party and movement organization leaders:
14. What were major debates you had with (parties/organizations) that you
cooperate closely with?
15. Can you think of someone else either in (your party/movement) or in (so-
cial movement organizations/the Green Party/the Pirate Party) I should
be talking to regarding my research interests?
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX: PARTY MEMBER SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
1. In which year did you first join Miljo¨partiet de gro¨na?
Open-ended responses
2. A number of reasons why people might join Miljo¨partiet are listed below.
Thinking back to your first decision to join, please indicate how important a
role each reason played for you personally.
• I wanted to meet likeminded people
• I wanted to become politically active
• I wanted to help in the realisation of political aims that I support
• I wanted to influence the selection of candidates for political office
• I wanted to pursue a career in Miljo¨partiet
• I wanted to support the party financially
• I expected that party membership would be advantageous for my career
• I wanted to learn more about Miljo¨partiet
• I wanted to express my support for the political aims of Miljo¨partiet
0=Not at all important to 4=very important
3. How do your experiences as a member so far relate to your initial expecta-
tions?
0=not at all lived up to my expectations to 3=fully lived up to my expectations
4. Political parties can pursue different goals which occasionally may be in con-
flict with each other. Please order the four goals below in the order in which
Miljo¨partiet should pursue them, with 1 being the highest priority and 4 the
lowest.
• Maximse electoral support
• Promote its program and policies
• Gain governmental office
• Create a truly democratic political party
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5. How much time do you devote to party activities in an average month?
Open-ended responses
6. Do you currently hold any office within the party (for example local party
spokesperson) or any public office representing the party (for example local
councillor)?
Yes/No
6a. At which level are you holding an office? PLEASE TICK ALL BOXES THAT
APPLY
Two columns, one for party and one for public office:
• Local level
• Regional level
• National level
• European/international level
7. Have you taken part in any of the following political activities during the last
four years? If yes, how often?
• Worked in voluntary organisations and associations
• Voted in elections
• Boycotted certain products
• Participated in public demonstrations
0=not at all to 3=frequently
8. Before your current membership in Miljpartiet, were you a member of an-
other party (parties)?
Yes/No
8a. Which party/parties were you a member of?
• Socialdemokraterna
• Moderaterna
• Folkpartiet
• Centerpartiet
• Sverigedemokraterna
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• Kristdemokraterna
• Va¨nsterpartiet
• Piratpartiet
• Feministiskt initiativ
• Other
8b. How often did you participate in organising party activities in that political
party (parties)?
from 1=never to 4=often
9. Below is a list of various social movements. Have you ever been active in any
of them (for example taken part in demonstrations, organised meetings etc.)? If
yes, please indicate in which decades you have been active.
Columns for “never active” and each decade starting with the 1960s
• Student Movement
• Environmental Movement
• Animal-Rights movement
• Anti-nuclear Movement
• Peace Movement
• Feminist Movement
• HBTQ Movement
• Trade Union Movement
• Third-World Movement
• Globalization Movement
• Civil Rights Movement
• Anti-fascist Movement
• Other Movement
9a. Please name the other movement(s) that you have been active in.
Open-ended responses
10. A number of reasons why people might become active in a social movement
are listed below. Thinking back to your first decision to become active, please
indicate how important a role each reason played.
266
• I wanted to meet likeminded people
• I wanted to become politically active
• I wanted to help in the realisation of political aims that I support
• I wanted to pursue a career in the movement/non-governmental organi-
sation sector
• I wanted to support the movement financially
• I wanted to learn more about the movement
• I wanted to express my support for the political aims of the movement
0=not at all important to 4=very important
11. How often did you participate in organising social movement activities (for
example demonstrations or meetings)?
from 1=never to 4=often
12. Have you ever used the internet for political activism (for example for com-
municating with other activists, organising a protest or signing a petition)?
Yes/No
12a. Below you will find a list of political issues. Please tell us whether you have
ever used the internet for political activism regarding these issues. PLEASE
TICK AS MANY BOXES AS APPLY
• Environment
• Animal rights
• Nuclear Power
• Peace
• Women’s rights
• HBTQ rights
• Employees’ rights
• Globalisation
• Civil rights
• Direct democracy
• Transparency
• Other
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12b. Please name the other issue(s) for which you used the internet as a tool for
political activism.
Open-ended responses
13. Have you ever used one of the following tools to communicate with other
activists? PLEASE TICK AS MANY BOXES AS APPLY
• email
• microblogging sites (for example twitter)
• social networks (for example Facebook, Google +)
• IRC client/chat
• blogs
• other
14. Have you ever been a member of (or regularly supported) any of the follow-
ing organizations?
• Naturskyddsfo¨reningen
• Fa¨ltbiologerna
• Greenpeace
• WWF
• Jordens va¨nner
• Sveriges ornitologiska fo¨rening
• Folkkampanjen mot ka¨rnkraft
• Ekologiska Lantbrukarna
• other national environmental organisation
• other local environmental organisation
15. Below you will find a list of sources of information. Please tell us how often
you make use of these sources to get political information.
• Radio
• TV
• Newspapers
• Websites of newspapers or news agencies
• Blogs
268
• Miljo¨partiet (newsletters etc.)
• Non-governmental organisations (newsletters etc.)
from 0=never to 3=often
16. Would you say you spend more time being active in Miljo¨partiet or more
time being active in a social movement or non-governmental organisation
(NGO) just mentioned?
1=More time for Miljo¨partiet, 2=More time for the movements and NGOs,
3=About equal time for both
17. Did your activity in a social movement or an NGO lead to your decision
to join Miljo¨partiet (for example by being invited to join by a fellow movement
activist)?
Yes/No
17a. Please describe shortly in the box below how your movement or NGO
activity led to becoming a member of Miljo¨partiet.
Open-ended answers
18. Did your membership in Miljo¨partiet lead to your decision to become active
in a movement or one of the NGOs mentioned above (for example by being
encouraged to by a fellow party member)?
Yes/No
18a. Please describe shortly in the box below how your membership in
Miljo¨partiet led to becoming active in a social movement or NGO.
Open-ended answers
19. Has your activity in a social movement or NGO ever directly influenced
your work within Miljo¨partiet (for example by introducing a party convention
motion based on movement demands)?
Yes/No
19a. Please describe shortly in the box below how your social movement or
NGO activity has influenced your work within Miljo¨partiet.
Open-ended answers
20. Has your membership in Miljo¨partiet ever directly influenced your work
within a social movement or NGO?
Yes/No
20a. Please describe shortly in the box below how your membership in
Miljo¨partiet has influenced your work within a social movement or NGO.
Open-ended answers
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21. Did you ever perceive the goals or strategies of the movements or NGOs
you are active in to be in conflict with those of Miljo¨partiet?
Yes/No
21a. In those cases of conflict do you tend to side with the movements’/NGOs’
view or the party’s view?
1=The movements’/NGOs’ view, 2=The party’s view, 3=With both about
equally
21b. Do you in those cases try to actively sway the party’s position towards
that of the movements/NGOs (for example by trying to convince fellow party
members or by offering amendments to the party platform during party confer-
ences)?
Yes/No
21c. Do you in those cases try to actively sway the movements’/NGOs’ po-
sition towards that of Miljo¨partiet (for example by trying to convince fellow
movement activists of the party’s position)?
Yes/No
21d. When you agree with the movements’/NGOs’ views, do you actively try to
sway the party’s position towards that of the movements/NGOs (for example
by trying to convince fellow party members or by offering amendments to the
party platform during party conferences)?
Yes/No
21e. And what about when you agree with the party’s view. Do you in those
cases try to actively sway the movements’/NGOs’ position towards that of
Miljo¨partiet (for example by trying to convince fellow movement activists of
the party’s position)?
Yes/No
22. Were the conflicts between Miljo¨partiet and the movements/NGOs you are
active in usually about strategies or political goals?
1=Strategies, 2=Political goals, 3=About equally about strategies and political
goals, 4=Can’t say
23. Looking at the list below, please tick a box next to the one thing you think
should be the country’s highest priority, the most important thing it should do.
And which one do you think should be the country’s next highest priority, the
second most important thing it should do? PLEASE TICK ONE BOX IN EACH
COLUMN
Two columns; one for highest and one for second highest priority
• Maintain the order in the nation
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• Give people more say in government decisions
• Fight rising prices
• Protect freedom of speech
• Can’t choose
24. On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in
Sweden? And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX IN EACH COLUMN
Two columns; one for Sweden, one for the European Union
from 0=not at all satisfied to 3=very satisfied
25. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? People
like me can have a real influence on politics if they are prepared to get involved
from 0=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree
26. What is your gender?
Male/Female/Other
27. In which year were you born?
Open-ended responses
28. Are you currently in full-time education?
Yes/No
28a. How old were you when you stopped full-time education?
Open-ended responses
29. What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?
• I have no degree
• Grundkskola
• Gymnasium
• Ho¨gskola, grundniva˚
• Ho¨gskola, avancerad niva˚
• Annan eftergymnasial utbildning
30. Are you currently employed?
Yes/No
30a. Which of the following items best describes the work you did in your last
job?/Which of the following items best describes the work you do?
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• Professional or highly technical work (for example doctor, accountant,
schoolteacher, university lecturer, social worker, systems analyst)
• Manager or Senior Administrator (for example company director, finance
manager, personnel manager, senior sales manager, senior local govern-
ment officer)
• Clerical work (for example clerk, secretary)
• Sales or Services (for example commercial traveller, shop assistant, nurs-
ery nurse, care assistant, paramedic)
• Small Business Owner (for example shop owner, small builder, farmer,
restaurant owner)
• Foreman or Supervisor of Other Workers (for example building site fore-
man, supervisor of cleaning workers)
• Skilled Manual Work (for example plumber, electrician, fitter, train driver,
cook, hairdresser)
• Semi-skilled or Unskilled Manual Work (for example machine operator,
assembler, postman, waitress, cleaner, laborer, driver, bar-worker, call-
centre worker),
• Other type of work (please specify)
• Never had a job
31. Which sector of the economy did you work in during your last job?/Which
sector of the economy do you work in?
• Agriculture, Fishing, Hunting, Forestry
• Industry (for example Manufacturing, Mining, Construction, Utilities)
• Education
• Health, Social Services,
• Media (Newspaper, Radio, TV), Culture (Film, Theatre)
• Security Services (for example Police, Armed Forces, etc.)
• Other Public Administration (for example Local Authority, Civil Service)
• Banking, Finance, Insurance, Property
• NGOs, Parties
• Information Technology (IT)
• Other Services (for example retail trade, transport, catering, leisure, clean-
ing, etc.)
• Other (please specify)
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32. Do you consider yourself as belonging to a particular religion?
Yes/No
32a. Which religion do you consider yourself to be belonging to?
• Roman-catholic church
• Svenska kyrkan
• Other Protestant Church
• Other Christian
• Jewish
• Buddhist
• Hindu
• Muslim
• Other
33. In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. On a scale from 0 repre-
senting the extreme left and 10 representing the extreme right, were would you
place yourself?
Shifting scale from 0=extreme left to 10=extreme right
34. In politics people sometimes talk of libertarian and authoritarian orienta-
tions. Libertarian orientations are characterized by preferences for alternative
politics (for example direct democracy), environmental protection, and liberal
social policies such as same-sex marriage. Authoritarian orientations are char-
acterized by preferences for traditional values, the defense of the national com-
munity and opposition regarding immigration. On a scale from 0 represent-
ing the most libertarian and 10 representing the most authoritarian orientation,
were would you place yourself?
Shifting scale from 0=most libertarian to 10=most authoritarian
35. Please tell us which category below describes your household’s total
monthly income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you
don’t know the exact figure, please give an estimate.
• 0 - 14.999 kr
• 15.000 - 21.999 kr
• 22.000 - 28.999 kr
• 29.000 - 39.999 kr
• 40.000 or more
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APPENDIX E
APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Conceptual Differences Between Movement Platform and Niche
Parties
Figure E.1: Conceptual Differences Between Movement Platform and
Niche Parties
  Niche Party 
  Yes No 
Movement 
Platform  
Party 
Yes 
Regionalist Parties, Pirate 
Parties, Green Parties,  
Radical Right Parties  
Anti-austerity Parties (e.g., 
Podemos) 
No 
Communist Parties, 
Regionalist Parties without 
mobilized movements 
Contemporary Mainstream 
Parties 	
Additional Analyses of Movement Activity by Party Preference
The data is from the first wave of the European Social Survey (NSD - Norwegian
Centre for Research Data, Norway - Data Archive and distributor of ESS data
for ESS ERIC 2002). Party preference was measured by polling whether citizens
felt closer to one party “than all other parties,” and which one. Participants
and volunteers were identified using the question “For each of the voluntary
organisations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of
these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, if so, which.” The
organizations were described as “an organisation for environmental protection,
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peace or animal rights,” and the relevant activities here were “Participated,”
and “Voluntary Work,” respectively. Design weights were applied.
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Figure E.2: Activist Participation in Environmental NGOs by Party Prefer-
ence; Green parties highlighted; Source: ESS
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Figure E.3: Volunters of Environmental NGOs by Party Preference; Green
parties highlighted; Source: ESS
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Additional Micro-level Analyses
The main independent variable in the indvidual-level models in chapter 5 is
based on responses to an item polling the most important problem facing a re-
spondent’s country. The item was open-ended and responses were coded into
issue groups. Tables E.1, E.2, and E.3 summarize the issue groups that constitute
the different issue concerns (concerns regarding the environment, immigration,
regionalism, economy, welfare policy, democracy and good governance, law &
order policies, foreign policy, and the European Union).
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Table E.4: Descriptive Statistics: Issue Concerns
Greens Radical Right Regionalists
Programmatic Concerns
Economy
no 6693 6769 3692
yes 14163 13484 8531
Welfare Policy
no 15399 15962 9933
yes 5457 4291 2290
Democracy/Governance
no 18896 18710 1110
yes 1960 1543 1113
Law & Order
no 18791 18319 10830
yes 2065 1934 1393
Foreign Policy
no 19712 19071 11598
yes 1144 1182 625
EU
no 19947 19375 11862
yes 909 878 361
Number of Countries 12 10 6
Number of Movement Platform Parties 15 16 22
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Additional Macro-level Analyses
Definition of primary domestic energy supply: “Total primary energy domes-
tic supply (sometimes referred to as energy use) is calculated by the Interna-
tional Energy Agency as production of fuels + inputs from other sources + im-
ports - exports - international marine bunkers + stock changes. It includes coal,
crude oil, natural gas liquids, refinery feedstocks, additives, petroleum prod-
ucts, gases, combustible renewables and waste, electricity and heat. Domestic
supply differs from final consumption in that it does not take account of distri-
bution losses. The supply and use of energy commodities are converted to Kg.
oil equivalent using standard coefficients for each energy source.” (OECD 2005)
Table E.5: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Government Participa-
tion, Substantive Gains, and Economic Growth on Electoral Suc-
cess of Green Parties (without Danish and Norwegian “Green-
Socialist” Parties)
Independent Variable Coefficient
(standard error)
Government Participation -.23* (.10)
Substantive Gain Scale -.11 (.12)
Government Participation*Substantive Gain Scale .13* (.05)
Economic Growth .04 (.07)
Economic Growth *Government Participation -.002 (.04)
Lagged electoral success .69* (.10)
Intercept 2.20* (.58)
R2 .52
Mean Squared Error 1.93
Number of Observations 85
*p <.05 (two-tailed test); standard errors are robust-cluster standard errors
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Table E.6: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Government Partici-
pation, Substantive Gains, Economic Growth, and the Electoral
Threshold on Electoral Success of Green Parties
Independent Variable Coefficient
(standard error)
Government Participation -.24* (.10)
Substantive Gain Scale -.01 (.11)
Government Participation*Substantive Gain Scale .12* (.06)
Economic Growth -.01 (.08)
Economic Growth *Government Participation -.01 (.04)
Electoral Threshold -.04 (.04)
Lagged electoral success .66* (.08)
Intercept 2.82* (.70)
R2 .55
Mean Squared Error 2.17
Number of Observations 107
*p <.05 (two-tailed test); standard errors are robust-cluster standard errors
The effective thresholds are taken from the Political Data Handbook (Lane,
McKay, & Newton 1997) and represent “estimates of the midpoint between no
representation and full representation. Falling below the effective threshold en-
tails being substantially underrepresented, but not necessarily unrepresented”
(Lane, McKay, & Newton 1997, p. 117). They range from 1.0 (Netherlands) to
35.0 (United Kingdom).
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